This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS C4-96-467 Matthew Preston, Appellant, vs. All American Life Insurance Company, an Illinois Corporation, Defendant, Paul Thomas, et al., Respondents. Filed August 13, 1996 Reversed and Remanded Schumacher, Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. 956010 Jan Stuurmans, Law Offices of Jan Stuurmans, P.A., 1800 Rand Tower, 527 Marquette Avenue, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for Appellant) James A. Beitz, Hagerty, Johnson, Albrightson & Beitz, P.A., 701 Fourth Avenue South, Suite 1700, Minneapolis, MN 55415 (for Appellant) Thomas E. Peterson, Eric J. Strobel, Peterson & Hektner, Ltd., 8400 Normandale Lake Boulevard, Suite 1475, Minneapolis, MN 55437 (for Respondents) Considered and decided by Short, Presiding Judge, Schumacher, Judge, and Holtan, Judge.* U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N SCHUMACHER, Judge Matthew Preston appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents Paul and Shirley Thomas, arguing they were negligent per se by failing to mark a window as required by statute. We reverse and remand for trial. FACTS The Thomases owned the Golden Valley Best Western Motel. While attending a wedding reception at the motel, Preston was injured when he walked through a side light (a floor-to-ceiling window adjacent to a doorway). Preston left the reception twice during the evening to smoke cigarettes on an outdoor balcony. In deposition testimony, Preston said that on his first trip to the balcony, he noticed the side light and had no trouble ascertaining the location of the doorway. While attempting to re-enter the motel after his second trip to the balcony, Preston was injured when he walked through the side light adjacent to the doorway. A test at the hospital following the incident revealed Preston had a blood-alcohol content of .16. A police officer at the scene, however, stated that "Mr. Preston did not appear to be intoxicated." The police officer also stated that "[f]rom the outside it appears as though the window is actually an open doorway." Another wedding guest stated in an affidavit that twice during the evening he too "walked into the window, mistaking it for an open doorway." Preston brought a personal injury action, alleging the Thomases were negligent in not warning of a dangerous condition and that they failed to mark the side light. The Thomases moved for summary judgment, contending (1) Preston's claims were barred by the statute of repose, Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a) (1994), (2) Minn. Stat. § 299G.11 (1994), which requires side lights to be marked, does not apply to buildings constructed before the statute was enacted, and (3) they had no duty under Minn. Stat. § 299G.11 to mark the side light because Preston admitted that he had observed it earlier. The district court rejected the Thomases' first two arguments. The court found, however, that the Thomases were not liable because Preston admitted he was aware of the side light, and it was not foreseeable that a person who had observed the side light would later walk through it. Preston appeals from the summary judgment. D E C I S I O N On appeal from summary judgment, this court asks (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the district court erred in applying the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (1990). The evidence is to be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Abdallah, Inc. v. Martin, 242 Minn. 416, 424, 65 N.W.2d 641, 646 (1954). Minn. Stat. § 299G.11 (1994) provides: If doors or side lights of a public building, whether privately or publicly owned, are constructed with clear glass, markings shall be placed on such clear glass or the clear glass shall be manufactured with markings. Sidelights are defined as the clear glass panels not less than 15 inches wide immediately adjacent to the door. The parties dispute whether the side light was properly marked. Because we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Preston, we assume that there were no markings. The violation of a statute may result in negligence per se. Alderman's, Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. 1995). It is well settled that breach of a statute gives rise to negligence per se if  the persons harmed by that violation are within the intended protection of the statute and  the harm suffered is of the type the legislation was intended to prevent. The statute * * * imposes a fixed duty of care, so its breach constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 558-59 (Minn. 1977) (citations omitted). As a business invitee, Preston fell within the intended protection of the statute. Thus, Minn. Stat. § 299G.11 set the Thomases' standard of care and a breach of that standard is negligence per se. "[N]egligence per se is not liability per se," and therefore there remain the defenses of contributory negligence and proximate cause. See Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Minn. 1981). According to the Restatement: A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. Restatement (Second) of Tort § 343A (1965) (emphasis added). The district court concluded that there was no evidence the Thomases could expect Preston to walk through the side light when he earlier had knowledge of it. In Peterson v. Haule, 304 Minn. 160, 230 N.W.2d 51 (1975), the supreme court allowed a 10-year-old girl to recover from a defendant who was violating Minn. Stat. § 299G.11, despite the fact that she had been at the defendant's business "on numerous occasions during the preceding 2 years." Id. at 162, 230 N.W.2d at 53. As the Restatement recognizes: There are, however, cases in which the possessor of land can and should anticipate that the dangerous condition will cause physical harm to the invitee notwithstanding its known or obvious danger. * * * Such reason to expect harm to the visitor from known or obvious dangers may arise, for example, where the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee[ ] * * * will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A cmt. f. This is not a case such as Ramstad v. Lear Siegler Diversified Holdings Corp., 836 F. Supp. 1511 (D. Minn. 1993), cited by the district court. In Ramstad, a farmer was injured by a grain auger when he put his foot near the auger's intake. Id. at 1513. The court rejected the farmer's claim that although he was aware of the danger, a warning reminding him of it would have prevented him from acting as he did. Id. at 1516. Here, the known danger of a grain auger is not the same as the danger of walking into a transparent side light that was at one time known. The markings required by Minn. Stat. § 299G.11 not only give a one- time notice that an expanse of glass is not a doorway but provide continuous notice of the existence of glass. Illustration 3 to section 343A is analogous to this case: The A Drug Store has a soda fountain on a platform raised six inches above the floor. The condition is visible and quite obvious. B, a customer, discovers the condition when she ascends the platform and sits down on a stool to buy some ice cream. When she has finished, she forgets the condition, misses her step, falls, and is injured. If it is found that this could reasonably be anticipated by A, A is subject to liability to B. It is for a jury to decide if a risk fell within a defendant's range of foreseeability. Van Gordon v. Herzog, 410 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Minn. App. 1987). Thus, the question of forseeability, even though at one time Preston had knowledge of the side light, is for the jury. Reversed and remanded. * Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.