This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals
                              C3-96-492

     In Re the Marriage of:

Phudhiphorn Thienprasit,

petitioner,
     Respondent,


vs.

Darat Thienprasit,
     Appellant.


Filed October 15, 1996
Affirmed
Harten, Judge

Ramsey County District Court


File No. F1-93-357

Robert H. Zalk, Sonja Trom Eayrs, Zalk & Eayrs, P.A., 5861 Cedar Lake Road,
Minneapolis, MN 55416 (for Respondent)

William E. Haugh, Jr., Sarah J. Batzli, Collins, Buckley, Sauntry & Haugh,
P.L.L.P., West 1100 First National Bank Bldg., 332 Minnesota St., St. Paul,
MN 55101-1379 (for Appellant)

Considered and decided by Harten, Presiding Judge, Crippen, Judge, and
Thoreen, Judge.(*)
        [Footnote] (*)Retired judge of the district court,
        serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals
        by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI,
        § 10.
                                     
                        Unpublished Opinion

HARTEN, Judge (Hon. Paulette K. Flynn, District Court Trial Judge)

Wife challenges dissolution judgment denying her maintenance and contends
that the district court erred in its valuation of certain marital property
and in its award of attorney fees. We affirm.
                                     
                               Facts

On January 9, 1970, Phudhiphorn Thienprasit (husband) and Darat Thienprasit
(wife) were married in Bangkok, Thailand. Shortly thereafter, they moved to
the United States to complete their advanced medical training. Husband
specialized in neurosurgery and developed a highly successful medical
practice in the Twin Cities. Wife specialized in anesthesiology and
practiced until 1980, when she left to raise the parties' children. Wife
returned to medical practice from 1986 until 1989 when, following a
protracted contract renegotiation period, she left her anesthesiology
practice complaining of memory problems and the high stress level. Wife's
gross income for her last year of practice (1989) was approximately
$160,000 plus an additional $35,068 received in 1990 for services rendered
in 1989. Wife retains her medical license in California and believes she is
licensed in Thailand; she has not maintained her medical license in
Minnesota.

After leaving her medical practice, wife discussed opening a jewelry
business in Thailand with her sisters. Wife studied at a gemological
institute between 1990 and 1992. Subsequently, wife traveled to Thailand to
organize a jewelry business and obtained a 24-year lease at a new shopping
mall in Chiangmai, Thailand. During this time, wife also acquired equipment
for the jewelry store and improved the premises to prepare for the store's
opening. Wife did not open the jewelry store as planned, but instead
returned to the United States.

Husband petitioned for marriage dissolution. The parties stipulated to most
dissolution matters including distribution of marital assets. At trial, the
primary issue was spousal maintenance. Judgment was entered dissolving the
parties' marriage and denying wife maintenance. Wife brought a post-trial
motion for amended findings or, in the alternative, a new trial, which the
district court denied. This appeal followed.
                                     
                              Decision

1. Spousal Maintenance
Wife's primary contention is that the district court abused its
discretion in denying her request for maintenance. Wife claims that the
evidence does not support several of the district court's findings. She
also argues that the court erred by failing to balance wife's needs and


ability to meet those needs against husband's ability to provide financial
support.
a. Findings of Fact
Wife argues that the evidence does not support several of the district
court's findings.(1)
        [Footnote] (1)Besides the findings described below,
        wife also challenges any finding that implies she
        acted in bad faith or was less than forthcoming.
        These are issues involving the credibility of
        witnesses and are based on the district court's
        personal observation of witnesses and the court's
        conclusions therefrom. We must give due regard to
        the

opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of witnesses.
See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; Sefkaw v. Sefkaw, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210
(Minn. 1988).

A district court's findings of fact concerning spousal maintenance must be
upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Gessner v. Gessner, 487
N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. App. 1992). First, wife asserts that there was no
support for the district court's finding that wife left her medical
practice in 1989 because of a contract dispute. Wife maintains that she had
a number of reasons for leaving her anesthesiology practice, including
memory problems and the high level of stress. In her brief, however, wife
recognizes that there was evidence to support the district court's finding
(wife stated that the contract problems she was having with Surgicare were
a factor). Our review of the record reveals ample evidence to support the
district court's finding, even though wife desires a different finding
(i.e., a number of factors contributed to her leaving practice). Therefore,
we conclude that her argument is unpersuasive given the clearly erroneous
standard of review for findings of fact.

