may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Lorrie Lynn Rinn, petitioner,
Clay Alan Rinn,
Filed December 17, 1996
Winona County District Court
File No. F589495
Quentin R. Wittrock, Jonathan M. Redgrave, Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, P.A., 3400 City Center, 33 S. Sixth St., Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for Appellant)
Judy M. Gernander, 111 Riverfront, Suite 203, Winona, MN 55987 (for Respondent)
Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge, Short, Judge, and Davies, Judge.
On a second appeal, after remand, appellant-mother claims the ALJ erred by failing to make findings of fact and by failing to address whether father self-limited his income. We affirm.
On mother's appeal, this court remanded for the ALJ to address whether the 1994 stipulation should be vacated under Minn. Stat. § 518.145 for mistake and whether the parties, when they entered that stipulation, had a meeting of the minds. Rinn v. Rinn, No. C9-95-678 (Minn. App. Oct. 17, 1995) (Rinn I). This court also gave the ALJ discretion to address whether father self-limited his income. Id.
On remand, the ALJ vacated the stipulation, finding that the parties lacked a meeting of the minds when they entered the stipulation and that it had been based on a mistake. The ALJ set support during father's seasonal unemployment at the guideline amount for his unemployment benefits. Mother again appeals.
Here, the ALJ found that father's counsel was not involved in the negotiations, that father's unemployment and the impact it should have on his support obligation were not discussed, and that the parties consequently lacked a meeting of the minds. Unless it is clearly erroneous, we will not set aside the ALJ's finding that the parties failed through mistake to reach a meeting of the minds. See Roberge v. Cambridge Coop. Creamery, 248 Minn. 184, 196, 79 N.W.2d 142, 150 (Minn. 1956) (existence of meeting of minds is fact question); Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (findings of fact not set aside unless clearly erroneous). Here, because the record supports the critical findings, they are not clearly erroneous.
The ALJ also stated that, because the stipulation was not based on accurate information concerning father's income, it was "impossible" to determine whether the stipulation was fair to the children and the parties. A support obligation must be fair to the children. See Tammen v. Tammen, 289 Minn. 28, 30, 182 N.W.2d 840, 842 (1970) (regardless of parents' stipulation on support, court's "paramount consideration" is children's welfare). Given the parties' mistake, leading to a failure to reach a meeting of the minds, and because the support ordered may be unfair to the children, the ALJ did not abuse his discretion by vacating the stipulation.
Mother also claims that the ALJ could not have considered the statutory factors because the record lacks evidence on them. See Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5(c) (Supp. 1995) (listing factors to be considered in setting support); Nazar v. Nazar, 505 N.W.2d 628, 634 (Minn. App. 1993) (when awarding support, "trial court must consider the statutory guidelines and [the statutory factors]"), review denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 1993). But in ruling that the support obligation fairly reflected the needs of all parties, the ALJ referred to a "rebuttable presumption that the guidelines shall be applied" and otherwise indicated that he was aware that other information could be considered in setting support. Mother did not provide such other information. Generally, a party's failure to provide relevant evidence precludes that party from complaining about a district court's or ALJ's failure to make findings addressing the missing information. Taflin v. Taflin, 366 N.W.2d 315, 319 (Minn. App. 1985).
Mother next claims that the ALJ annualized father's income before setting the support obligation and that the reduction of the obligation during father's unemployment periods thus had the effect of accounting for reduced income twice. Review of the figures indicates, though, that the ALJ did not annualize father's income before setting his support obligation.