This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat.  480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
CX-95-2665
C2-96-175

In Re the Marriage of:
Kathleen Ann Dawson,
n/k/a Kathleen Ann Foord, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Gregory Paul Dawson,
Respondent.

Filed August 13 , 1996

Affirmed 
Toussaint, Chief Judge


Hennepin County District Court
File No. 169985


Louis M. Reidenberg, Louis M. Reidenberg Law Offices, 625 
Pillsbury Center, 200 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402-
1887 (for appellant)

Gregory Dawson, 5643 Green Circle Drive, #303, Minnetonka, 
MN 55343 (pro se respondent )

	Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge, 
Kalitowski, Judge, and Stone, Judge.*



U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge
	In two consolidated appeals from several orders of the 
district court, appellant-mother challenges (1) the denial of her 
motion asking that the judgment and decree be interpreted as 
granting her sole physical custody of the parties' minor children, 
(2) the denial of her motion for modification of custody and 
visitation, and (3) the award of attorney fees in favor of 
respondent-father.  We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

I.
	Appellant requested that the judgment be interpreted to 
grant her sole physical custody of the parties' minor children.  The 
district court denied appellant's request.  
	A district court's findings regarding the intended meaning 
of an ambiguous judgment should not be reversed unless it is 
clearly erroneous.  Empire State Bank v. Devereaux, 402 N.W.2d 
584, 587 (Minn. App. 1987).  Construction of an unambiguous 
instrument is a question of law.  Id.  The judgment and decree 
should be interpreted as a whole, and if upon such consideration 
the language is ambiguous or open to two constructions, the whole 
record may be examined to determine "what was intended by the 
judgment and to evolve a more definite expression thereof."  Palmi 
v. Palmi, 273 Minn. 97, 102-03, 140 N.W.2d 77, 81 (1966).  The 
district court has the inherent power to correct errors so that the 
judgment accurately depicts what occurred and what was decided.  
Palmi, 273 Minn. at 103, 140 N.W.2d at 81.     
	The practice of sharing joint physical custody does not 
require an equal division of responsibility and time.  Ayers v. 
Ayers, 508 N.W.2d 515, 520 (Minn. 1993).  In fact, some courts 
choose "to designate joint physical custodians as primary and 
secondary joint custodians."  Lutzi v. Lutzi, 485 N.W.2d 311, 314 
(Minn. App. 1992).  Furthermore, a stipulation that the children's 
primary residence shall be with the mother is not 
incompatible with the label "joint physical custody," [rather 
it] is consistent with an arrangement in which the residence 
of the children is "structured between the parties." 
Ayers, 508 N.W.2d at 520; see Minn. Stat.  518.003, subd. 3(d) 
(1994) (defining "joint physical custody" as a system where "the 
routine daily care and control and the residence of the child is 
structured between the parties").   
	Here, appellant argues the district court erred by 
interpreting the judgment to mean she shared joint physical 
custody of the children with respondent because (1) her home is 
the children's primary residence, (2) she is the primary caregiver, 
and (3) she has custody of the children approximately 60% of the 
year.  We are unpersuaded.
	The parties' Marriage Termination Agreement (the 
agreement) provides:
8. Both parties are fit and proper parents.  The best interests 
of the minor children would be served by granting the 
parties joint legal and physical custody, subject to the 
shared custody schedule * * * .