Second, wife contends that there was no support for the district court's
finding that she could return to her medical practice, which resulted in
the court mistakenly attributing to her potential income of over $100,000.
Wife argues that her memory problems and the high professional stress level
prevented her from continuing her practice. Wife, however, had practiced
medicine for a number of years. The district court noted that wife
submitted no medical testimony to substantiate her memory problems.
Moreover, the district court considered wife's claim of memory problems
undercut by her ability to complete training successfully at a gemological
institute. Wife continues to be licensed to practice medicine in California
and apparently also Thailand, although she is no longer licensed in
Minnesota. Therefore, there was ample evidence in the record to support the
district court's finding that wife could return to the practice of
medicine.

Third, wife claims the district court's finding that she has sufficient
potential income from the Thailand assets to meet her reasonable needs is
unsupported by the evidence. Wife argues that the district court's decision
places her in the untenable position of having to return to medicine (which
she claims she cannot do because of her memory problems) or open the
jewelry store in Thailand (which she claims she cannot do because she has
no capital liquidity). As discussed above, however, there was evidence to
support the district court's finding that wife could return to medicine.
Therefore, regardless of the jewelry business, wife has her earning
capacity as a physician to meet her needs.

Notwithstanding, wife contends that the amount of income, if any, that
could be generated by the jewelry store is entirely speculative. The
parties testified, however, that the jewelry store was ready to open by
December 1992, but wife delayed the opening. Thus, by delaying the opening
of the jewelry store, wife prevented the district court from ascertaining
the potential income from the store. Under the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that the district court's finding was not
clearly erroneous.

b. Maintenance Determination

A district court's determination as to spousal maintenance will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318
N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982). A district court's decision must be clearly
erroneous and against logic and the facts in the record before an abuse of
discretion will be found. Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn.
1984).

Wife contends that the district court did not consider her financial needs
and ability to support herself in conjunction with husband's ability to pay
maintenance. The district court's findings of fact, however, indicate
otherwise. The district court appears to have reviewed wife's claimed
monthly expenses. The district court specifically found some of wife's
projected needs were non-recurring (e.g., shopping mall lease, attorney
fees) and thus should not be considered in its maintenance determination.
The district court also found several of her claimed needs were ``far too
extravagant for this court to consider reasonable.'' These comments
indicate a review of wife's financial needs. The district court then
provided a table describing and detailing all of wife's monthly living
expenses.(2)
        [Footnote] (2)The district court reduced wife's
        claimed monthly expenses from $13,050 to $5,450 by
        excluding $3,100 as lease payments for the Thai
        jewelry business and $1,600 in attorney fees and by
        limiting many of her proposed expenses as
        unsubstantiated or extravagant, while mindful of the
        parties' high marital standard of living.

The district court further considered wife's ability to meet her needs and
found wife's income from her medical practice for the years 1987, 1988, and
1989 to be approximately $120,000, $150,000 and $195,000 respectively. It
is apparent from the extensive findings that the district court considered
wife's financial needs.

The district court then considered husband's ability to pay maintenance.
The district court listed husband's gross annual income from his
neurosurgery practice for the six preceding years and noted his monthly
expenses.(3)
        [Footnote] (3)Husband's gross annual income from
        1989 to 1994 ranged from a high of $584,868 to a low
        of $358,682 earned in the year of the dissolution
        proceedings.

The district court's findings of fact indicate that the court considered
husband's ability to pay maintenance before reaching its conclusion.

In addition, the district court's findings cited Minn. Stat. 𨹞.552,
subd. 1 (1994), which contains the threshold maintenance considerations,
and stated it had weighed that standard. The district court listed specific
reasons for its denial of maintenance including the large amount of assets
awarded to wife by stipulation. The district court further commented that
the ``evidence suggests that [wife] has additional assets she has failed to
disclose in the dissolution proceeding.'' The district court also
specifically found that wife had voluntarily left her medical position,
from which she derived a six-figure income, complaining of
``unsubstantiated'' memory problems.(4)
        [Footnote] (4)Wife attaches significance to
        husband's tacit support of her decision to leave her
        medical practice. Husband's approval, however, does
        not negate wife's potential earning capacity.

In addition, the district court considered in its maintenance decision the
proceeds from the sale of the parties' two Florida condominiums and the
sale of wife's jewelry. Therefore, we conclude that the district court

appropriately evaluated wife's financial needs and ability to support
herself against husband's ability to pay maintenance.

