This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS C9-96-528 Dipchan Kissoondath, et al., Appellants, vs. Gregory Alan Ammerman, et al., Respondents. Filed August 13, 1996 Affirmed Schultz, Judge* Hennepin County District Court File No. 9216164 Richard Baldwin, 301 Degree of Honor Building, 325 Cedar Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; Paul J. Phelps, Lyons, Sawicki, Neese & Phelps, 1560 Beam Avenue, Suite A, St. Paul, MN 55109; Michael J. Weidner, Snelling, Christensen & Laue, P.A., 5101 Vernon Avenue South, Suite 400, Minneapolis, MN 55436 (for Appellants) Mark A. Gwin, Andrea E. Reisborg, Cousineau, McGuire & Anderson, Chartered, 600 Travelers Express Tower, 1550 Utica Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55416-5318; George C. Hottinger, Erstad & Riemer, 1000 Northland Plaza, 3800 West 80th Street, Minneapolis, MN 55431 (for Respondents) Considered and decided by Short, Presiding Judge, Schumacher, Judge, and Schultz, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N SCHULTZ, Judge Personal injury plaintiffs seek interest under a liability insurance policy from the date of a jury verdict when the policy allows interest only after the entry of judgment. Because the policy language is clear and unambiguous and the reasonable- expectations doctrine does not apply, we affirm. FACTS United States Fire Insurance (U.S. Fire) is the liability insurer for a taxi cab company. Greg Ammerman's taxi cab hit Michael Heinonen's pickup truck, injuring Heinonen and passenger Dipchan Kissoondath. Heinonen, Kissoondath, and his wife Ann (appellants) sued Ammerman and the cab company. The jury awarded appellants $2.28 million on August 22, 1994. The district court stayed entry of judgment pending posttrial motions and an appeal to this court. This court affirmed the merits of the jury verdict. Kissoondath v. Ammerman, No. C0-95-1346 (Minn. App. Dec. 26, 1995), review granted (Minn. Feb. 12, 1996). U.S. Fire deposited its policy limit, $350,000, with the district court on December 21, 1994. Judgment was entered on March 29, 1995. Appellants first received a disbursement from the policy funds on April 17, 1995. Appellants filed a notice of appeal in March 1996. They contend that the district court erroneously denied their motion for interest from the date of the verdict until the date appellants first received funds from the policy. D E C I S I O N We first reject U.S. Fire's argument that this court lacks jurisdiction to decide this appeal. The parties appeal from an order denying a motion to file a supplemental complaint adding U.S. Fire as a defendant and garnishee. This is an appealable order. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03 (f). Interpreting an insurance policy is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Garrick v. Northland Ins. Co., 469 N.W.2d 709, 711 (Minn. 1991). U.S. Fire's insurance policy lists six "coverage extensions." U.S. Fire must pay interest on a judgment after judgment is entered. In addition to the Limit of Insurance, we will pay for the "insured": * * * (6) All interest on the full amount of any judgment that accrues after entry of the judgment in any 'suit' we defend; but our duty to pay interest ends when we have * * * deposited in court the part of the judgment that is within our Limit of Insurance. No other provision in the policy concerns interest on a judgment. Appellants seek interest from the jury verdict on August 22, 1994, until April 1995, when they first received funds from the policy. But U.S. Fire deposited the funds on December 21, 1994. The policy clearly states that U.S. Fire's duty to pay interest ends when it deposits the policy funds with the court. By the plain language of the policy, appellants are not entitled to interest after U.S. Fire deposited the policy funds. Appellants argue that "judgment" is ambiguous and interchangeable with "verdict." Policy language is ambiguous only if "reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning." ICC Leasing Corp. v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 257 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Minn. 1977). Any ambiguity in the policy must be construed in the insured's favor. Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. 1989). Courts must construe the policy language according to the terms the parties used and give unambiguous language its plain and ordinary meaning. Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins., 383 N.W.2d 645, 652 (Minn. 1986); Dairyland Ins. v. Implement Dealers Ins., 294 Minn. 236, 244, 199 N.W.2d 806, 811 (1972). The policy provision on interest is clear and unambiguous. The only reasonable interpretation is that U.S. Fire must pay interest on the judgment once the judgment has been entered. Entry of judgment is a separate act after the verdict when "[t]he judgment [is] entered and signed by the court administrator in the judgment roll; this entry constitutes the entry of the judgment." Minn. R. Civ. P. 58.01. Judgment has a meaning distinct from verdict. The ordinary meaning of judgment is "[a] determination of a court of law; a judicial decision." American Heritage Dictionary 975 (3d ed. 1992). But verdict is defined as "[t]he finding of a jury in a trial." Id. at 1983. A verdict is tied to the jury's role as a fact finder but a judgment is a final judicial decision on a matter, creating an obligation. Blurring this distinction only creates an ambiguity. And this court may not read an ambiguity into an insurance policy's plain language. Hubred, 442 N.W.2d at 310; Columbia Heights Motors v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn. 1979). Appellants also argue that this interpretation of the policy violates the insured's reasonable expectations. The reasonable- expectations doctrine evaluates whether the insured's expectation of coverage is reasonable under the circumstances. Hubred, 442 N.W.2d at 311; see also Atwater Creamery v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985) (listing factors of the doctrine). The doctrine does not apply to the present case. First, appellants are not a party to this insurance contract, and the doctrine concerns the insured's reasonable expectations, not those of some third party. Furthermore, the reasonable-expectations doctrine concerns the policy's overall coverage. In Atwater Creamery, the court refused to interpret a burglary insurance policy to exclude coverage when a sophisticated burglar left no visible marks of forcible entry. Id. at 278-79. But appellants do not allege that U.S. Fire failed to provide auto liability coverage. Moreover, decisions after Atwater limit the reasonable-expectations doctrine to contracts with hidden exclusions. See Ross v. City of Minneapolis, 408 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn. App. 1987) (citing cases), review denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 1987). The interest provision is not a hidden exclusion. It limits interest, not general liability coverage. The reasonable- expectations doctrine does not provide appellants a basis for postverdict interest. Affirmed. * Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.