may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Gary Thomas Mader,
Houston County District Court
File No. K996402
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101, and
William V. Von Arx, La Crescent City Attorney, 274 South Kingston, Caledonia, MN 55921 (for respondent)
Ross A. Phelps, 106 South Walnut Street, La Crescent, MN 55947 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Harten, Presiding Judge, Short, Judge, and Amundson, Judge.
On appeal from revocation of probation and execution of a stayed sentence, Gary Thomas Mader argues the revocation order should be reversed and vacated because: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to make adequate findings of fact; and (2) the state failed to prove Mader violated the terms of his probation. We affirm.
Mader argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to make express findings regarding the extent and intent of the alleged probation violations. See Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250 (concluding before revoking probation, trial court must designate specific conditions that were violated, find violation was intentional or inexcusable, and conclude that need for confinement outweighs policies favoring probation). However, a trial court's failure to make express findings is not an abuse of discretion where the record contains sufficient evidence supporting revocation. See id. (concluding trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation by failing to designate which conditions were violated, where there was sufficient evidence to warrant finding appellant intentionally disobeyed his probation officer's instructions); State v. Theel, 532 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Minn. App. 1995) (concluding court did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation by failing to expressly find violations were intentional or that need for confinement outweighed polices favoring probation when there was sufficient evidence of both), review denied (Minn. July 20, 1995). The record demonstrates Mader: (1) failed to keep out-patient treatment appointments; (2) admitted use of alcohol; (3) refused counseling and disagreed with his treatment program; and (4) believed he could control his drinking without "totally abstaining" from alcohol. Given this evidence of intentional behavior, we conclude the trial court's failure to make express findings was not an abuse of discretion.
Mader also argues the state failed to prove he violated the terms of his probation in "a meaningful way." See Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 3(3)(b) (allowing revocation of probation only if violation shown by clear and convincing evidence). We disagree. As a condition of probation, Mader was required to: cooperate with his current alcohol treatment program, comply with care recommendations, and abstain from alcohol or any other illicit substance use, unless prescribed by a licensed physician. There is ample evidence that Mader violated these terms. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Mader's probation. See, e.g., State v. Rock, 380 N.W.2d 211, 213 (Minn. App. 1986) (concluding defendant's unwillingness to work within treatment program provides sufficient grounds for revoking probation), review denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 1986).