Finally, the district court concluded its analysis of the maintenance issue
by considering the statutory factors regarding maintenance contained in
Minn. Stat. 𨹞.552, subd. 2 (1994). The district court considered not
only the threshold issues of subdivision 1, but also the subdivision 2
factors utilized in determining the amount and duration of maintenance
before denying wife's request for maintenance. Our review of the record and
the parties' testimony reveals ample evidence to support the district
court's findings concerning wife's financial resources, education and
training, standard of living, absence from employment, age, physical and
emotional condition, and husband's ability to pay maintenance. Based on the
foregoing, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying maintenance.
c. Maintenance: Thai Courts
Wife argues the district court abused its discretion when it declined
to award temporary maintenance pending further consideration of the
maintenance issue by Thai courts. Wife cites Minn. Stat. 𨹞.552,
subd. 3 (1994). This provision, however, applies only after the district
court has determined that a maintenance award is appropriate and the court
is uncertain whether to make the maintenance temporary or permanent. Here,
the district court decided the threshold maintenance issue against wife.
Thus, the district court did not have occasion to consider whether an award
of temporary maintenance during the interim period was appropriate. We see
no abuse of discretion on this issue.

2. Valuation of Boats

Wife argues that the district court erred in determining the value of
several boats belonging to the parties. We will not reverse a district
court's valuation of an asset unless it is ``clearly erroneous on the
record as a whole.'' Hertz v. Hertz, 304 Minn. 144, 145, 229 N.W.2d
42, 44 (1975). Moreover, we do not require that district courts be exact in
their valuations of assets; ``it is only necessary that the value arrived
at lies within a reasonable range of figures.'' Johnson v. Johnson,
277 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Minn. 1979) (quoting Hertz, 304 Minn. at 145,
229 N.W.2d at 44). Wife contends that the district court erred in
adopting husband's testimony as to boat value ($5,300) instead of a
purported appraisal submitted by wife ($12,010).

The district court faulted wife's appraisal because it was ``unsigned,
undated, cryptic, difficult to decipher and was not totalled.''(5)
        [Footnote] (5)Wife argues that the district court
        adopted this language verbatim from husband's
        proposed findings on this issue. The practice of
        adopting one party's findings is acceptable,
        particularly if the findings are detailed, specific,
        and sufficient enough to enable meaningful review by
        the appellate court. Bliss v. Bliss, 493
        N.W.2d 583, 590 (Minn. App. 1992), review
        denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993). Nonetheless, the
        district court's adoption of one party's proposed
        findings raises the question of whether the court
        independently evaluated each party's testimony and
        evidence. Id.
        Based on the limited incorporation of proposed
        language in its findings, we conclude that the
        district court independently evaluated the testimony
        and evidence.

Further, the district court did not consider the appraisal credible because
wife did not attach an affidavit identifying and authenticating the
appraisal. Wife asserts that the business card attached to the appraisal
was sufficient identification for authentication purposes. But weighing the
credibility of the evidence is within realm of the factfinder and will not
be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. Reviewing the entire record,

we do not see the district court's valuation of the boats as clearly
erroneous. Moreover, the figure of $5,300 does not appear to be so far
outside the range of reasonable prices as to be clearly erroneous.

3. Attorney Fees
Finally, wife asserts that the district court abused its discretion in
her award of attorney fees. ``Generally, the award for attorney fees [based
on Minn. Stat. 𨹞.14] lies in the discretion of the court.'' Katz
v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d 835, 840 (Minn. 1987). An award of attorney fees
will not be upset absent an abuse of discretion. Id.
Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by not
awarding her the total amount of her attorney fees incurred in the
dissolution proceedings. Wife contends the property distribution of
American assets favors husband ($1,127,372 to husband and $613,310 to
wife). These figures, however, do not take into account the parties' Thai
assets and the mechanism established by the district court to equalize its
property distribution. The district court ordered the sale of the parties'
two Florida condominiums and wife's jewelry. The proceeds from these sales
are to be held in escrow and divided between the parties to equalize any
disproportionality after the Thai courts render a decision as to the Thai
assets.

Wife also asserts that she is unemployed and her income is speculative,
thus, she will need to deplete her marital property to pay attorney fees.
The district court, however, considered wife's financial needs before
fixing the amount of any attorney fees, by noting, ``This court finds
[wife] does not have the ability to pay all of her attorney fees without
substantially diminishing her liquid financial resources.'' Based on this,
the district court ordered husband pay $20,000 of wife's attorney fees. The
district court's decision to award wife only a portion of her fees instead
of the entire amount is within the court's discretion. Considering wife's
financial resources, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion.

Affirmed.