This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat.  480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).


Lillian L. Johnson,


Sholom Home, Inc.,

Commissioner of Economic Security,

Filed August 13, 1996
Parker, Judge

Department of Economic Security
File No. 8918UC95

Lillian L. Johnson, 4704 Golden Ponds Lane, St. Paul, MN 55110 
(relator pro se)

Ruth Huntrods, Sholom Home, Inc., 1554 Midway Parkway, St. 
Paul, MN 55108 (for respondent Sholom Home)

Kent E. Todd, Minnesota Department of Economic Security, 390 
North Robert Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondent 
Commissioner of Economic Security)

	Considered and decided by Parker, Presiding Judge, Short, 
Judge, and Foley, Judge.*

U N P U B L I S H E D    O P I N I O N

PARKER,  Judge
	Relator Lillian L. Johnson appeals the decision of the 
Commissioner's representative that she voluntarily quit her job 
without good cause attributable to her employer.  We affirm.


The narrow standard of review requires that findings 
be viewed in the light most favorable to the decision, 
and if there is evidence reasonably tending to sustain 
them, they will not be disturbed.
White v. Metropolitan Medical Ctr., 332 N.W.2d 25, 26 (Minn. 
1983).  This court reviews the decision of the Commissioner's 
representative, not that of the reemployment insurance judge.  Tuff 
v. Knitcraft Corp., 526 N.W.2d 50, 51 (Minn. 1995).
	Resolution of conflicting testimony lies with the 
Commissioner.  This court will not question the credibility 
determinations made by the Commissioner's representative.  
Nelson v. Bemidji Regional Interdistrict Council, 359 N.W.2d 38, 
41 (Minn. App. 1984).
	Johnson argues that the findings of the Commissioner's 
representative do not support the conclusion that she voluntarily 
quit her job without good cause attributable to her employer.   She 
contends there is ample evidence in the record to show that the 
tender of her resignation was attributable to poor working 
conditions and the unreasonable demands made by her supervisor. 
 Johnson claims that, in an attempt by her employer to force her 
out of a job, she was (1) assigned the additional job duty of 
processing the incoming mail; (2) told by her employer that 
overtime would not be available to complete her job tasks; and (3) 
forced to work under hazardous conditions.   She argues that it is 
obvious that her supervisor purposely tried to pressure her into 
accepting additional job duties, and therefore the decision of the 
Commissioner's representative cannot be sustained by the facts.
	A person who voluntarily quits a job without good cause 
attributable to the employer is disqualified from receiving benefits 
for a certain period of time.  Minn. Stat.  268.09, subd. 1(a) 
(1994).  The employer has the burden of proving whether an 
employee voluntarily quit.  Marz v. Department of Employment 
Servs., 256 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Minn. 1977).  Whether an employee 
had good cause to quit is a question of law that "is not binding on 
the court if it does not have reasonable support in the findings."  
Zepp v. Arthur Treacher Fish & Chips, Inc., 272 N.W.2d 262, 
263 (Minn. 1978). 
	"Good cause" to quit has been defined as a reason that is 
"real, not imaginary, substantial not trifling, and reasonable, not 
whimsical; there must be some compulsion produced by 
extraneous and necessitous circumstances."  Ferguson v. 
Department of Employment Servs., 311 Minn. 34, 44 n.5, 247 
N.W.2d 895, 900 n.5 (1976).  "Good cause" does not require 
employer negligence, fault, or wrongfulness.  Hanson v. I.D.S. 
Properties Management Co., 308 Minn. 422, 425 n.1, 242 N.W.2d 
833, 835 n.1 (1976).  A personality conflict or irreconcilable 
differences between an employee and a supervisor or coworker 
does not provide the employee with good cause to quit a job.  
Trego v. Hennepin County Family Day Care Ass'n, 409 N.W.2d 
23, 26 (Minn. App. 1987).
	The Commissioner's representative concluded that Johnson 
had not quit her job with good cause attributable to her employer.  
Although Johnson claimed that health problems would prevent her 
from completing her new job assignments, the representative 
found that she had not presented any evidence to support that 
proposition.  The representative found that Johnson believed the 
additional responsibilities would take more time, but concluded 
that Johnson had not shown that she would go uncompensated for 
any additional hours worked.  Concluding that Johnson did not quit 
for good cause attributable to her employer, the Commissioner's 
representative noted that Johnson could have attempted to 
complete all of her responsibilities as best she could in the time 
allotted and, if unable to complete all of the tasks, to then inform 
her supervisor. 
	On review of the record, we hold that the findings of the 
Commissioner's representative are supported by substantial 
evidence.  We recognize that the assignment of handling the 
incoming mail may have constituted a substantial addition to 
Johnson's job duties.  We agree, however, with the finding of the 
Commissioner's representative that had Johnson attempted to 
complete the added task and failed, a different result may have 
been reached.  Under these circumstances, we believe that Johnson 
had a duty to attempt to comply with her employer's directive.  We 
are not directed to any evidence  to show that Johnson attempted to 
comply with her employer's request and was then criticized or 
disciplined by her employer for failing to complete the tasks 
assigned.  We therefore cannot conclude that Johnson's voluntary 
resignation was for good cause attributable to her employer.

     * Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, 
serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI,  10.