may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Bonnie Marie Giemza, petitioner,
Ronald Donald Giemza,
Winona County District Court
File No. F096000827
James R. Forsythe, Streater & Murphy, 64 East Fourth Street, P.O. Box 310, Winona, MN 55987-0310 (for appellant)
Howard K. Kruger, 301 West Broadway, Winona, MN 55987 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Davies, Presiding Judge, Harten, Judge, and Schultz, Judge.[*]
Appellant-husband claims that the district court should not have amended the parties' stipulated dissolution judgment to allow respondent-wife additional time to purchase his interest in certain land. We affirm.
The part of the judgment in dispute was based on the parties' stipulation. The district court stated that when it approved the stipulation, it was not aware that there would be a three-day delay in wife's ability to secure the funds she needed to pay husband. Further, at the October 27 hearing, the district court stated:
[Counsel] picked the 30 days which, of course, I could have changed if I thought it was going to be of any problem whatsoever. I never dreamed that this thing would come popping back because you couldn't make it in 30 days. I would have, if that would have been up to me, I would have extended a little time knowing that this is how things work in this world.
(Emphasis added). A district court may "refuse to accept the terms of [a] stipulation in part or in toto." Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Minn. 1989). Thus, here, the district court (a) had authority to accept or alter the parties' stipulation; (b) stated it would have altered the 30-day period if it thought that period was going to be a problem; and (c) was, when it approved the stipulation, unaware of the three-day delay which caused the 30-day period to be a problem. As a result, the district court's post-judgment extension of the 30-day period is, essentially, its doing what it would have done originally if it had fully understood the circumstances. Husband has not shown such a ruling to be an abuse of the district court's discretion.
We reject any argument that Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 does not apply here.
See Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 522 n.3 (Minn. 1997) (noting linguistic and functional similarities between Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 and Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02); Artz v. Artz, 361 N.W.2d 135, 136 (Minn. App. 1985) (stating rule 60.02 was not intended "to correct judicial error" or to allow district court to correct error it "feels" it made). In the cases typified by Artz, an appeal of the allegedly mistaken ruling was available. Here, however, because the parties asked the district court to adopt the stipulation, neither party could have been aggrieved when the district court did what the parties asked it to do. Therefore, neither party could have appealed. See Twin Cities Metro. Pub. Transit Area v. Holter, 311 Minn. 423, 425, 249 N.W.2d 458, 460 (1977) ("[a] party who is not aggrieved by a judgment may not appeal from it").
[*] Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. Art. VI, § 10.