This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals

     In the Matter of:

Robert W. Shirley

Filed October 15, 1996
Randall, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. P38330678

Thomas Bennett Wilson, III, Gayle Gaumer, Wilson Law Firm, 4933 France
Avenue South, Suite 220, Edina, MN 55410 (for Appellant Robert Shirley)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Peter Stiehm, Assistant
County Attorney, A-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for
Respondent ReEntry House)

Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge, Amundson, Judge, and
Foley, Judge.(*)
        [Footnote] (*)Retired judge of the Minnesota Court
        of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn.
        Const. art. VI, § 2.
                        Unpublished Opinion

RANDALL, Judge (Hon. Ann Alton, District Court Trial Judge)

Appellant Robert W. Shirley had been previously committed as mentally ill.
ReEntry House filed a petition seeking his continued commitment. After a
hearing, the trial court ordered continued commitment as mentally ill.
Shirley appeals. We affirm.

Appellant Robert Shirley has a long history of mental illness. In 1994, he
stopped taking his medication and began to display symptoms again. This led
to his commitment as mentally ill in March 1994, September 1994, and
September 1995.

At the time of the hearing, appellant was living at ReEntry House. Although
he has said he is ready to live in an apartment, Dr. Chris Meadows, the
court-appointed examiner, and appellant's mother testified as to why this
has not occurred. Appellant did not keep his appointments to see apartments
and claims to be particular about the kind of neighborhood in which he
would like to live. In addition, because of other commitments, he has not
spent much time searching for an apartment.

Dr. Meadows diagnosed appellant with a schizoaffective disorder. He
explained that appellant continues to be delusional, even when he takes his
medication. Appellant believes that if he stops taking the medication for a
long enough period, he will improve and have the ability to function in
daily activities. The record shows that when appellant has not been under a
court order, he has discontinued his medication and his condition has
deteriorated. The request by ReEntry that appellant be recommitted is based
primarily on appellant's assertion that he will stop taking his medication
if not recommitted. While it is difficult to predict, Dr. Meadows testified
that if not recommitted, appellant would likely stay on his medication a
short while, then stop taking it and deteriorate.

The trial court found that if not involuntarily committed, appellant
        would likely attempt to physically harm himself or
        others and fail to provide necessities, based on
        [his] persistence in indicating that he will abandon
        his medication therapy if his commitment is
        terminated. [H]e has a long history of mental
        illness and hospitalizations for treatment.
        Nonetheless, he cannot acknowledge the fact that he
        is mentally ill or that his mental functioning has
        drastically deteriorated when he is not on
        psychotropic medications. He adamantly denies having
        had any problems in the past when he is off his
        psychotropic medication, despite substantial
        evidence to the contrary. In the past few years, he
        has demonstrated an inability to care for himself
        and his medical needs when he is not taking his
        psychotropic medications. He left a hospital
        [against medical advice] in sub-zero weather clad
        only in a hospital gown and a pair of slippers. His

        thinking was disorganized and he obsessed on the
        letter ``N''. He required restraints in the hospital
        on a nearly daily basis due to his aggressive
        behavior. When not on medications, [he]
        decompensates and is at high risk to engage in
        behaviors that would cause physical harm to himself
        or others. If [he] does not take his psychotropic
        medications, he will decompensate. He has made it
        clear he will stop taking those medications when his
        commitment is no longer in effect. Therefore, one
        can only conclude that, if [his] commitment ends, he
        will decompensate to the dangerous condition he was
        in at the time he was committed in March of 1994.

The trial court ordered appellant's continued commitment to ReEntry House
and the Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Center as mentally ill. This appeal

Appellant argues the evidence does not show he is likely to harm himself or
others. On a petition for continued commitment, it is not necessary to show
a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others, or a recent
failure to provide necessities. Minn. Stat. 𨵕B.12, subd. 4 (1994);
cf. Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13(b) (1994) (standard for
initial commitment requiring such proof).
        Instead, the court must find that the patient is
        likely to attempt to physically harm self or others,
        or to fail to provide necessary personal food,
        clothing, shelter, or medical care unless
        involuntary commitment is continued.

Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 4. Findings will not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous. In re Cordie, 372 N.W.2d 24, 31 (Minn. App.
1985), review denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 1985).

Appellant argues that the commitment must be based on overt evidence of a
current condition that will result in the likelihood of future harm, not
just speculation. See In re McGaughey, 536 N.W.2d 621, 623 (Minn.
1995) (initial commitment as mentally ill). He contends the court here
merely found he would be harmful to himself if he discontinued his
medications, but there was no finding he is presently psychotic or unable
to obtain necessities, or poses a danger to himself or others, as the
court-appointed examiner agreed.

A patient's symptoms may be in remission due to medication, but may recur
when the patient fails to take the medication. See In re Malm, 375
N.W.2d 888, 891 (Minn. App. 1985) (commitment as mentally ill and
dangerous). In that case, precommitment behavior may be considered. Id.
Appellant's symptoms are not completely in remission. Dr. Meadows
testified appellant continues to experience delusions about his medication
and evidence indicated he has said repeatedly he will stop taking the
medication when he is no longer committed. The court found he has
deteriorated in the past when not taking his medication, showing an
inability to provide for himself and his medical needs and a likelihood of
harming himself or others. The court cited an earlier instance in which he
stopped taking his medication, left a hospital in subzero weather clad only
in a gown and slippers, and required restraints on nearly a daily basis due
to aggressive behavior. The trial court determination that appellant is
likely to attempt to harm himself or others or to fail to provide
necessities if not committed is not clearly erroneous.

Appellant also argues that the trial court order did not identify conduct
to support the commitment. Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 7 (findings
required for continued commitment). A remand may be required if a trial

court does not make sufficient findings. See In re Stewart, 352
N.W.2d 811, 813 (Minn. App. 1984) (remand for findings where order for
continued commitment failed to specify any conduct supporting
determination, state statutory criteria of commitment met, or discuss less
restrictive alternative). In this case, the trial court made extensive
findings, and appellant's argument is without merit.

Finally, appellant contends the trial court improperly rejected the less
restrictive alternative of independent living solely because an apartment
had not yet been found. When ordering a continued commitment, the trial
court must consider less restrictive alternatives. Minn. Stat. §
253B.12, subd. 7. The court must consider alternative programs and the
patient's treatment preferences. In re King, 476 N.W.2d 190, 193
(Minn. App. 1991). The trial court decision will not be reversed unless
clearly erroneous. Id.
The trial court considered less restrictive alternatives such as
apartment living, but rejected them because appellant is presently
searching for a suitable apartment and until he finds one, it is not an
option. It noted he has procrastinated somewhat and that the treatment team
represented to the court they will help appellant find an apartment.

Appellant's choice of placement, an apartment, is not available yet because
he has not completed the process of choosing one. The trial court could not
commit him to a placement not yet available, and the findings indicated
this option would be pursued. This record does not display either startling
facts or a consistent pattern of egregious conduct as is often the case in
renewed commitments. But that is not the standard. The record supports the
trial court's determination, and we affirm its commitment of appellant to
ReEntry House and Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Center. See In re
Knapp, 351 N.W.2d 391, 393 (Minn. App. 1984) (commitment to Anoka Metro
Regional Treatment Center upheld where patient missed appointments to
discuss admission into another facility, Hennepin County Medical Center was
unwilling to treat because patient did not follow medical advice, preferred
facility would not be available for five weeks, and social worker
recommended Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Center).