may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Angie Ann Redenius, n/k/a Angie Ann Tesdahl,
Martin County District Court
File No. K29521
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, Paul R. Kempainen, Assistant Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondent)
Terry W. Viesselman, Martin County Attorney, 923 North State Street, Suite 130, Fairmont, MN 56031 (for respondent)
Steven P. Russett, Assistant State Public Defender, 875 Summit Avenue, LEC 304, St. Paul, MN 55105 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Amundson, Presiding Judge, Short, Judge, and Harten, Judge.
A jury convicted Angie Ann Redenius of aiding and advising first-degree burglary in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.582, subd. 1(a) (underlying offense), 609.05, subd. 1 (aiding and advising); aiding and advising third-degree criminal damage to property in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.595, subd. 2(a) (underlying offense), 609.05, subd. 1 (aiding and advising); and driving after revocation in violation of Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2. On appeal, Redenius argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions; and (2) the trial court's erroneous evidentiary ruling requires a new trial. We affirm.
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, our review is limited to whether a jury could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense. State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51, 58 (Minn. 1992). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and assume the jury believed the state's witnesses while disbelieving any contrary evidence. State v. McKenzie, 511 N.W.2d 14, 17 (Minn. 1994). Even if an element of the state's proof rests on circumstantial evidence, we must uphold the verdict so long as reasonable inferences from the evidence are consistent only with the defendant's guilt. State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 923 (Minn. 1995).
Redenius argues the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish that her co-defendant, Daniel Tesdahl, entered a building with intent to commit a crime, or that Redenius intentionally aided or advised Tesdahl to commit burglary and property damage. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.582, subd. 1 (1996) (defining first-degree burglary as entry of building with intent to commit a crime), 609.05, subd. 1 (1996) (creating liability for crime of another if person intentionally aids or advises the other in committing crime); State v. Arrendondo, 531 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Minn. 1995) (holding accomplice liability is established by showing defendant had knowing role in commission of crime and did nothing to thwart its completion). We disagree. The record demonstrates: (1) the victim's house was dark and there were no vehicles in the driveway; (2) Tesdahl proceeded to the victim's front door, rang the door bell, turned the door knob, and pounded on the front door before going to the back door, which was less visible from the road; (3) the victim observed Redenius watching Tesdahl from a parked car in the victim's driveway approximately 50 feet from the house and 200 feet from the main road; (4) Redenius remained parked in the driveway for approximately two minutes, until Tesdahl proceeded to the back door; (5) Tesdahl kicked open the back door; (6) although the parties claim circumstances forced Tesdahl to enter the house to use the telephone, there were other homes nearby that Tesdahl could have visited to obtain help; and (7) Redenius picked Tesdahl up in her car after the break-in. Taken as a whole, the evidence supports the state's case and makes Redenius's explanation appear unreasonable. See Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d at 923 (stating inconsistencies in state's case or possibilities of innocence do not compel reversal where evidence taken as a whole makes such theories unreasonable). Viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the state, we conclude a reasonable jury could believe Tesdahl broke into the victim's home with the intent to commit a crime, and Redenius's presence constituted aiding and advising him in that endeavor. See State v. Hardimon, 310 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Minn. 1981) (stating person's intent must be determined from words and actions in light of all surrounding circumstances); State v. Ulvinen, 313 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Minn. 1981) (noting person's participation in crime may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct, before and after offense); State v. Johnson, 417 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Minn. App. 1987) (holding requisite intent to commit crime must be determined from all circumstances, including whether there was forcible entry).
Evidentiary rulings rest within the trial court's discretion and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Glaze, 452 N.W.2d 655, 660 (Minn. 1990). Harmless error impact analysis applies to a trial court's erroneous exclusion of defense evidence in violation of the defendant's right to present evidence. State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. 1994). An erroneous exclusion of evidence is not harmless if there exists a reasonable possibility the verdict would have been different had the evidence been admitted. Id.
The trial court limited the testimony of Tesdahl's sister to her contact with and observations of Redenius and Tesdahl on the day of the burglary. Redenius argues the trial court's ruling constituted reversible error because her defense would have been more plausible had the witness been allowed to testify as to the volatile relationship between Redenius and Tesdahl. We disagree. The victim's uncontroverted testimony negated the possibility that Redenius dropped off Tesdahl on a gravel road following an argument. Even if limiting the scope of the witness's testimony was error, we conclude the verdict would not have been different, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.