This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS CX-95-2066 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Douglas Eric Towle, Appellant. Filed August 13, 1996 Affirmed Short, Judge St. Louis County District Court File No. K694600475 Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, Catherine M. Keane, Assistant Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Respondent) Alan L. Mitchell, St. Louis County Attorney, 100 North Fifth Avenue West, #501, Duluth, MN 55802 (for Respondent) Lawrence W. Pry, Assistant State Public Defender, 875 Summit Avenue, LEC 304, St. Paul, MN 55105 (for Appellant) Considered and decided by Parker, Presiding Judge, Short, Judge, and Foley, Judge.* U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N SHORT, Judge A jury convicted Douglas Eric Towle of three counts of aiding and abetting first-degree manslaughter in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 2 (aiding and abetting), 609.20(1) (first-degree manslaughter, heat of passion). On appeal, Towle argues the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) not permitting him to introduce hearsay statements of his codefendant; and (2) rejecting his proposed jury instructions. We affirm. D E C I S I O N I. A trial court has discretion to allow the introduction of hearsay statements made against the declarant's interest if the declarant is unavailable as a witness. See Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (excepting statements made against the declarant's interest from the hearsay rule); State v. Glaze, 452 N.W.2d 655, 660-61 (Minn. 1990) (reviewing the denial of a request to introduce statements under this rule for an abuse of discretion). Towle argues the trial court abused its discretion by declining to permit the admission of his codefendant's statements, in which the codefendant: (1) described his perceptions of events leading up to the shootings; (2) indicated no one knew he had a gun; and (3) admitted to shooting the three victims. Despite the codefendant's unavailability, we disagree. First, the statements describing events prior to the shootings and those discussing knowledge of the gun did not tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability or to inculpate him at the time he uttered them. See Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (using this standard as one indication of a statement against interest); see also Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2435 (1994) (holding the identical Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) does not allow the admission of non-self- inculpatory statements even when made within a broader, and generally self-inculpatory, narrative). And second, although the codefendant's statements admitting he shot the three victims are inculpatory, they are not sufficiently trustworthy so as to require their admission. See State v. Watts, 452 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Minn. App. 1990) (finding a statement that lessened the declarant's involvement in the criminal activity still established criminal liability); see also Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (requiring corroborating circumstances clearly indicating the trustworthiness of statements against penal interest that are offered to exculpate the defendant). While the codefendant's three first-degree murder convictions tend to corroborate these statements, a consideration of other factors does not clearly establish the statements' trustworthiness. Relevant factors include: (1) whether there is any apparent motive for the out-of-court declarant to misrepresent the matter, (2) the general character of the speaker, (3) whether other people heard the out-of-court statement, (4) whether the statement was made spontaneously, (5) the timing of the declaration and the relationship between the speaker and the witness. Unites States v. Bobo, 994 F.2d 524, 528 (8th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Rasmussen, 790 F.2d 55, 56 (8th Cir. 1986)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 250 (1993). The record shows: (1) the codefendant made the statements while in custody and despite his belief that his conversations may have been recorded; (2) the statements tend to suggest he did not premeditate the killings; (3) Towle is the brother of the codefendant's girlfriend, the rape of whom allegedly led to the shootings; (4) the statements were not heard by anyone else; (5) they were not spontaneous; and (6) the codefendant did not make the inculpatory statements until at least several days after the shootings. See State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1981) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) advisory comm. note, and acknowledging that certain in-custody statements may be motivated by a desire to curry favor with the police, and finding a statement made after assurance of lenient treatment was not against the declarant's interest); State v. Thompson, 413 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Minn. App. 1987) (finding a statement inadmissible as a statement against interest and noting it was offered as an attempt to mitigate the offense); see also State v. Higginbotham, 298 Minn. 1, 5, 212 N.W.2d 881, 883 (1973) (noting a close friend might fabricate a confession in order to absolve the defendant). Furthermore, even the witness to whom the codefendant made the statements believed the codefendant was covering for Towle. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting the use of the codefendant's statements. II. A trial court also has discretion to reject a requested jury instruction and error results only from an abuse of that discretion. State v. Blasus, 445 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 1989). When reviewing jury instructions, we consider the instructions as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately explained the law. State v. Flores, 418 N.W.2d 150, 155 (Minn. 1988). The trial court instructed the jury that Towle was guilty of aiding and abetting his codefendant if the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to assist the codefendant in committing the charged crimes or their lesser-included offenses. See Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (1994) (setting forth this standard for aiding and abetting). In addition, the court gave instructions paralleling Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2 (1994), which allows aiding and abetting convictions for unintended crimes when "committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable * * * as a probable consequence of committing * * * the crime intended." See also 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 4.01 (1990) (outlining the corresponding jury instruction). Towle argues this instruction tended to mislead and confuse the jury by suggesting the jury could convict him based solely on reasonable foreseeability, and without a finding of intent to commit any of the crimes. See Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (requiring proof of intent to aid and abet). However, Towle was charged with three crimes of intentionally aiding and abetting. If the jury found Towle intended to aid and abet at least one of the killings, the statute allows the jury to convict him for the other crimes based on the intent involved in this original crime. Cf. State v. Peirce, 364 N.W.2d 801, 809-10 (Minn. 1985) (rejecting another claim that an instruction given pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2 diluted the burden of proof). Under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by including this instruction. Affirmed. * Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.