This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994) State of Minnesota in Court of Appeals C5-96-669 In Re Estate of Raymond Dykema, Deceased. Filed October 15, 1996 Affirmed Short, Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. P4941329 Bonnie M. Fleming, Brendan W. Randall, Faegre & Benson LLP, 2200 Norwest Center, 90 South Seventh Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for appellant Gregory Keever, special administrator of the estate of Raymond Dykema) Ronald J. Riach, Franke & Riach, P.A., 200 Rosedale Towers, 1700 West Highway 36, Roseville, MN 55113 (for respondent Patricia Davis) William J. Brody, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., 1100 International Centre, 900 Second Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for personal representatives of the estate of Raymond Dykema) Considered and decided by Crippen, Presiding Judge, Parker, Judge, and Short, Judge. Unpublished Opinion SHORT, Judge (Hon. Ann A. Alton, District Court Trial Judge) Less than four months after marrying Patricia Davis, Raymond Dykema died testate. By his will, the deceased left Davis one million dollars in cash, unencumbered title to their condominium worth $575,000, and $10,000 per month maintenance until Davis had received at least $500,000 of the one million dollar cash bequest. Dykema's estate valued approximately $28,000,000. Believing that Davis fraudulently obtained the deceased's consent to marry, his other beneficiaries filed a petition for construction of the will and for instructions as to whether Davis was entitled to receive assets from the estate as the deceased's surviving spouse. Davis objected to the petition and filed a motion to dismiss. In June of 1995, the trial court dismissed the beneficiaries' petition and appointed a special administrator for the limited purpose of resolving the issue of Davis's right to receive assets from the estate. After conducting an investigation, the special administrator filed a petition challenging Davis's right to take under the will. In August, Davis moved for summary judgment. By order dated November 1995, the trial court granted judgment for Davis. On appeal, the special administrator argues the trial court erred in its application of the law, and summary judgment is inappropriate because a fact issue exists as to whether Davis fraudulently obtained the deceased's consent to marry. We affirm. Decision On appeal from summary judgment, we examine the record to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist and decide whether the trial court erred in applying the law. Offerdahl v. University of Minn. Hosps. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn. 1988); See Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 (setting forth summary judgment standard). The special administrator argues the trial court erred by holding that the right to challenge a marriage on the basis of fraud is personal to the spouses. Because the deceased and Davis were married in Hawaii, we analyze this issue under the law of the state. See In re Kinkead's Estate, 239 Minn. 27, 30, 57 N.W.2d 628, 631 (1953) (applying the law of the place of contracting of the marriage) (cited in Ma v. Ma, 483 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Minn. App. 1992). The Hawaiian statute regulating marriage provides: In order to make valid the marriage contract, * * * it shall be necessary that: * * * * (4) Consent of neither party to the marriage has been obtained by force, duress, or fraud. Haw. Rev. Stat. 𨺔-1 (Supp. 1995). The special administrator suggests any marriage that fails to satisfy the elements of a valid marriage is absolutely invalid. See Parke v. Parke, 25 Haw. 397, 405 (1920) (holding a marriage created without a license null and void); Godfrey v. Rowland, 16 Haw. 377, 380 (1905) (stating in dicta that failure to satisfy a requirement of the marriage statute renders a marriage void). However, the marriage validity provision of the statute cannot be read alone, but must be read together with other related provisions to determine its meaning. See Haw. Rev. Stat. ڇ-16 (1993) (directing that laws on the same subject matter be construed with reference to each other); State v. Russell, 617 P.2d 84, 88 (Haw. 1980) (construing statute with reference to whole system of law of which it forms a part). No Hawaiian marriage is automatically invalid, but must be nullified through judicial processes. See generally Haw. Rev. Stat. chs. 571- 88 (1993 & Supp. 1995) (including no provision for nullification without court action). Therefore, challenges to a marriage are governed by Hawaii's annulment statute. That section empowers courts to declare a marriage a nullity for a failure to meet any requirement of the marriage validity statute, with two exceptions not relevant to this case. Haw. Rev. Stat. 𨺜-21 (1993). However, the Hawaiian legislature chose to grant only a limited right to obtain an annulment for fraud. Under the statute, an annulment of marriage due to fraud is available only to the party who was fraudulently induced to marry. See Haw. Rev. Stat. 𨺜-21(5) (requiring that the consent to marriage of the party applying for annulment was obtained by fraud). No mechanism exists to nullify a marriage at the application of any person other than the defrauded party. See id.; cf. Haw. Rev. Stat. 𨺜-21(1) (placing no restriction on the court's ability to nullify an incestuous marriage, at any time, at the application of any party or non-party to the marriage). Thus, Hawaii's statutory annulment scheme does not permit the collateral attack on a marriage for fraud after the death of an allegedly defrauded spouse. See Haw. Rev. Stat. 𨺜-21 (providing the sole means to invalidate a marraige); See also W. Allen, Annotation, Right to Attack Validity of Marriage After Death of Party Thereto, 47 A.L.R.2d 1393, 1407 (1956) (concluding that marriages are normally immune to attack for fraud after the death of a party to the marriage). Neither the deceased nor Davis sought an annulment of their marriage. As a matter of Hawaiian law, the special administrator may not collaterally attack the validity of that marriage. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Davis and ordered the estate to distribute assets to her, as the deceased's lawful spouse, under his will. Because we conclude the special administrator has no legal basis for attacking Davis's marriage, his arguments regarding fact issues and the adequacy of discovery time are immaterial. Affirmed.