This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994) State of Minnesota in Court of Appeals C5-96-476 In the Matter of: Mary E. Frendin, petitioner, Respondent, vs. Steven S.R. Frendin, Appellant. Filed October 15, 1996 Affirmed Klaphake, Judge Polk County District Court File No. F8-95-620 Alan J. Sheppard, 921 South 2nd Avenue, Fargo, ND 58103 (for Appellant) Mary Seaworth, Howe & Seaworth, 421 DeMers Avenue, Grand Forks, ND 58201 (for Respondent) Considered and decided by Davies, Presiding Judge, Peterson, Judge, and Klaphake, Judge. Unpublished Opinion KLAPHAKE, Judge (Hon. Michael J. Kraker, District Court Trial Judge) In this marital dissolution appeal, appellant Steven S.R. Frendin challenges the trial court's (1) finding of $10,000 nonmarital equity in the homestead, (2) refusal to require a list of respondent Mary E. Frendin's property prior to trial, (3) refusal to rule on appellant's motion for sanctions, (4) omission of a specific finding on the property valuation date, (5) reservation of spousal maintenance, and (6) imposition of a set visitation schedule for the parties' son. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion on the issues of property characterization, property values, and spousal maintenance, and because we deem other issues waived, we affirm. Decision 1. Nonmarital Equity in the Family Home Appellant contends respondent's $31,000 inheritance lost its nonmarital character when she allowed it to be mixed with marital property and could not trace an amount to the purchase of the homestead. Nevertheless, appellant acknowledged that at least $12,000 of the homestead downpayment came from the parties' joint account in which the nonmarital inheritance had been deposited. This is sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that respondent met her burden of proof for tracing. See Doering v. Doering, 385 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. App. 1986) (party seeking to trace nonmarital property not held to ``strict tracing'' standard and need only show by preponderance of evidence that asset ``acquired in exchange for nonmarital property.''). 2. Requiring List of Assets and Debts Prior to Trial Appellant argues that the failure of the trial court to require disclosure of respondent's assets and debts prior to trial prevented the trial court from making proper valuation determinations. A court's valuation decision must be ``supported by documentary or testimonial evidence, or by comprehensive findings issued by the court.'' Ronnkvist v. Ronnkvist, 331 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. 1983). Nevertheless, there is no requirement that this evidence be available to the court prior to trial. Before making its findings, the trial court received a list of respondent's assets and heard testimony from the parties on property values. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the property without requiring a complete list prior to trial. See Letsch v. Letsch, 409 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Minn. App. 1987).
3. Motion for Sanctions Appellant moved to sanction respondent for failing to answer interrogatories, but the court never ruled on the motion. Where there are neither findings of fact nor a conclusion of law as to an issue and the claimed omission is not brought to the attention of the trial court by motion for amended facts, this court will not review the issue. Pacific Mut. Door Co. v. James, 465 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. App. 1991) (citation omitted). As appellant did not move for amended findings, we decline to review this issue on appeal. See id. 4. Date of Valuation Appellant contends the trial court erred by failing to set a date for valuing the marital property. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (1994) directs a trial court to value marital assets as of the date of the pretrial conference, unless the parties agree on a different date, or the court makes a specific finding for another date. Here, the trial court found no specific valuation date, and no other date was agreed upon. Thus, we assume that the trial court used the pretrial date. See Loth v. Loth, 227 Minn. 387, 392, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (error by trial court never presumed on appeal). The trial court received testimony and exhibits on all of the property distributed without dispute as to the values on any specific date. The trial court set the values within the reasonable range of figures available from the record. See Johnson v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Minn. 1979) (trial court need only arrive at value within reasonable range of figures offered). While appellant testified that the value of one vehicle varied according to the time of year, the trial court's valuation of that item fell within the range of the evidence presented for valuing that item as of the date of pretrial. Because appellant has not proven the trial court's findings on property values were clearly erroneous, we affirm. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (trial court findings not set aside unless clearly erroneous). 5. Reservation of Spousal Maintenance Minnesota law provides that a court may reserve jurisdiction of spousal maintenance for determination at a later date. Minn. Stat. 𨹞.55, subd. 1 (1994). Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously reserved the issue of maintenance because it did not make specific findings to justify an award of maintenance. Because the trial court reserved the issue, we review only for an abuse of discretion. See Van De Loo v. Van De Loo, 346 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Minn. App. 1984) (appellate court will not reverse reservation of spousal maintenance unless trial court abused its discretion). The record indicates appellant's income exceeded respondent's income in the past, but he was temporarily unemployed at the time of trial. Respondent testified that her employment could be ending and that she would need additional training to maintain skills within her profession. Under these circumstances, respondent may be able to establish her need for maintenance in the future, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reserving the issue. 6. Visitation Schedule In her statement of the case, appellant objects to the trial court's imposing a set visitation schedule for the parties' son. Appellant failed to address the issue in his appellate brief, however, and thus waived the issue. See Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (issues not argued in appellate briefs deemed waived). Affirmed.