may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Lester Ray Wiley,
Filed March 11, 1997
Affirmed in part, Reversed in part and Remanded
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 94102049
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for Respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for Appellant)
Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge, Huspeni, Judge, and Schumacher, Judge.
Lester Ray Wiley appeals from an order requiring him to make restitution to 10 individuals, arguing the trial court erred in basing the restitution on dismissed and uncharged arson and burglary crimes. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
Wiley argues he should not be responsible for restitution because the victims' losses were directly caused by arson and burglary crimes for which he was either never charged or the charges were dismissed.
The trial court found that Wiley was the "fence" for the arson and burglary ring. The record reveals Wiley's house and garage were specially modified to facilitate the covert delivery of stolen goods. The record shows that large quantities of the victims' property were found in Wiley's home. Moreover, Wiley was caught trying to sell compact discs known to have been stolen from some of the residences targeted by the arson and burglary ring. Wiley's help in the storage and disposal of the stolen property, therefore, "directly contributed" to the victims' losses. See State v. Jola, 409 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. App. 1987) (affirming restitution for receiving and dismantling stolen truck for separate sale). The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in ordering restitution based on the victims' burglary losses caused by Wiley's crimes.
We cannot agree, however, that Wiley is responsible for restitution for any damage to the victims' homes and possessions that was caused by the arsons. The arson charges against Wiley were dropped for lack of evidence. The trial court acknowledged that the state could not connect Wiley to the arsons by direct evidence. Wiley, therefore, did not "directly cause" those damages. The trial court abused its discretion in ordering restitution based on the victims' property damage caused by the arsons.
The record on appeal is inadequate to determine what amount of each victim's damages was attributable to Wiley's involvement in the burglaries and what amount was caused by the arsons. We remand to the trial court to make this determination.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.