This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals

     In Re Estate of Raymond Dykema, Deceased.

Filed October 15, 1996
Short, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. P4941329

Bonnie M. Fleming, Brendan W. Randall, Faegre & Benson LLP, 2200 Norwest
Center, 90 South Seventh Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for appellant
Gregory Keever, special administrator of the estate of Raymond Dykema)

Ronald J. Riach, Franke & Riach, P.A., 200 Rosedale Towers, 1700 West
Highway 36, Roseville, MN 55113 (for respondent Patricia Davis)

William J. Brody, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., 1100 International Centre, 900
Second Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for personal representatives of
the estate of Raymond Dykema)

Considered and decided by Crippen, Presiding Judge, Parker, Judge, and
Short, Judge.
                        Unpublished Opinion

SHORT, Judge (Hon. Ann A. Alton, District Court Trial Judge)

Less than four months after marrying Patricia Davis, Raymond Dykema died
testate. By his will, the deceased left Davis one million dollars in cash,
unencumbered title to their condominium worth $575,000, and $10,000 per
month maintenance until Davis had received at least $500,000 of the one
million dollar cash bequest. Dykema's estate valued approximately

Believing that Davis fraudulently obtained the deceased's consent to marry,
his other beneficiaries filed a petition for construction of the will and
for instructions as to whether Davis was entitled to receive assets from
the estate as the deceased's surviving spouse. Davis objected to the
petition and filed a motion to dismiss. In June of 1995, the trial court
dismissed the beneficiaries' petition and appointed a special administrator
for the limited purpose of resolving the issue of Davis's right to receive
assets from the estate. After conducting an investigation, the special
administrator filed a petition challenging Davis's right to take under the
will. In August, Davis moved for summary judgment. By order dated November
1995, the trial court granted judgment for Davis. On appeal, the special
administrator argues the trial court erred in its application of the law,
and summary judgment is inappropriate because a fact issue exists as to
whether Davis fraudulently obtained the deceased's consent to marry. We

On appeal from summary judgment, we examine the record to determine whether
genuine issues of material fact exist and decide whether the trial court
erred in applying the law. Offerdahl v. University of Minn. Hosps. &
Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn. 1988); See Minn. R. Civ. P.
56.03 (setting forth summary judgment standard).

The special administrator argues the trial court erred by holding that the
right to challenge a marriage on the basis of fraud is personal to the
spouses. Because the deceased and Davis were married in Hawaii, we analyze
this issue under the law of the state. See In re Kinkead's Estate,
239 Minn. 27, 30, 57 N.W.2d 628, 631 (1953) (applying the law of the place
of contracting of the marriage) (cited in Ma v. Ma, 483 N.W.2d 732,
735 (Minn. App. 1992).

The Hawaiian statute regulating marriage provides:
        In order to make valid the marriage contract, * * *
        it shall be necessary that:
        * * * *
        (4) Consent of neither party to the marriage has
        been obtained by force, duress, or fraud.

Haw. Rev. Stat. 𨺔-1 (Supp. 1995). The special administrator suggests
any marriage that fails to satisfy the elements of a valid marriage is
absolutely invalid. See Parke v. Parke, 25 Haw. 397, 405 (1920)
(holding a marriage created without a license null and void); Godfrey v.
Rowland, 16 Haw. 377, 380 (1905) (stating in dicta that failure to
satisfy a requirement of the marriage statute renders a marriage void).
However, the marriage validity provision of the statute cannot be read
alone, but must be read together with other related provisions to determine
its meaning. See Haw. Rev. Stat. ڇ-16 (1993) (directing that
laws on the same subject matter be construed with reference to each other);

State v. Russell, 617 P.2d 84, 88 (Haw. 1980) (construing statute
with reference to whole system of law of which it forms a part).

No Hawaiian marriage is automatically invalid, but must be nullified
through judicial processes. See generally Haw. Rev. Stat. chs. 571-
88 (1993 & Supp. 1995) (including no provision for nullification without
court action). Therefore, challenges to a marriage are governed by Hawaii's
annulment statute. That section empowers courts to declare a marriage a
nullity for a failure to meet any requirement of the marriage validity
statute, with two exceptions not relevant to this case. Haw. Rev. Stat.
𨺜-21 (1993). However, the Hawaiian legislature chose to grant only a
limited right to obtain an annulment for fraud.

Under the statute, an annulment of marriage due to fraud is available only
to the party who was fraudulently induced to marry. See Haw. Rev.
Stat. 𨺜-21(5) (requiring that the consent to marriage of the party
applying for annulment was obtained by fraud). No mechanism exists to
nullify a marriage at the application of any person other than the
defrauded party. See id.; cf. Haw. Rev. Stat. 𨺜-21(1)
(placing no restriction on the court's ability to nullify an incestuous
marriage, at any time, at the application of any party or non-party to the
marriage). Thus, Hawaii's statutory annulment scheme does not permit the
collateral attack on a marriage for fraud after the death of an allegedly
defrauded spouse. See Haw. Rev. Stat. 𨺜-21 (providing the
sole means to invalidate a marraige); See also W. Allen, Annotation,
Right to Attack Validity of Marriage After Death of Party Thereto,
47 A.L.R.2d 1393, 1407 (1956) (concluding that marriages are normally
immune to attack for fraud after the death of a party to the marriage).

Neither the deceased nor Davis sought an annulment of their marriage. As a
matter of Hawaiian law, the special administrator may not collaterally
attack the validity of that marriage. The trial court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of Davis and ordered the estate to distribute
assets to her, as the deceased's lawful spouse, under his will. Because we
conclude the special administrator has no legal basis for attacking Davis's
marriage, his arguments regarding fact issues and the adequacy of discovery
time are immaterial.