This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS CX-96-618 State of Minnesota, Appellant, vs. Mary Katherine Reiser, Respondent. Filed August 13, 1996 Reversed Davies, Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. 96003604 Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota St., St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Appellant) Paul D. Baertschi, 4640 IDS Center, 80 S. Eighth St., Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for Appellant) Faison T. Sessoms, 840 Midland Square Bldg., 331 Second Ave. S., Minneapolis, MN 55401 (for Respondent) Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge, Davies, Judge, and Harten, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N DAVIES, Judge State appeals from an order ruling that a gross misdemeanor prosecution of respondent was barred by a previous dismissal. We reverse. FACTS Respondent Mary Katherine Reiser was tab charged with gross misdemeanor DWI. At her first appearance in early November 1995, she requested the issuance of a formal complaint, but when she appeared to receive the complaint in late December 1995, it had not yet been filed. District court Judge Fitzgerald denied the state's request for a continuance to file a complaint, stating, "Denied. That will be dismissed." About two weeks later, the state filed a formal complaint charging Reiser with gross misdemeanor charges of driving under the influence and having an alcohol concentration of .10 or more within two hours of driving, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subds. 1(a), (e), and 3(c)(1) (1994). After a first appearance on the formal complaint, district court Judge Carey granted Reiser's motion to dismiss, stating: This matter was dismissed with prejudice by the Honorable Patrick W. Fitzgerald, Judge of the District Court. Thus, the State's remedy was to appeal said order to the higher court and seek its reversal. However, it is inappropriate for the State to simply ignore the order of Judge Fitzgerald and recharge the defendant. D E C I S I O N I. Though the parties state the issue several ways, there is actually only one substantive issue here: Did Judge Fitzgerald bar further prosecution of this case by stating, "Denied. That will be dismissed."? To prevail in this pretrial appeal, the state must show clearly and unequivocally that Judge Carey erred as to the legal effect of Judge Fitzgerald's order. See State v. Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Minn. 1987) (to prevail on pretrial appeal, state must demonstrate "clearly and equivocally" that trial court erred in its judgment and that error will have critical impact on outcome at trial unless reversed). The state met its burden, for, contrary to Judge Carey's conclusion, it is unclear from Judge Fitzgerald's ruling--or at least not as clear as the rules of criminal procedure require--whether he meant to bar further prosecution. Under Minn. R. Crim P. § 17.06, subd. 4(3), [i]n misdemeanor cases and also in gross misdemeanor cases under Minn. Stat. § 169.121 * * * dismissed for failure to file a timely complaint within the time limits as provided by Rule 4.02, subd. 5(3), further prosecution shall not be barred unless additionally a judge or judicial officer of the court has so ordered. (Emphasis added.) A comment to the rule reiterates that, in misdemeanor cases and also in gross misdemeanor cases under Minn. Stat. § 169.121 * * * dismissed for failure to file a timely complaint within thirty (30) days pursuant to Rule 4.02, subd. 5(3), further prosecution is not automatically barred, but is barred only if so ordered by the court. Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.06, subd. 4(3) cmt. (emphasis added). Judge Fitzgerald did not state that "further prosecution is barred." He simply said, in response to the state's request for a continuance, "Denied. That will be dismissed." This falls short of barring further prosecution for, on its face, it merely denies a request for a continuance and dismisses the case from the court's calendar. It was error to construe it as doing more than this. Minn. R. Crim. P. 4.02, subd. 5(3), contemplates that a complaint can be filed even after a charge has been dismissed for failure to file a valid complaint. By his ruling, Judge Carey erroneously denied this reality. We reverse. II. Reiser has moved for an award of $840 in attorney fees and $46.38 in briefing expenses incurred on appeal. We award her these amounts pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 2(6), which provides that a defendant forced to respond to a pretrial appeal by the state is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs. Reversed. As the prosecution was dismissed here, the critical-impact requirement is plainly met. A line of cases states that even the words "with prejudice" alone may not be determinative in a criminal case. See, e.g., City of St. Paul v. Halvorson, 301 Minn. 48, 51, 221 N.W.2d 535, 537 (1974) ("[I]t is not the words utilized by the lower court in its dismissal but rather the basis of the dismissal itself that is controlling for our purposes."); City of St. Paul v. Landreville, 301 Minn. 43, 46, 221 N.W.2d 532, 534 (1974) ("[W]hen referring to dismissals the words 'with prejudice' or 'permanently' must be held to be superfluous."); City of West St. Paul v. Banning, 409 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Minn. App. 1987) ("The phrases 'with prejudice' and 'without prejudice' are irrelevant to a determination of the finality of a dismissal in a criminal case.").