This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS C8-96-35 In Re Paternity of M.R.S.: Dawn Marie Stemig, Appellant, vs. Richard Francis Schilling, Respondent. Filed August 13, 1996 Affirmed Lansing, Judge Ramsey County District Court File No. F59150447 Dawn Kujawski, fka Dawn Marie Stemig, Post Office Box 10657, St. Paul, MN 55110 (Pro Se). Sylvia Ivey Zinn, Burke J. Ellingson, Brendel and Zinn, Ltd., 46 East Fourth Street, Suite 804, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Respondent). Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Willis, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N LANSING, Judge We review the denial of a motion to modify custody and visitation of six-year-old M.R.S. The district court acted within its discretion in continuing joint legal custody and allowing supervised visitation, and we affirm. I In determining a motion to modify custody, the district court should continue an existing custody order unless a change in circumstances makes modification necessary to serve the child's best interests. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) (1995 Supp.). The changes that justify a modification are circumstances that endanger a child's physical or emotional health or impair the child's emotional development. Id. at (d)(iii). We will sustain the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly in error, and we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings. Ayers v. Ayers, 508 N.W.2d 515, 521 (Minn. 1993). The district court's decision on a modification motion will be upheld unless it is an abuse of discretion. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). Dawn Kujawski argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding she failed to present sufficient evidence of endangerment to M.R.S. to support a modification from joint to sole legal custody. It is true that two agencies and the guardian ad litem recommended that Kujawski have sole legal custody instead of joint legal custody with M.R.S.'s father, Richard Schilling. But in exercising its independent judgment, the district court is not obligated to adopt a particular professional recommendation. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985); Rogge v. Rogge, 509 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 1994). The evidence presented at the hearing on whether Schilling abused M.R.S. was sharply contested, and the district court had to make a credibility determination. The fact finder, not this court, assesses credibility. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210. The district court expressly discounted testimony by Dr. Wright, M.R.S.'s therapist, finding that her role was "overwhelmingly partisan and that her findings, such as they are, lack objective collateral support." Part of the court's reason for discounting Dr. Wright's opinion was her testimony that she was not concerned with the truth of M.R.S.'s statements on whether there had been abuse. The guardian ad litem and the two agency reports heavily relied on Dr. Wright's opinion. By expressly discounting Dr. Wright's evaluation and testimony, the district court implicitly discounted the reports that relied on Dr. Wright. An independent evaluator reported that M.R.S. "did not disclose any incidents of abuse or maltreatment." We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding insufficient evidence of endangerment. The district court correctly noted that Kujawski's essential argument was that the parties could not cooperate in raising M.R.S. This is not a statutory reason to modify custody, unless it rises to a level endangering the child. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d). The court found that the parties "disliked" each other. But the court did not find that they were unable to cooperate in raising M.R.S. The court instead stated that "[t]he parties have cooperated on those matters encompassed within joint legal custody such as medical care, education, or religious training." The court concluded that the parties' mutual dislike did not amount to endangerment. The evidence supports the court's determinations. The parties agree on basic health care, religious training, and general upbringing. See Chapman v. Chapman, 352 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Minn. App. 1984) (reversing joint custody because parties had "basic differences" in these areas). The testimony supports the district court's finding that the parties could cooperate on basic issues with M.R.S. See Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 529 N.W.2d 724, 726 (Minn. App. 1995) (affirming award of joint legal custody when parties were hostile but court found they could "set aside their personal feelings for the best interest of the children when required."). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kujawski's request for sole legal custody. II In deciding Kujawski's motion to restrict Schilling's visitation, the district court has "broad discretion," and its determination will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. See Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. 1995). The court shall modify visitation if it serves the child's best interests. Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5 (1994). The court may restrict visitation if it finds that visitation is "likely to endanger the child's physical or emotional health or impair the child's emotional development." Id.; see also Anderson v. Archer, 510 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1993) (court must find that the current visitation endangers the child). Kujawski argues that the district court erred by re- establishing Schilling's visitation which had been suspended to investigate the allegations of abuse. But the district court restricted Schilling's visitation by requiring supervision. The court concluded that although Kujawski presented insufficient evidence of abuse, M.R.S. currently fears Schilling, and immediate visitation would endanger M.R.S.'s emotional health and development. The court ordered supervised visitation for at least one year. The court also ordered an impartial therapist to address this fear and prepare M.R.S. to re-establish a relationship with Schilling. The evidence supports the court's findings and its ultimate conclusion. An independent evaluator concluded that M.R.S. "is under a great deal of emotional and psychological strain." And the Ramsey County Community Corrections Domestic Relations Report also recommended supervised visitation. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kujawski's motion to deny Schilling visitation. Schilling raised two procedural issues and requested attorneys' fees. Contrary to Schilling's argument, Kujawski timely filed her appellate brief. The transcript was delivered by mail on March 14, 1996. Kujawski had until April 16 to serve and file her brief, and she filed it on April 15. We also deny Schilling's motion to strike portions of Kujawski's brief because the argument, although peripheral, does not improperly raise a new issue. Finally, we deny Schilling's request for attorneys' fees and costs. Although Kujawski's appeal was ultimately unsuccessful, it is not without merit. See Radloff v. First Am. Nat. Bank, 470 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Minn. App. 1991) (sanctions are not appropriate simply because a party did not prevail on the merits), review denied (Minn. July 24, 1991). Affirmed.