This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals

     Eugene Fuchs,


Sylvia J. Habstritt,

Filed October 15, 1996
Schumacher, Judge

Hubbard County District Court

File No. C89491

James A. Wellner, London Anderson Antolak & Hoeft, Ltd., 2250 One Financial
Plaza, 120 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for Respondent)

John E. Valen, Fifth and Michigan, Post Office Box 1105, Walker, MN 56484
(for Appellant)

Considered and decided by Short, Presiding Judge, Parker, Judge, and
Schumacher, Judge.

                        Unpublished Opinion

SCHUMACHER, Judge (Hon. Jodie Metcalf, District Court Trial Judge)

Appellant Sylvia J. Habstritt claims errors in the trial court's findings
of fact and application of Minn. Stat. § 501B.07 (1994) regarding
``purchase money resulting trusts.'' We affirm.

Habstritt and respondent Eugene Fuchs met in 1986 and began a romantic
affair. Habstritt was single, but Fuchs was married. In 1989, the parties
were involved in the purchase of real estate in Grand Marais, Minnesota.
Fuchs personally paid the full purchase price, but title was placed in
Habstritt's name in order to avoid procuring Fuchs's wife's signature on
the deed and to avoid obtaining his wife's approval on any future
transactions involving the property. In 1992, when the parties sold this
property, Habstritt signed all the documents as title holder and
transferred all proceeds from the sale to Fuchs.

In 1991, the parties were involved in the purchase of a lot and cabin in
Park Rapids, Minnesota. Fuchs again paid the full purchase price and title
was again placed in Habstritt's name. In June 1991, shortly after the
purchase of the Park Rapids property, an attorney prepared a will for
Habstritt, which provided as follows: (1) if Fuchs were to die before
Habstritt, his estate would have no interest in the Park Rapids property;
(2) if Habstritt were to die before Fuchs, then Fuchs would inherit the
property; and (3) Habstritt would not sell the property without first
obtaining the consent of Fuchs. At the time, both parties used the Park

Rapids property as their weekend get-away. In the fall of 1992, Habstritt
moved to Park Rapids and made the cabin her permanent home. Habstritt paid
the telephone and electric bills and real estate taxes, and the property
was classified as homestead property in her name.

In February 1993, Habstritt suffered a subarachnoid hemorrhage. Fuchs
visited Habstritt in the hospital and she signed a deed transferring the
Park Rapids property to him. Fuchs was primarily concerned that a medical
lien would be placed against the property. Soon thereafter, Habstritt had a
stroke and she presently suffers from a loss of memory and a difficulty
articulating her thoughts. Habstritt continued to live in the Park Rapids
cabin, although her relationship with Fuchs ended. Fuchs brought this
action seeking return of the property or damages, and Habstritt
counterclaimed seeking a declaration that the deed transferring the Park
Rapids property to Fuchs was null and void.

After a one-day court trial, the trial court concluded that Habstritt's
signature on the deed was obtained through undue influence and declared the
deed null and void. Nevertheless, the court found the circumstances
surrounding the purchase of both properties manifested an intention by
Fuchs to create a resulting trust on each occasion, pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 501B.07. The trial court denied Habstritt's motion for amended
findings and she appeals.

1. On appeal from a court trial, the scope of review is limited to
determining whether the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous and
whether it erred in its conclusions of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01;
Thuma v. Kroschel, 506 N.W.2d 14, 18 (Minn. App. 1993), review
denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 1993). Clearly erroneous means ``manifestly
contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.'' Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods.,
304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975). Due regard shall be
given to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; Thuma, 506 N.W.2d at 18.

Minn. Stat. § 501B.07 (1994), entitled ``purchase money resulting
trusts,'' provides that
        [i]f a transfer of property is made to one person
        and the purchase price is paid by another, a
        resulting trust is presumed to arise in favor of the
        person by whom the purchase price is paid * * *.

The statute contains three exceptions, two of which apply to the instant
        (1) if the person by whom the purchase price is paid
        manifests a contrary intention, no resulting trust
        is presumed to arise; and

(2) if the transferee is a spouse, child, or other natural object of bounty
of the payor, a gift in favor of the transferee is presumed and no
resulting trust is presumed to arise.


2. Habstritt argues that the trial court erred in its conclusion that
Fuchs did not ``manifest a contrary intention'' pursuant to section
501B.07(1). The trial court noted that, ``although there was some evidence
that the parties intended that the Park Rapids property would be their
retirement home, the Court does not find such evidence convincing.'' The
trial court had a first-hand opportunity to judge the credibility of the
witnesses and found it ``highly unlikely'' that Fuchs would ever make a
gift of the Park Rapids property to Habstritt. The trial court's finding is

not clearly erroneous, and the court did not err in its conclusion that
section 501B.07(1) was inapplicable.

3. Habstritt argues that the trial court erred in its conclusion that she
was not a natural object of Fuchs's bounty, pursuant to section 501B.07(2).
We disagree. The trial court stated that
        Black's Law Dictionary defines ``natural object of
        bounty'' as those persons who would take from a
        testator in the absence of a will.

The complete definition of ``natural object of testator's bounty'' is as
        In testamentary law, term comprises whoever would
        take, in the absence of a will, because they are the
        persons whom the law has so designated, and in the
        ordinary case the law follows the normal condition
        of near relationship.

Black's Law Dictionary 1027 (6th ed. 1990). The trial court relied
on an acceptable definition of natural object of bounty and did not err in
its conclusion that section 501B.07(2) did not apply to the facts.