This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals

     In Re the Marriage of:

Dawn Annette Schmitz, petitioner,


Michael Dennis Schmitz,

Filed October 15, 1996
Short, Judge

Washington County District Court

File No. F7943807

Terry L. Mitchell, Glenn P. Bruder, Mitchell & Bruder, The Colonnade, Suite
970, 5500 Wayzata Boulevard, Minneapolis, MN 55416 (for Respondent)

Martin L. Swaden, Swaden Law Offices, 7301 Ohms Lane, Suite 550, Edina, MN
55439 (for Appellant)

Considered and decided by Short, Presiding Judge, Parker, Judge, and
Crippen, Judge.
                        Unpublished Opinion

SHORT, Judge (Hon. Smith F. Eggleston, District Court Trial Judge)

This dissolution case involves issues of property, child support,
visitation, and attorney fees. On appeal from an amended judgment and
decree, Terry Dennis Schmitz argues the trial court abused its discretion
by: (1) awarding nonmarital property to his former spouse; (2) setting
child support; (3) deciding visitation questions; and (4) awarding attorney
fees to his former spouse. Schmitz's former spouse requests an enlargement
of her lien on the marital homestead and additional attorney fees. We

Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in dividing property, setting child
support, establishing visitation rights, and awarding attorney fees. See
Rohling v. Rohling, 379 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 1986) (property
division); Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 51 (Minn. 1984) (child
support); Manthei v. Manthei, 268 N.W.2d 45, 45 (Minn. 1978)
(visitation rights); Solon v. Solon, 255 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Minn.
1977) (attorney fees). A trial court's determination of these issues will
not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Id. We must
affirm a trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.

Schmitz argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding a $75,097
lien to his former spouse on the marital homestead, part of two Piper
Jaffray and Hopwood accounts, and the 1988 Cadillac because the property
division invaded nonmarital property. However, the trial court made a
finding of unfair hardship. See Minn. Stat. 𨹞.58, subd. 2
(1994) (allowing the trial court to apportion up to one-half of nonmarital
property to either spouse upon a finding of unfair hardship). The record
demonstrates Schmitz's former spouse: (1) was not employed during the
marriage; (2) incurred debt in order to train herself for future
employment; (3) lacked sufficient means to support herself and the parties'
child; and (4) incurred significant attorney fees due to this litigation.
In addition, Schmitz is unable to pay reasonable child support because he
is unemployed due to ``stress.'' Given these facts, the trial court's
finding of undue hardship is not clearly erroneous. See Fredericksen v.
Fredericksen, 368 N.W.2d 769, 775 (Minn. App. 1985) (upholding an
invasion of nonmarital interests due to unfair hardship).

Our inquiry under Minn. Stat. 𨹞.58, subd. 2, is whether the trial
court apportioned half or less of the nonmarital property. See Roel v.
Roel, 406 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. App. 1987) (where the record justifies
a finding of unfair hardship, the court acts within its discretion in
apportioning nonmarital property). The record supports the trial court's
determination that the division did not improperly invade Schmitz's
nonmarital interests. As to the marital homestead, the record shows: (1)
the parties treated the homestead as if it were jointly owned; (2) in
purchasing the original homestead outright, Schmitz contributed 91% of the
purchase price with nonmarital funds; and (3) the marital homestead's fair

market value is $177,500, free of encumbrances. Even if the entire value of
the appreciated second homestead could be attributable to Schmitz's
nonmarital contribution, the lien award of $75,097 would fall far short of
the statutory maximum allowed in unfair hardship cases.

As to the division of the Piper Jaffray accounts and the automobile, the
record shows the trial court did not invade nonmarital interests. Under
these circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in dividing the parties' property.


The trial court ordered Schmitz to pay $270 per month in child support,
based on his dividend income of $1,079.16 per month. Schmitz argues the
trial court abused its discretion because his future dividend income likely
will decrease. However, it is undisputed Schmitz: (1) lives in an
unencumbered house valued at $177,500; (2) drives a collector Corvette
automobile; (3) receives money regularly from his parents; and (4) has
investment account assets in excess of $75,000. Given these facts, we
cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in setting Schmitz's child
support obligation or requiring Schmitz to pay $20 monthly towards the $50
per month day-care costs incurred by his former spouse.


Schmitz also argues the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law are inconsistent regarding supervision of his visitation rights. We
disagree. The findings of fact and conclusions of law complement each other
and require Schmitz to: (1) enter a therapeutic treatment program
regardless of whether he is willing to admit that abuse occurred; (2)
commence supervised visitation even if he chooses not to participate in the
Domestic Abuse Project; and (3) complete a satisfactory program of therapy,
as determined by his therapist, before unsupervised visitation will begin.

Pursuant to Minn. Stat. 𨹞.165, subd. 2 (1994), the trial court
appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the child's interests. Given the
order for protection, the findings by the Child Protection Services of
Washington County, and the testimony of Schmitz's expert witness, we cannot
say the trial court abused its discretion in determining visitation issues.


Schmitz further argues the trial court erred in determining he has the
financial ability to make a $2,000 contribution to the attorney fees
incurred by his former spouse. In contrast, Schmitz's former spouse argues
the award of partial fees was an abuse of discretion in light of Schmitz's
wrongful conduct and her lack of financial resources. The record
demonstrates:(1) Schmitz has the financial ability to contribute to his
former spouse's attorney fees; and (2) Schmitz's former spouse lacks
sufficient property to support herself and the parties' child. Given the
parties' financial situations and our limited standard of review, we cannot
say the trial court's award was an abuse of discretion.