This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS C5-95-2718 Duling Optical Corporation, d/b/a Duling, D&K Optical, Inc., Appellant, vs. First Union Management, Inc., d/b/a First Union Estate Investments, Respondent. Filed August 13, 1996 Affirmed in part and reversed in part Amundson, Judge Stearns County District Court File No. C4-94-520 Michael P. Gallagher, Norwood Office Plaza, 423 NE Fourth Street, Grand Rapids, MN 55744 (for appellant) Neil C. Franz, 1011 North Second Street, P.O. Box 307, St. Cloud, MN 56302 (for respondent) Considered and decided by Amundson, Presiding Judge, Norton, Judge, and Peterson, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N AMUNDSON, Judge Appellant Duling Optical Corporation challenges the district court's finding that its waiver of damages resulting from a forcible eviction is effective and the court's conclusion that respondent First Union Management is entitled to an award of attorney fees for a related, but separate, unlawful detainer action. We affirm in part and reverse in part. FACTS Appellant Duling Optical Corporation leased business space in Crossroads Shopping Center in St. Cloud. Duling subleased the space and was subject to the terms of the primary lease. In the spring of 1993, Duling went into default under the terms of the lease due to its failure to pay rent. Duling was able to cure this default, but went into default again in January 1994. On January 5, 1994, respondent First Union Management, Inc. (First Union) commenced an unlawful detainer action. On February 4, First Union changed the locks on Duling's premises, resulting in a forcible eviction of Duling. On February 9, Duling filed for a temporary restraining order and commenced this action for damages incurred as a result of the forcible eviction. The temporary restraining order was granted on February 15, and Duling was restored to the premises. On June 15, the district court issued an order in the unlawful detainer action, concluding that First Union had failed to give adequate notice as provided in the lease. On August 30, the district court incorporated this order by reference into the damages proceedings. On December 22, 1994, First Union commenced a second unlawful detainer action. A different district court judge concluded that the lease provision waiving Duling's right to redeem was invalid under the unlawful detainer statute. On September 28, 1995, the district court issued an order in the damages action, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to award attorney fees for either of the previous unlawful detainer actions because they were decided in separate actions and that, although Duling's waiver of the right to redeem was in violation of public policy, the waiver of damages resulting from a forcible eviction was not. The court then awarded First Union interest on the back rent and attorney fees for the second unlawful detainer action. This appeal followed. DECISION I. Waiver Duling contends that the district court clearly erred in finding that the lease provision waiving the right to damages resulting from a forcible entry was effective. Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. The lease provides that, in the event of a default, the Landlord shall have the immediate right to re-enter the Premises, either by summary proceedings, by force or otherwise and to dispossess Tenant and all other occupants therefrom and remove and dispose of all property therein or, at Landlord's election, to store such property in a public warehouse or elsewhere at the cost and for the account of Tenant, all without service of any notice of intention to re- enter with or without resort to legal process (which Tenant hereby expressly waives) and without Landlord being deemed guilty of trespass or becoming liable for any loss or damage which may be occasioned thereby. The district court concluded that the common law remedy of re-entry and forcible detainer had been replaced with the unlawful detainer statute. The court also concluded that, because the statute was silent as to whether parties may waive their right to the unlawful detainer process, waiver of those rights is in violation of public policy. The court nonetheless concluded that the waiver of the right to damages for violation of the unlawful detainer process did not subvert the intent of the legislature that the right of possession of a leased premises be determined in the courts and thus was valid. The district court correctly concluded that the waiver of the right to redeem as provided by the unlawful detainer statute is a violation of public policy. See 614 Co. v. D. H. Overmyer Co., 297 Minn. 395, 397-98, 211 N.W.2d 891, 894 (1973). The unlawful detainer statute, however, does not include a provision for the recovery of damages, and thus the district court correctly noted that a waiver of damages does not subvert the intent of the legislature to have the right of possession determined in the courts. Because Duling knowingly entered into the sublease subject to the provisions of the original lease, the right to collect damages due to forcible entry was knowingly relinquished, and the district court did not err in concluding that the waiver was effective. See Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab Industries, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1982) ("[A] waiver is defined as an intentional relinquishment of a known right * * *."). II. Attorney Fees Duling contends that the district court abused its discretion in awarding First Union attorney fees that arose out of a separate unlawful detainer action. On review, we will not reverse a district court's award of attorney fees absent an abuse of discretion. Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng'g Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 1987). The district court concluded that [b]ecause this action is separate and distinct from either of the unlawful detainer actions concerning the landlord-tenant relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant, the issue of reimbursement of attorney fees accrued in those actions is not properly before this Court. The disposition of that issue should have been decided in the relevant unlawful detainer actions and this Court has no jurisdiction to revisit either unlawful detainer action. Despite this conclusion, the district court awarded First Union attorney fees for the second unlawful detainer action; an action heard by a different judge. We conclude that the district court correctly noted that it lacked jurisdiction to award attorney fees for the unlawful detainer actions, and thus the award of attorney fees for the previous action was an abuse of discretion. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.