may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of the Welfare of:
A. E., Child.
Filed June 3, 1997
Clay County District Court
File No. J5-96-50596
James F. Lester, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 9673, 921 Second Avenue South, Fargo, ND 58106-9673 (for Appellant)
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, 14th Floor NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Respondent)
Scott G. Collins, Assistant Clay County Attorney, Clay County Courthouse, 807 North 11th Street, Moorhead, MN 56560 (for Respondent)
Considered and decided by Davies, Presiding Judge, Toussaint, Chief Judge, and Harten, Judge.
The district court adjudicated A.E. delinquent for making terroristic threats in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (1996). A.E. asserts on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his delinquency adjudication because the prosecution witnesses lacked credibility. We affirm.
A.E. argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the district court decision that he made terroristic threats in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (1996) because the prosecution witnesses lacked credibility. A.E. cites State v. Kemp, 272 Minn. 447, 450, 138 N.W.2d 610, 612 (1965), for the proposition that this court may reverse a criminal conviction when the evidence to overcome the presumption of innocence is dependent on a single witness whose testimony is of dubious veracity in light of the record as a whole. In Kemp, the court reversed the defendant's conviction and granted a new trial because the testimony of the complaining witness was uncorroborated and the factfinder had not been presented with evidence impeaching the testimony of the complaining witness or evidence corroborating the defendant's alibi. Id. at 449-50, 138 N.W.2d at 611-12.
In the instant case, however, A.E.'s adjudication of delinquency was based not only on the testimony of the complaining witness but also on the testimony of two other witnesses who corroborated that testimony. Furthermore, in an attempt to impeach the prosecution witnesses, A.E. testified that they had reputations for untruthfulness. Despite this evidence, the district court concluded that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses was credible based on "demeanor and manner of testifying." Our standard of review prohibits this court from second-guessing the district court's express credibility determination that the prosecution's witnesses rendered a consistent and credible account of the incident. See State v. Lloyd, 345 N.W.2d 240, 245 (Minn. 1984) (resolution of conflicting testimony is the exclusive function of the factfinder "because it has the opportunity to observe * * * the witnesses"); Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 ("due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witness"). We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the delinquency adjudication.