19. Custody.  That the parties shall be granted joint legal 
and physical custody of the parties' two (2) minor children, 
* * * .  That the primary residence of the minor children 
shall be with [appellant], subject to visitation by 
[respondent] * * * .
(emphasis added)  The agreement further provides that 
the terms of this agreement shall be made a part of any 
decree issued, by reference, whether or not each and every 
portion of this agreement is literally set forth in said decree.
	The resulting judgment specifically incorporates paragraph 
8 of the agreement, but in curious nonconformity, only refers to 
"joint legal custody" in the Conclusions of Law.  	The judgment's 
single reference to joint legal custody--without mention of physical 
custody--appears to be a clerical error.  However, regardless of 
whether it is an error, we affirm the district court because the 
totality of the agreement in conjunction with the Ayers and Lutzi 
holdings permits no other result.
II.
	The district court concluded it did not have the power to 
change the custody and visitation schedule because "[t]here has 
been no showing of endangerment to the children, as required 
under the parties' judgment and decree * * * ."  Appellant 
challenges the district court's conclusion, arguing that application 
of the endangerment standard is improper in this case.
	An appellate court will not reverse a custody or visitation 
determination unless the trial court abused its discretion by making 
findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying 
the law.   Manthei v. Manthei, 268 N.W.2d 45, 46 (Minn. 1978).
	The endangerment standard applies both to the modification 
of joint custody orders and to the restriction of visitation rights.  
See Minn. Stat.  518.18 (e), (d) (1994) (endangerment standard 
applies to the modification of a prior custody order, unless parties 
agree to use a different standard); Minn. Stat.  518.175, subd. 5 
(1994) (court may restrict visitation rights if visitation is likely to 
endanger the child).
	Here, the parties agreed that
neither party shall attempt to change this custody and 
visitation agreement without the consent of the other party, 
unless one of the "children's therapists" has stated, in 
writing, that the current environment "endangers the 
children's physical or emotional health or impairs the 
children's emotional development and the harm likely to be 
caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the 
advantage of a change to the child."  
Nevertheless, appellant argues it was inappropriate to apply the 
endangerment standard because her proposed modification does 
not "restrict" respondent's visitation rights.   	
	Appellant's argument appears to be entirely based on Minn. 
Stat.  518.175.  It ignores both Minn. Stat.  518.18 and the 
parties' bargained-for agreement, neither of which refers to or 
requires that the change be a "restriction."  In light of Minn. Stat. 
 518.18, as well as the express terms of the agreement, we hold 
that an application of the endangerment standard was not only 
appropriate, but mandatory. 
III. 
	The district court concluded it was not in the "best interests" 
of the children to change school districts,  citing the apparent 
academic superiority of the Hopkins school district, the children's 
long-standing ties to the Hopkins school district, their established 
circle of friends, their familiarity with teachers, their involvement 
in Hopkins school activities and sports, their success in the 
Hopkins school district, and the convenience of appellant's 
continuing, daily commute to the Hopkins school district area.
	Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.  Appellant does not dispute the 
district court's findings.  Rather, she argues the district court did 
not thoroughly consider the inconvenience of a long commute and 
the need for the children to make new friends in Chaska.  There is 
nothing in the record to indicate that the court failed to consider 
these factors when it determined what was in the children's best 
interest, only that the greater weight of all factors considered 
resulted in a finding that it is in the best interests of the children to 
remain in the Hopkins school district.  Consequently, given our 
standard of review, we affirm the district court's decision on the 
school district issue.
IV.
	The district court awarded respondent $8,091 in attorney 
fees pursuant to the express language of the judgment, which 
provides:
[I]f a party does proceed to court on a motion to change 
custody, and if the change of custody is denied, the 
prevailing party shall be awarded his or her attorney's fees 
* * * from the other party.
An award of attorney fees will not be upset absent an abuse of 
discretion.  Katz v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d 835, 840 (Minn. 1987).  The 
record supports the district court's award of attorney fees.  
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
	Affirmed.


     * Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to 
Minn. Const. art. VI,  10.
       Appellant contends the "best interest" of the children 
is the appropriate standard to apply in this case.  Even if it 
were, appellant fails to address the best interest factors 
enumerated in Minn. Stat.  518.17 (1994), arguing instead 
that it is not in her children's adverse interest to modify 
custody and visitation.  This simply is not the standard.  See 
Sydnes v. Sydnes, 388 N.W.2d 3, 6 (Minn. App. 1986) 
(stating that the moving parent carries the burden of proving 
that the move is in the children's best interests).
      	The "best interest of the child" standard is the 
appropriate standard for determining the most appropriate 
school for a child to attend.   See Novack v. Novack, 
446 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied 
(Minn. Dec. 1, 1989) (instructing the district court to 
apply the best interests standard to determine whether 
the child should attend public school or be "home 
schooled" by the mother).