This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS C4-96-713 Shawn Eggleston, Appellant, vs. Cecil Newman Corporation, a/k/a Cecil Newman Plaza Limited Partnership, Respondent, Beverly Benner, Defendant. Filed August 13, 1996 Affirmed Schumacher, Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. 9418753 Kenneth W. Pearson, Paul E. Overson, Bale Anderson Polstein Pearson & Hill, Ltd., 607 Marquette Avenue, Suite 400, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for Appellant) Daniel A. Haws, Mark D. Covin, Murnane, Conlin, White & Brandt, P.A., 1800 Piper Jaffray Plaza, 444 Cedar Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Respondent) Carol Lynn O'Gara, Sieben, Grose, Von Holtum, McCoy & Carey, Ltd., 900 Midwest Plaza East, Eighth and Marquette, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for Amicus Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association) Considered and decided by Schumacher, Presiding Judge, Norton, Judge, and Harten, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N SCHUMACHER, Judge Shawn Eggleston appeals from summary judgment, arguing the district court erred in concluding that respondent Cecil Newman Corporation, a/k/a Cecil Newman Plaza Limited Partnership, (Newman Corporation) did not owe Eggleston a duty to protect him from the criminal acts of a third person and was not vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee, Beverly Benner. We affirm. FACTS Eggleston was shot in the leg by Jumoke Owens. The shooting was in response to a prior altercation between Eggleston and Owens's girlfriend Judonna Parker. Parker had previously threatened Eggleston that Owens was going to shoot him. The shooting occurred in a hallway in building 709 of the Cecil Newman Plaza Apartments (the Plaza) in north Minneapolis. Building 709 is not a security building, but has controlled access through a buzzer/intercom lock system in each apartment. About 10:00 p.m. on July 25, 1992, Owens came to the door of building 709. Benner, who was visiting her daughter Parker, opened the door to let Owens inside. Owens went to Eggleston's mother's door and demanded to see Eggleston. As Eggleston started to leave the building, two of Owens's friends grabbed Eggleston and Owens shot him in the leg three times. Eggleston suffered severe leg injuries and remains partially disabled. Benner does not live in the Plaza but worked there for Newman Corporation. Benner received a salary and free rent in a different property owned by Newman Corporation. Benner's duties included answering the phone, taking rent, making deposits, showing apartments, passing out keys, signing contracts, and filling out maintenance reports. Benner also said she occasionally walked around the Plaza to make sure the apartments were safe and that there was no trouble. Newman Corporation denies that Benner had any security or safety duties at the Plaza. Eggleston brought a negligence action against Newman Corporation and Benner for his injuries. Newman Corporation separately moved for summary judgment on the issue of its liability, arguing there was no special relationship between Newman Corporation and Eggleston that would create a duty to protect Eggleston. Newman Corporation also argued it was not vicariously liable because Benner was not acting within the course and scope of her employment when she opened the door for Owens. The district court granted Newman Corporation's motion, and Eggleston appeals. D E C I S I O N On appeal from summary judgment this court asks whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). This court views the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Offerdahl v. University of Minn. Hosps. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn. 1988). 1. Eggleston argues that Newman Corporation had a duty to protect him from the criminal acts of a third party. We disagree. To establish a claim for negligence, Eggleston must show a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and injury. Spitzak v. Hylands, Ltd., 500 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. July 15, 1993). Generally, under common law, there is no duty either to warn or protect others who may be endangered by a third party's conduct or to control the conduct of a third person to prevent him or her from causing physical harm to others. Id.; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965). An exception to this rule may find a duty depending on (1) whether there is a special relationship between the parties, and (2) the foreseeability of the risk involved. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Minn. 1989). A special relationship arises where the injured party "has in some way entrusted his or her safety to [the other party] and [the other party] has accepted that entrustment." Id. at 168. This special relationship also assumes that the harm represented by [the third person] is something that [the other party] is in a position to protect against and should be expected to protect against. Id. Whether a legal duty exists is usually an issue for the court to determine as a matter of law. Larson v. Larson, 373 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Minn. 1985). In Erickson, the court found a special relationship between the owner of a parking ramp and its users based on the fact that the parking ramp in question had unique features that provided a focus and opportunity for crime. 447 N.W.2d at 168-69. The court held that the risk must be greater than "that presented out on the street and in the neighborhood generally" before a duty will be imposed. Id. at 169. Eggleston has not shown a duty similar to Erickson. The record reveals no history of crime in the Plaza or the surrounding neighborhood. Nothing indicates that the crime in question was in or out of keeping with the streets or surrounding neighborhood. The record also does not indicate that the Plaza is "uniquely" designed or situated to create an opportunity for criminal activity in the area. Public policy does not support finding a special relationship because: (1) the prevention of crime is a governmental function that should not be shifted to the private sector; (2) imposing a duty to protect against the "unpredictable conduct of criminals does not lend itself easily to an ascertainable standard of care"; and (3) the cost necessary to prevent this type of crime is prohibitive for both Newman Corporation and its tenants. See Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168-69 (analyzing public policy factors). Moreover, this case is not similar to H.B. by Clarke v. Whittemore, 533 N.W.2d 887 (Minn. App. 1995), review granted (Minn. Sept. 20, 1995). In Whittemore, a special relationship was found between the owner of a trailer park and children molested by a park resident because the park manager knew of the perpetrator's history, had notice of the children's complaints, and the owner held the manager out as its "local authority" for security matters. Id. at 891. Here, there is no evidence that Newman Corporation held Benner out as its "local authority" for security matters. We find as a matter of law that there was no special relationship between Newman Corporation and Eggleston to create a duty to protect Eggleston from the criminal acts of a third party. Because we conclude there was no special relationship, we do not reach the issue of foreseeability. See Donaldson v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 539 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Minn. 1995). 2. Eggleston argues that Newman Corporation is vicariously liable for the negligence of Benner. We disagree. For an employer to be held vicariously liable for an employee's negligent conduct, the employee's conduct must have been in the course and scope of his or her employment. Edgewater Motels v. Gatzke, 277 N.W.2d 11, 15 (Minn. 1979). To show that an employee's negligent act occurred within his or her scope of employment, it must be shown that the conduct was, to some degree, in furtherance of the interests of the employer. Id. Other factors to be considered are whether the conduct is of the kind that the employee is authorized to perform and whether the act occurs substantially within authorized time and space restrictions. Id. Each case must be analyzed on its own individual facts. Id. The furtherance of the employer's interest test "requires both the existence of the duty [to act for the employer] and its exercise." Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, 329 N.W.2d 306, 310 (Minn. 1982). Benner admitted that when she was visiting her daughter at 10 p.m., "it was just personal," and not for any employment-related purpose. Because Benner was not on duty at the time she opened the door for the assailant, Newman Corporation cannot be held liable. Affirmed.