This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

C5-96-719

Bill J. Plamann, et al.,

Appellants,

vs.

Clayton Strolberg, et al.,

Respondents.

Filed December 3, 1996

Affirmed

Short, Judge

Meeker County District Court

File No. C7945150

Scott J. Newman, Keefe & Kasal, 246 Main Street South, P.O. Box 220, Hutchinson, MN 55350 (for appellants)

Jean E. Paulson, Nelson & Paulson, 370 Broadway Avenue South, P.O. Box V, Cokato, MN 55321 (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge, Short, Judge, and Davies, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

SHORT, Judge

This case arises out of the failure to close a real estate transaction involving unimproved land in Meeker County. Bill and Kathy Plamann (buyers) sued Clayton and Judith Strolberg (sellers) seeking specific performance of a purchase agreement. After a bench trial, the court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in favor of the buyers. Sellers moved for amended findings and conclusions. The trial court granted the motion, amending its findings and conclusions, and reversing its original judgment. On appeal, buyers argue the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) failing to apply Minn. Stat. § 559.21 (1994), which imposes a 60-day notice of termination on real estate contracts; and (2) finding that all title objections had been satisfied and that the buyers defaulted. We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

The findings of a trial court sitting without a jury will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. A finding is clearly erroneous if it has no substantial evidentiary support or was induced by an erroneous view of the law. Reserve Mining v. State, 310 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn. 1981). Decisions regarding equitable relief are left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only for a clear abuse of that discretion. City of Cloquet v. Cloquet Sand & Gravel, 312 Minn. 277, 279, 251 N.W.2d 642, 644 (1977).

I.

The buyers argue the trial court abused its discretion by failing to require the sellers to follow the termination procedures set forth in Minn. Stat. § 559.21, subd. 2a (1994). We disagree. Although the statutory language is broad enough to include purchase agreements, the nature of the parties' agreement is determinative. Romain v. Pebble Creek Partners, 310 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Minn. 1981). Where material conditions are contained in a contract, application of section 559.21 is improper. See Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 122 (noting proper inquiry is "whether a term essential to the final bargain is left open for further negotiations or is dependent on a contingency").

The record demonstrates that the purchase agreement conditioned the offer upon the buyers' obtaining suitable financing. Because the parties' agreement contained such a condition, the trial court correctly found the agreement was beyond the scope of Minn. Stat. § 559.21, subd. 2a. See Liebsch v. Abbott, 265 Minn. 447, 456, 122 N.W.2d 578, 584 (1963) (holding statutory termination procedure did not apply because contract was contingent upon buyer obtaining mortgage loan). Under these circumstances, the trial court's decision was not induced by an erroneous view of the law.

II.

The buyers also argue there is no substantial evidence supporting the trial court's amended findings that the sellers had established marketable title prior to giving notice of termination, and that the buyers' failure to tender payment constituted a breach of the parties' agreement. We disagree. The record shows: (1) upon receipt of written objections to title, the parties' agreement provided the sellers with 120 days to cure and make title marketable; (2) upon correction of the title and within 10 days after written notice to the buyers, the parties' agreement required performance; (3) by letter dated October 12, 1993, the mortgage bank's attorney listed three objections to marketable title; (4) by letter dated November 22, 1993, the bank attorney retracted two of the three objections, and noted the third objection could only be satisfied by recaptioning abstract B; (5) the buyers' realtor recaptioned the abstract and on November 24, 1993, delivered it to the bank attorney's office; (6) by letter dated July 15, 1994, the sellers gave notice of termination to the buyers; (7) the sellers' notice gave the buyers until July 28, 1994, to perform under the terms of the agreement; and (8) the buyers did not tender payment to the sellers. Given these facts, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. Because we conclude the parties' agreement terminated according to its own terms, we decline to award the equitable relief of specific performance. See Formanek v. Langton, 271 Minn. 59, 62-63, 134 N.W.2d 883, 885-86 (1965) (refusing to award specific performance where a contract has been terminated).

Affirmed.