This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals
                              C5-96-476

     In the Matter of:

Mary E. Frendin, petitioner,
     Respondent,


vs.

Steven S.R. Frendin,
     Appellant.


Filed October 15, 1996
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge

Polk County District Court

File No. F8-95-620

Alan J. Sheppard, 921 South 2nd Avenue, Fargo, ND 58103 (for Appellant)


Mary Seaworth, Howe & Seaworth, 421 DeMers Avenue, Grand Forks, ND 58201
(for Respondent)

Considered and decided by Davies, Presiding Judge, Peterson, Judge, and
Klaphake, Judge.
                                     
                        Unpublished Opinion

KLAPHAKE, Judge (Hon. Michael J. Kraker, District Court Trial Judge)

In this marital dissolution appeal, appellant Steven S.R. Frendin
challenges the trial court's (1) finding of $10,000 nonmarital equity in
the homestead, (2) refusal to require a list of respondent Mary E.
Frendin's property prior to trial, (3) refusal to rule on appellant's
motion for sanctions, (4) omission of a specific finding on the property
valuation date, (5) reservation of spousal maintenance, and (6) imposition
of a set visitation schedule for the parties' son. Because we conclude that
the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion on the issues of
property characterization, property values, and spousal maintenance, and
because we deem other issues waived, we affirm.
                                     
                              Decision

1. Nonmarital Equity in the Family Home
Appellant contends respondent's $31,000 inheritance lost its nonmarital
character when she allowed it to be mixed with marital property and could
not trace an amount to the purchase of the homestead. Nevertheless,
appellant acknowledged that at least $12,000 of the homestead downpayment
came from the parties' joint account in which the nonmarital inheritance
had been deposited. This is sufficient evidence for the trial court to
conclude that respondent met her burden of proof for tracing. See
Doering v. Doering, 385 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. App. 1986) (party
seeking to trace nonmarital property not held to ``strict tracing''
standard and need only show by preponderance of evidence that asset
``acquired in exchange for nonmarital property.'').

2. Requiring List of Assets and Debts Prior to Trial

Appellant argues that the failure of the trial court to require disclosure
of respondent's assets and debts prior to trial prevented the trial court
from making proper valuation determinations. A court's valuation decision
must be ``supported by documentary or testimonial evidence, or by
comprehensive findings issued by the court.'' Ronnkvist v. Ronnkvist,
331 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. 1983). Nevertheless, there is no requirement
that this evidence be available to the court prior to trial. Before making
its findings, the trial court received a list of respondent's assets and
heard testimony from the parties on property values. Thus, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in valuing the property without requiring a
complete list prior to trial. See Letsch v. Letsch, 409 N.W.2d 239,
242 (Minn. App. 1987).
3. Motion for Sanctions

Appellant moved to sanction respondent for failing to answer
interrogatories, but the court never ruled on the motion.
        
        Where there are neither findings of fact nor a
        conclusion of law as to an issue and the claimed
        omission is not brought to the attention of the
        trial court by motion for amended facts, this court
        will not review the issue.

Pacific Mut. Door Co. v. James, 465 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. App.
1991) (citation omitted). As appellant did not move for amended findings,
we decline to review this issue on appeal. See id.

4. Date of Valuation

Appellant contends the trial court erred by failing to set a date for
valuing the marital property. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (1994)
directs a trial court to value marital assets as of the date of the
pretrial conference, unless the parties agree on a different date, or
the court makes a specific finding for another date. Here, the trial court
found no specific valuation date, and no other date was agreed upon. Thus,
we assume that the trial court used the pretrial date. See Loth v. Loth,
227 Minn. 387, 392, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (error by trial
court never presumed on appeal).

The trial court received testimony and exhibits on all of the property
distributed without dispute as to the values on any specific date. The
trial court set the values within the reasonable range of figures available
from the record. See Johnson v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Minn.
1979) (trial court need only arrive at value within reasonable range of
figures offered). While appellant testified that the value of one vehicle
varied according to the time of year, the trial court's valuation of that
item fell within the range of the evidence presented for valuing that item
as of the date of pretrial. Because appellant has not proven the trial
court's findings on property values were clearly erroneous, we affirm.
See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (trial court findings not set aside
unless clearly erroneous).

5. Reservation of Spousal Maintenance
Minnesota law provides that a court may reserve jurisdiction of spousal
maintenance for determination at a later date. Minn. Stat. 𨹞.55,
subd. 1 (1994). Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously reserved
the issue of maintenance because it did not make specific findings to
justify an award of maintenance. Because the trial court reserved the
issue, we review only for an abuse of discretion. See Van De Loo v. Van
De Loo, 346 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Minn. App. 1984) (appellate court will not
reverse reservation of spousal maintenance unless trial court abused its
discretion). The record indicates appellant's income exceeded respondent's
income in the past, but he was temporarily unemployed at the time of trial.
Respondent testified that her employment could be ending and that she would
need additional training to maintain skills within her profession. Under
these circumstances, respondent may be able to establish her need for
maintenance in the future, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in reserving the issue.
6. Visitation Schedule
In her statement of the case, appellant objects to the trial court's
imposing a set visitation schedule for the parties' son. Appellant failed
to address the issue in his appellate brief, however, and thus waived the
issue. See Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (issues
not argued in appellate briefs deemed waived).

Affirmed.