may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Gary David Caron,
Filed November 18, 1997
Anoka County District Court
File No. K8967062
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, State Attorney General, Suite 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; and
Robert M.A. Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, M. Katherine Doty, Assistant County Attorney, Anoka County Government Center, Seventh Floor, 2100 Third Avenue, Anoka, MN 55303 (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Susan K. Maki, Assistant Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Crippen, Presiding Judge, Parker, Judge, and Short, Judge.
Appellant challenges a fifth degree controlled substance conviction determined in a court trial on stipulated facts, contending that (a) a critical search warrant contained material misrepresentations and (b) the record fails to show that he made a valid waiver of his right to a jury trial. We affirm.
The police obtained a search warrant for appellant's residence premised on an informant's controlled buy. The officer who applied for the warrant did not disclose in the warrant application (a) that appellant's housemate had told the informant earlier that day that there were "not much drugs left inside the house" and (b) that appellant's housemate drove to Ramsey to pick up the drugs that she sold to the informant.
An omission in the search warrant application renders the warrant invalid only if the omission is material to the determination of probable cause and is deliberately or recklessly withheld by the applicant. State v. Causey, 257 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Minn. 1977). An omission is material only if its inclusion would have destroyed the showing of probable cause for a search. State v. Doyle, 336 N.W.2d 247, 252 (Minn. 1983).
Appellant contends that the officer's omissions are material because of some inference that there were no more drugs at the residence. But that inference is rendered immaterial by evidence and inferences that (a) the housemate did not suggest that drugs were uncommonly kept in the home, and (b) the housemate picked up more drugs on the occasion of the informant's purchase than the .1 gram of cocaine the informant bought. The omission was not material to the finding of probable cause.
Appellant correctly recites that the record should show a personal waiver of a defendant's right to a jury trial. State v. Ulland, 357 N.W.2d 346, 347 (Minn. App. 1984) (stating that the waiver rule is strictly construed and requires a personal waiver by the defendant). The record shows that appellant made a voluntary waiver. Appellant stated that he understood that there would be a court trial as part of his personal agreement for a trial on stipulated facts under State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1980). Moreover, appellant acknowledged not simply the procedure that would follow but the fact that the court would find him guilty. This record shows a valid waiver.