This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).




In the Matter of the Welfare of:

M.L.H., Child.

Filed May 12, 1998


Willis, Judge

Isanti County District Court

File No. J39650481

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Charlann Winking, Assistant State Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue SE, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant M.L.H.)

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 and Jeffrey R. Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Kimberley K. Sobieck, Certified Student Attorney, 555 18th Avenue S.W., Cambridge, MN 55008 (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge, Willis, Judge, and Mulally, Judge.

*Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.



Appellant M.L.H. challenges her adjudication as delinquent for aiding and abetting receiving stolen property. We affirm.


The parties stipulated to the following facts: On the evening of August 1, 1997, M.L.H. was driving her car in Cambridge, Minnesota, with two juvenile male friends, B.G.B. and R.D.W., as passengers. At approximately 11:00 p.m., she dropped the boys off at a convenience store. She did not know what they intended to do, but it was agreed that the three of them would meet later at the Cambridge city park.

M.L.H. left and later returned to the convenience store but was unable to find either B.G.B. or R.D.W. As M.L.H. left the area, she saw the boys riding on a golf cart, which they told her they planned to drive to the park.

M.L.H. later met the boys at R.D.W.'s house, and drove them, along with two other juveniles, to the park where B.G.B. and R.D.W. had left the golf cart. M.L.H. and J.R.H., a third juvenile male, got on the golf cart with R.D.W., who drove it down a street toward a party in another part of the park. A police officer stopped the golf cart carrying M.L.H. and her two companions as they were on their way to the party. M.L.H. did not at any time drive the golf cart, but she knew or had reason to know that it was stolen.

M.L.H. was charged with one count of receiving stolen property and one count of aiding and abetting receiving stolen property, pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 609.53, subd. 1, and 609.05, subd. 1. The district court adjudicated M.L.H. delinquent for aiding and abetting receiving stolen property, dismissed the "other counts," and placed her on indefinite probation. She appeals the adjudication.



M.L.H. contends the evidence was insufficient to support the adjudication of delinquency for aiding and abetting receiving stolen property. In an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record and any inferences drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the charge was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Dale v. State, 535 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn. 1995); see also In re Welfare of L.B., 404 N.W.2d 341, 345 (Minn. App. 1987) (applying same standard to juvenile cases).

"A person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime." Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (1996). M.L.H. argues that she did not aid B.G.B. and R.D.W. in receiving stolen property because she was not present when the boys stole the golf cart and she did not drive the golf cart but rather was merely a passenger. This argument is irrelevant; M.L.H. was not adjudicated delinquent for receiving stolen property. She was adjudicated for aiding and abetting receiving stolen property, and to prove that charge the state was not required to show that she was present when the boys stole the golf cart or that she drove the golf cart.

M.L.H. also argues that her mere presence at the scene is insufficient to prove aiding and abetting receiving stolen property, relying on State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 924 (Minn. 1995) (stating that "[m]ere presence at the scene of a crime does not alone prove that a person aided or abetted because inaction, knowledge, or passive acquiescence does not rise to the level of criminal culpability"). But the supreme court has stated that the defendant's presence at the commission of a crime is a consideration in determining whether the defendant aided and abetted because "presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are circumstances from which one's participation in the criminal intent may be inferred." State v. Parker, 282 Minn. 343, 355, 164 N.W.2d 633, 641 (1969). In Parker, the court found the state met its burden of proving an aiding and abetting charge when it showed that (1) the defendant was present during the commission of the crime; (2) the defendant's presence and acts helped make the crime possible; (3) the defendant did nothing to prevent the commission of the crime; (4) the defendant had a close association with the principal before and after the crime; and (5) the defendant fled the scene with the principal when police arrived. Id. at 355-57, 164 N.W.2d at 641.

M.L.H. was not merely present during B.G.B.'s and R.D.W.'s commission of the offense of receiving stolen property. 1 She transported the boys to the park where they had hidden the stolen golf cart, thereby assisting them in reassuming possession of the stolen property. M.L.H. did nothing to prevent the commission of the crime, and it appears from the record that she had a close association with B.G.B. and R.D.W. M.L.H. also contends that she cannot be adjudicated for aiding and abetting receiving stolen property because she did not encourage B.G.B. and R.D.W. to commit a crime. She relies on State v. Ulvinen, 313 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Minn. 1981) (interpreting Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1, to require state to prove that defendant encouraged principal "to take a course of action which he might not otherwise have taken"). In State v. Kessler, this court concluded that Ulvinen requires an "affirmative action" to show intent to aid and abet an "active" crime. 470 N.W.2d 536, 542 (Minn. App. 1991). Assuming, without conceding, that aiding and abetting receiving stolen property is an "active" crime, M.L.H. affirmatively acted when, knowing or having reason to know that the golf cart was stolen property, she drove B.G.B. and R.D.W. to the park so that they could retrieve it.

We hold that the trial court did not err in finding there was sufficient evidence to adjudicate M.L.H. delinquent for aiding and abetting receiving stolen property.


M.L.H. also contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she was guilty of receiving stolen property. But the district court dismissed the charge of receiving stolen property when it adjudicated M.L.H. delinquent. Because M.L.H. is not adversely affected by the dismissal of the charge of receiving stolen property, she does not have standing to appeal the dismissal. See City of St. Paul v. LaClair, 479 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Minn. 1992) (stating that standing is conferred when there is an injury to a legally protected right).