This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat.  480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).


Dipchan Kissoondath, et al.,


Gregory Alan Ammerman, et al.,

Filed August 13, 1996
Schultz, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 9216164

Richard Baldwin, 301 Degree of Honor Building, 325 Cedar 
Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; Paul J. Phelps, Lyons, Sawicki, Neese 
& Phelps, 1560 Beam Avenue, Suite A, St. Paul, MN 55109; 
Michael J. Weidner, Snelling, Christensen & Laue, P.A., 5101 
Vernon Avenue South, Suite 400, Minneapolis, MN 55436 (for 

Mark A. Gwin, Andrea E. Reisborg, Cousineau, McGuire & 
Anderson, Chartered, 600 Travelers Express Tower, 1550 Utica 
Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55416-5318; George C. 
Hottinger, Erstad & Riemer, 1000 Northland Plaza, 3800 West 
80th Street, Minneapolis, MN 55431 (for Respondents)

	Considered and decided by Short, Presiding Judge, 
Schumacher, Judge, and Schultz, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

	Personal injury plaintiffs seek interest under a liability 
insurance policy from the date of a jury verdict when the policy 
allows interest only after the entry of judgment.  Because the 
policy language is clear and unambiguous and the reasonable-
expectations doctrine does not apply, we affirm.


	United States Fire Insurance (U.S. Fire) is the liability 
insurer for a taxi cab company.  Greg Ammerman's taxi cab hit 
Michael Heinonen's pickup truck, injuring Heinonen and passenger 
Dipchan Kissoondath.  Heinonen, Kissoondath, and his wife Ann 
(appellants) sued Ammerman and the cab company.  The jury 
awarded appellants $2.28 million on August 22, 1994.  The district 
court stayed entry of judgment pending posttrial motions and an 
appeal to this court.  This court affirmed the merits of the jury 
verdict.  Kissoondath v. Ammerman, No. C0-95-1346 (Minn. 
App. Dec. 26, 1995), review granted (Minn. Feb. 12, 1996).  
	U.S. Fire deposited its policy limit, $350,000, with the 
district court on December 21, 1994.  Judgment was entered on 
March 29, 1995.  Appellants first received a disbursement from the 
policy funds on April 17, 1995.  
	Appellants filed  a notice of appeal in March 1996.  They 
contend that the district court erroneously denied their motion for 
interest from the date of the verdict until the date appellants first 
received funds from the policy.


	We first reject U.S. Fire's argument that this court lacks 
jurisdiction to decide this appeal.  The parties appeal from an order 
denying a motion to file a supplemental complaint adding U.S. Fire 
as a defendant and garnishee.  This is an appealable order.  Minn. 
R. Civ. App. P. 103.03 (f).
	Interpreting an insurance policy is a question of law that 
this court reviews de novo.  Garrick v. Northland Ins. Co., 469 
N.W.2d 709, 711 (Minn. 1991).  U.S. Fire's insurance policy lists 
six "coverage extensions."  U.S. Fire must pay interest on a 
judgment after judgment is entered. 
In addition to the Limit of Insurance, we will pay for the 
	* * * 
(6) All interest on the full amount of any judgment that 
accrues after entry of the judgment in any 'suit' we defend; 
but our duty to pay interest ends when we have * * * 
deposited in court the part of the judgment that is within our 
Limit of Insurance.
No other provision in the policy concerns interest on a judgment.
	Appellants seek interest from the jury verdict on August 22, 
1994, until April 1995, when they first received funds from the 
policy.  But U.S. Fire deposited the funds on December 21, 1994.  
The policy clearly states that U.S. Fire's duty to pay interest ends 
when it deposits the policy funds with the court.  By the plain 
language of the policy, appellants are not entitled to interest after 
U.S. Fire deposited the policy funds. 
	Appellants argue that "judgment" is ambiguous and 
interchangeable with "verdict."  Policy language is ambiguous only 
if "reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning."  ICC 
Leasing Corp. v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 257 N.W.2d 551, 554 
(Minn. 1977).  Any ambiguity in the policy must be construed in 
the insured's favor.  Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 
308, 310 (Minn. 1989).    Courts must construe the policy language 
according to the terms the parties used and give unambiguous 
language its plain and ordinary meaning.   Henning Nelson 
Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins., 383 N.W.2d 645, 
652 (Minn. 1986); Dairyland Ins. v. Implement Dealers Ins., 294 
Minn. 236, 244, 199 N.W.2d 806, 811 (1972).
	The policy provision on interest is clear and unambiguous.  
The only reasonable interpretation is that U.S. Fire must pay 
interest on the judgment once the judgment has been entered.  
Entry of judgment is a separate act after the verdict when "[t]he 
judgment [is] entered and signed by the court administrator in the 
judgment roll; this entry constitutes the entry of the judgment."  
Minn. R. Civ. P. 58.01.  Judgment has a meaning distinct from 
verdict.  The ordinary meaning of judgment is "[a] determination 
of a court of law; a judicial decision."  American Heritage 
Dictionary 975 (3d ed. 1992).  But verdict is defined as "[t]he 
finding of a jury in a trial."  Id. at 1983.  A verdict is tied to the 
jury's role as a fact finder but a judgment is a final judicial decision 
on a matter, creating an obligation.  Blurring this distinction only 
creates an ambiguity.  And this court may not read an ambiguity 
into an insurance policy's plain language.  Hubred, 442 N.W.2d at 
310; Columbia Heights Motors v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 
32, 34 (Minn. 1979).
	Appellants also argue that this interpretation of the policy 
violates the insured's reasonable expectations.  The reasonable-
expectations doctrine evaluates whether the insured's expectation 
of coverage is reasonable under the circumstances.  Hubred, 442 
N.W.2d at 311; see also Atwater Creamery v. Western Nat'l Mut. 
Ins., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985) (listing factors of the 
doctrine).  The doctrine does not apply to the present case.  First, 
appellants are not a party to this insurance contract, and the 
doctrine concerns the insured's reasonable expectations, not those 
of some third party.
	Furthermore, the reasonable-expectations doctrine concerns 
the policy's overall coverage.  In Atwater Creamery, the court 
refused to interpret a burglary insurance policy to exclude coverage 
when a sophisticated burglar left no visible marks of forcible entry. 
 Id. at 278-79.  But appellants do not allege that U.S. Fire failed to 
provide auto liability coverage.  Moreover, decisions after Atwater 
limit the reasonable-expectations doctrine to contracts with hidden 
exclusions.  See Ross v. City of Minneapolis, 408 N.W.2d 910, 
914 (Minn. App. 1987) (citing cases), review denied (Minn. Sept. 
23, 1987).  The interest provision is not a hidden exclusion.  It 
limits interest, not general liability coverage.  The reasonable-
expectations doctrine does not provide appellants a basis for 
postverdict interest.


     * Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to 
Minn. Const. art. VI,  10.