may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Tyrane Eugene Phyle,
Filed February 4, 1997
Washington County District Court
File No. KX953679
Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, 445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1400, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Respondent)
Richard M. Arney, Washington County Attorney, Peter J. Orput, Assistant County Attorney, 14900 61st Street North, Stillwater, MN 55082 (for Respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Bradford S. Delapena, Assistant State Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue SE, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for Appellant)
Considered and decided by Norton, Presiding Judge, Lansing, Judge, and Huspeni, Judge.
Tyrane Phyle appeals his conviction of aiding and abetting the introduction of contraband into a correctional facility. We conclude that the district court's instructions to the jury were not coercive, and we affirm. The record is inadequate to allow appellate review of Phyle's claim that the district court erroneously allowed physical restraints to be used on him during the jury selection proceedings, and we do not decide that issue.
First of all, you should discuss with one another and deliberate with a view of reaching an agreement, if you can do so, without doing violence to your individual judgment. You should decide the case for yourself only after you have examined the case with your fellow jurors and considered all of their views. You should certainly not hesitate to re-examine your views and change your opinion if you become convinced it is erroneous. But you should not surrender your honest opinion simply because other jurors disagree or merely in order to reach a verdict. You should not be influenced to vote in any way on any question by the single fact that a majority of jurors, or that any juror, favors such a decision.
Each juror also received a copy of written jury instructions which were substantially similar to the instructions that were read in court.
Approximately one hour after retiring, the jury returned with a verdict of guilty on the charged offense. Phyle appeals.
The standard jury instruction on unanimous verdicts reads:
In order for you to return a verdict, whether guilty or not guilty, each juror must agree with the verdict. Your verdict must be unanimous.
You should discuss the case with one another, and deliberate with a view to reaching agreement, if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment. You should decide the case for yourself, but only after you have discussed the case with your fellow jurors and have carefully considered their views. You should not hesitate to reexamine your views and change your opinion if you become convinced they are erroneous but you should not surrender your honest opinion simply because other jurors disagree or merely in order to reach a verdict.
10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 3.04 (1990).
The supreme court recently rejected an argument that the district court committed reversible error by reading the following variation of CRIMJIG 3.04 to the jury before it retired for deliberations:
There are 12 of you on this jury and all of you must agree to a verdict. Some of you may have been on juries in civil matters where you were permitted after so many hours of deliberation to return a so-called fractional verdict, in other words, some of you, not all of you could return a verdict in a civil case. But there are no fractional verdicts in a criminal case, and the jury's verdict must be unanimous.
State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Minn. 1996). Despite the district court's paraphrased instruction in Jones, the supreme court held that, as a whole, it was not an erroneous statement of the law.
Viewing the jury instructions in Phyle's case in their entirety, we conclude that they did not materially misstate the law. Phyle argues that the district court improperly deviated from CRIMJIG 3.04 by stating, in part, that "there are only two possible dispositions you can make; guilty or not guilty." But by the close of its instructions, the district court ultimately read most of the language from CRIMJIG 3.04, although not in precise sequence. The directly quoted language included the instruction that "you should not surrender your honest opinion simply because other jurors disagree or merely in order to reach a verdict." We conclude that the combination of jury instructions, viewed as a whole, did not coerce the jury to reach a verdict.
Phyle has not supplied this court with transcripts of his jury selection proceedings. Consequently, we are unable to address the merits of any arguments that relate to those proceedings. But Phyle is not precluded from asserting such arguments in the district court as possible bases for postconviction relief.