This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals

     Terrence Hansen, petitioner,

Juanita Lofkvist, f/k/a Juanita Hansen,

Filed October 15, 1996
Harten, Judge

Isanti County District Court

File No. F7-94-50334

Mary J. Norton-Larson, Attorney at Law, 32299 Jackson Road N.E., Cambridge,
MN 55008 (for Respondent)

David R. Spear, Spear & Swanson Law Office, 615 Third Avenue West, Pine
City, MN 55063 (for Appellant)

Considered and decided by Schumacher, Presiding Judge, Norton, Judge, and
Harten, Judge.
                        Unpublished Opinion

HARTEN, Judge (Hon. James R. Clifford, District Court Trial Judge)

Appellant-mother challenges the district court's award of sole physical and
legal custody of the parties' child to respondent-father. We affirm.

The marriage of appellant-mother Juanita Lofkvist, f/k/a Juanita Hansen,
and respondent-father, Terrence Hansen, was dissolved in or before 1989.(1)
        [Footnote] (1)The record does not reveal the date of

Thereafter, in October 1989, the parties reunited and had a child in 1990.
When the parties separated in April 1994, mother retained custody of the
parties' child.

Respondent commenced this parentage proceeding in August 1994. In January
1995, the parties stipulated that respondent is the father of the child.
The district court adjudicated paternity as stipulated. The parties also
stipulated to the entry of a temporary child custody order awarding
temporary joint legal custody and temporary physical custody to mother. The
temporary order also required that the parties cooperate in the preparation
of a custody study. The subsequent custody study recommended that sole
legal and physical custody of the child be awarded to father. In August
1995, a two-day custody hearing was held. In January 1996, the district
court awarded father sole legal and physical custody and awarded mother
visitation. Mother appeals.

1. Exclusion of Evidence
Mother challenges the district court's refusal to admit into evidence
an independent custody report(2)
        [Footnote] (2)In addition to the stipulated custody
        report, mother attempted to introduce an independent
        custody report that was not agreed to by the

and the oral testimony of the expert witness who prepared it. We will not
disturb a district court's decision to exclude evidence unless the
exclusion resulted from an erroneous view of the law or constituted an
abuse of discretion. Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130, 138 (Minn.
1990). Moreover, whether an improper evidentiary ruling entitles a party to
a new trial depends on ``the complaining party's ability to demonstrate
prejudicial error.'' Id.

Here, the excluded report and proposed testimony concerned
psychological evaluations of the child that had been conducted without the
father's knowledge or consent. The report did not compare and contrast the
attributes of both parents in formulating custodial conclusions and

recommendations. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the report and any
associated testimony. See Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641
(Minn. 1996) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by
excluding custody report made without mother's knowledge or consent and did
not address necessary statutory factors); Minn. Stat. 𨹞.17 (1994)
(enumerating statutory factors which must be considered in making custody

Mother also argues that the district court erred by disallowing evidence of
medical records concerning treatment that she received following alleged
incidents of spousal abuse. The district court found these documents
irrelevant because they related to incidents that occurred before the birth
of the child. Given this finding, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding these records as irrelevant. Finally,
Mother claims that the district court erred when it refused to receive into
evidence police reports concerning allegations of past spousal abuse. The
record, however, shows that mother never specifically offered this
evidence. Therefore, we need not address this issue. See Thiele v.
Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (appellate courts address only
issues presented and decided by district court). Nevertheless, even had
this evidence been offered, it lacked relevance on the same basis as did
the medical records.

2. Custody Determination

Mother argues that the district court's almost verbatim adoption of
father's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is evidence that
the district court did not render an independent decision. Verbatim
adoption of a party's proposed findings and conclusions is not
reversible error per se, but it does raise a question of whether the
district court independently evaluated each party's testimony and evidence.
Bliss v. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d 583, 590 (Minn. App. 1992), review
denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993).

Here, the district court made minor alterations to father's proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law, thereby demonstrating that it must
have critically evaluated the proposed documents. Moreover, the evidence
supports the findings and conclusions as made. We cannot say that the
district court abdicated its responsibility to evaluate independently all
the evidence presented.

Mother argues that the district court's four-month delay in rendering a
decision requires reversal because the court did not have adequate recall
of the facts.(3)
        [Footnote] (3)The record indicates that the hearing
        ended on August 29, 1995 and the district court
        signed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
        order for judgment on January 19, 1996. The record
        does not show how much post-trial time the attorneys
        were allowed to submit their proposals, but both
        attorneys submitted materials on or about September
        22, 1995.

Generally, all matters submitted to a judge for decision are to be decided
within 90 days. Minn.Stat. 𨹺.27 (1994). Failure to comply with the
90-day limitation, however, does not necessarily affect the validity of the
court's findings or order. The limitation serves to monitor timely judicial
administration. Section 546.27 does not provide a litigant with a private
cause of action.  See Merchants & Miners State Bank v. Spal Enter.,
391 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Sept. 22,

Mother also claims that the district court impermissibly relied on the
court ordered custody study. Here, both parties were allowed to cross-
examine the custody evaluator concerning the substance of her report. The
study was admitted into evidence and the evaluator testified as to its

contents. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its broad fact-
finding discretion by considering this evidence. See Scheibe v.
Scheibe, 308 Minn. 449, 450, 241 N.W.2d 100, 101 (1976) (court may rely on
a custody evaluation if parties have opportunity to cross-examine the author
of the evaluation).

3. Physical Custody

Custody decisions are discretionary with the district court; our review
is limited to determining ``whether the [district] court abused its
discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly
applying the law.'' Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn.
1985). Findings of fact made by the district court must be sustained unless
clearly erroneous. Id. When awarding custody, the district court
must consider the best interests of the child. Minn. Stat. 𨹞.17,
subd. 3. A child's best interests are defined as all relevant factors,
including those listed in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1. After careful
review of mother's claims and the district court's findings, we conclude
that the district court considered all relevant best interests factors. The
findings are supported by the evidence and not clearly erroneous. See
Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (findings of fact not set aside unless clearly
erroneous). We conclude that the award of sole physical custody to father
was not an abuse of discretion.

4. Legal custody
Joint legal custody is presumed to be in a child's best interests
provided the parties can cooperate regarding their child. Wopata v.
Wopata, 498 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn. App. 1993). After making findings on
the statutory joint legal custody factors, the district court determined
that joint legal custody was inappropriate because the parties could not
cooperate regarding their child. Because the evidence supports the district
court's findings, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by awarding father sole legal custody.

5. Motion to Strike
Father moved to strike certain documents in the appendix to mother's
brief. We agree that these documents are not part of the record.
Accordingly, we grant father's motion to strike the improperly included
materials from mother's brief and appendix. See Mitterhauser v.
Mitterhauser, 399 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn. App. 1987) (court cannot base
its decision on matters outside the record on appeal and must be stricken).
We decline to impose sanctions.