This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat.§ 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
C5-96-154

In the Matter of the Welfare of: D. J. D.

Filed September 17, 1996
Affirmed
Kalitowski, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. J895645339

William R. Kennedy, Hennepin County Public Defender, Renee Bergeron, Assistant Public Defender, 317 Second Avenue South, #200, Minneapolis, MN 55401-0809 (for Appellant D.J.D.)

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Respondent)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Paul R. Scoggin, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for Respondent)

Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Willis, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

KALITOWSKI, Judge
Appellant D.J.D. challenges the sufficiency of evidence proving his delinquency petition. The petition alleged D.J.D. committed one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of malicious punishment of a child against D.J.D.'s young cousin K.D. while K.D. was under D.J.D.'s supervision in a day care facility. We affirm.
D E C I S I O N

In a delinquency proceeding, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the petition beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Welfare of G.L.M., 347 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Minn. App. 1984). On an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, this court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, and will only overturn a finding of delinquency if the trier of fact could not reasonably find the juvenile committed the charged acts. In re Welfare of T.M.V., 368 N.W.2d 421, 423 (Minn. App. 1985).
Here, the evidence supporting the petition included testimony from K.D.'s mother, several treating physicians and the Cornerhouse interviewer that K.D. told them D.J.D. sexually and physically abused her while at the day care. The state also presented physical evidence corroborating such testimony.
D.J.D. argues the weight of the evidence does not support the district court's findings that: (1) K.D. stayed at the day care overnight from July 11 through Julyand (2) only D.J.D. and K.D.'s father had access to K.D. during this time. Although conflicting testimony was presented at trial on these issues, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the state we conclude the testimony of K.D.'s mother adequately supports the district court's findings, and the court was free to believe K.D.'s mother's testimony over other testimony offered at trial.
Moreover, even assuming K.D. went home with her mother during the evenings between July 11 and 13, such a finding would only lessen the corroborating evidence supporting K.D.'s story. The testimony of a sexual assault victim need not be corroborated. Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (1994). Corroboration of a child's allegations of sexual abuse is necessary only when the evidence is otherwise insufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1984); see also, State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 662 (Minn. 1990) (a jury can credit the out of court statements of a young sexual assault victim who is deemed unavailable to testify). Here, there is sufficient evidence that the petitions are true based upon physical evidence presented at trial along with K.D.'s many reports of D.J.D.'s sexual and physical abuse against her to her mother, several physicians, and the Cornerhouse interviewer.
Affirmed.