This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals

     Francis Fromm and Tracee Fromm,

husband and wife,


State Farm Mutual Insurance Company

of Bloomington, Illinois,

Filed October 15, 1996
Reversed and remanded
Forsberg, Judge

Redwood County District Court

File No. C9-95-368

J. Brian O'Leary, O'Leary & Moritz, P.O. Box 76, Springfield, MN 56087 (for

William M. Hart, Katherine A. McBride, Meagher & Geer, P.L.L.P., 4200
Multifoods Tower, 33 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge, Klaphake, Judge, and
Forsberg, Judge.(*)
        [Footnote] (*)Retired judge of the Minnesota Court
        of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn.
        Const. art. VI, § 10.
                        Unpublished Opinion

FORSBERG, Judge (Hon. David W. Peterson, District Court Trial Judge)

Appellant insurance company challenges summary judgment, alleging that the
insured's claim for no-fault benefits is not based upon the maintenance or
use of a motor vehicle. We reverse and remand.

John Fromm loaded a shotgun and drove to a cornfield where his brother,
respondent Francis Fromm, was working. John exited his truck and shot

Francis twice. Francis's wife, respondent Tracee Fromm, who had just
dropped off her husband and was driving away, saw John aiming the gun at
Francis. She backed up to where Francis was lying on the ground and shifted
her truck into neutral. As she knelt on the front seat and attempted to
pull her husband into the vehicle, John fired two shots through the truck's
rear window, striking Tracee once.

Appellant State Farm Mutual Insurance Company denied the Fromms'
applications for no-fault benefits, claiming that their injuries did not
arise out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. The Fromms brought
a declaratory judgment action against State Farm. After a hearing on cross-
motions for summary judgment, the district court denied Francis's motion
and ordered summary judgment in favor of State Farm with regard to him. It
held, however, that Tracee's injuries arose out of her use of a motor
vehicle and granted her motion for summary judgment. State Farm appeals.

On appeal from summary judgment, this court must determine whether any
issues of material fact exist and whether the district court erred in its
application of the law. Offerdahl v. University of Minn. Hosps. &
Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn. 1988). The facts are not in dispute
here; the parties simply contest the interpretation of the phrase
``maintenance or use of a motor vehicle'' as set forth in the no-fault act.
This dispute presents a legal issue for the court to determine.
Continental W. Ins. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876, 877 (Minn. 1987).

For an insured to be eligible for no-fault benefits, three general
requirements must be met: (1) the vehicle must be an ``active accessory in
causing the injury,'' meaning ``something less than proximate cause in the
tort sense and something more than the vehicle being the mere situs of the
injury;'' (2) there can be no act of independent significance breaking the
causal link between the injury and the use of the vehicle; and (3) the
injury must occur while the vehicle is being used for transportation
purposes. Klug, 415 N.W.2d at 878 (citations omitted).

Ultimately, whether these factors are met turns on the particular facts of
each case. Classified Ins. Corp. v. Vodinelich, 368 N.W.2d 921, 923
(Minn. 1985). Regardless of the particular details, though, one thing is
certain: ``The fact that an injury occurs while the injured party is in a
motor vehicle is not dispositive of the issue.'' Edwards v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins., 399 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn. App. 1986), review
denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 1987).

In the present case, we are convinced that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Tracee because two Klug
factors the ``causal link'' and the ``transportation purposes'' elements
are not met.
1. Causal Link

In deciding that this factor was met, the district court stated:
        From Ms. Fromm's perspective there was no act of
        independent significance to break the causal link
        between her vehicle and her injuries. Ms. Fromm was
        using her vehicle as a rescue device because of the
        shots being fired at her husband. It was bullets
        from the same gun, fired by the same gunman within a
        moment of her husband being shot which injured her.

This conclusion is erroneous because it is based on the faulty presumption
that this factor must be viewed from the victim's perspective. The district
court reached this conclusion by questioning Klug's validity following
the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in McIntosh v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins., 488 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. 1992). The McIntosh court held
that, for purposes of determining the applicability of no-fault coverage,
the term ``accident'' is to be viewed from the victim's perspective.
Id. at 480. The district court in the case at hand applied that
holding to this Klug factor in other words, it applied it out of
context but given that McIntosh reaffirmed Klug's applicability,
the district court did so erroneously.

In a factually analogous case, we concluded that there was no ``causal
link.'' Wieneke v. Home Mut. Ins., 397 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Minn. App.
1986), review denied (Minn. Jan. 21, 1987). In Wieneke, a
driver exited his car and walked to the insured's car, where a heated
exchange about driving followed. Id. at 598. While the insured was
still seated in his car, the other person punched him in the face, breaking
his nose. Id. at 598-99. The injured motorist was denied coverage
under the no-fault and uninsured motorist provisions of his automobile
insurance policy. Id. at 599. We held that the assailant's battery,
although precipitated by a driving dispute, and although visited upon the
insured as he sat in his own motor vehicle, ``unequivocally establish[ed] a
break in the necessary causal connection between the tortfeasor's acts
causing the injury and the use of an automobile.'' Id. at 600.

Applying that logic here mandates the conclusion that Tracee's injuries
resulted from an act of independent significance. As in Wieneke, the
assailant's act here of intentionally discharging a shotgun breaks any
causal link.
2. Transportation Purposes
        The requirement that coverage will exist only
        for injuries resulting from uses for transportation
        purposes is intended to limit an automobile
        insurance company's liability to those risks the
        policy was intended to insure against, that is,
        against risks associated with ``motoring.''

Vodinelich, 368 N.W.2d at 923. In finding that this connection was
met here, the district court made the following bold statement:
        [T]his Court takes judicial notice of the many cases
        which have come before it involving drivers and
        passengers of automobiles who are victims of
        assaults involving firearms. In addition, this Court
        notes that through the media the average person is
        regularly exposed to stories involving car-jacking
        in which a gun is used, drive-by shootings and
        random assaults in which a gun is used to shoot at a
        passenger or driver of a vehicle which was stopped
        at a stoplight or passing by on the highway.

With the number of assaults involving firearms and automobiles reaching an
all-time high and public awareness of those assaults, being shot while
operating an automobile has become a risk associated with driving in 1995
and is recognized as such by those buying automobile insurance.

Though we commend the court's concern, we nevertheless disagree with its
resolution. As we stated a decade ago in Edwards,
        [t]he risk of being a victim of a violent crime
        is unfortunately a risk associated with living in
        our society; it is not a risk associated with

399 N.W.2d at 98. This observation is as true now as when we made it. The
district court's concern does not authorize us to depart from existing
precedent, which mandates a conclusion that there is no coverage.

Because the district court erroneously concluded that these two Klug
factors are met, we reverse and remand, with directions to enter judgment
of dismissal in favor of State Farm.
Reversed and remanded.