This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS C4-95-2001 State of Minnesota Respondent, vs. Jose Guadalupe Sanchez-Almendariz, Appellant. Filed August 13, 1996 Affirmed Amundson, Judge Brown County District Court File No. K19575 Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, Mark Traynor, Assistant Attorney General, 900 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101, James R. Olson, Brown County Attorney, Box 428, New Ulm, MN 56073 (for Respondent) John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant State Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for Appellant) Considered and decided by Amundson, Presiding Judge, Norton, Judge, and Peterson, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N AMUNDSON, Judge Jose Guadalupe Sanchez-Almendariz challenges his judgment of conviction, arguing that he was denied his right to a fair trial because the trial court refused to disclose the name and background of a confidential reliable informant to the defense. He also argues that he was entrapped and that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was predisposed to sell drugs. We affirm. FACTS On February 6, 1995, and February 21, 1995, appellant Jose Guadalupe Sanchez-Almendariz was charged with several counts of selling controlled substances (marijuana, and on one occasion cocaine) to an informant working for the New Ulm Police Department. The sales allegedly took place on October 18, 1994; October 21, 1994; November 17, 1994; December 14, 1994; and February 5, 1995. On February 5, appellant allegedly sold 210 grams of marijuana and 13.8 grams of cocaine to the informant. Appellant allegedly also sold cocaine to another person present at the time. The state, pursuant to Rule 9.01, sought to avoid revealing the informant's identity. At the omnibus hearing, the trial court met in camera with the county attorney and a police officer (but without appellant's trial counsel) to discuss the reasons for certifying the informant's name. Two weeks later, the trial court held a hearing on appellant's motion to compel the state to disclose the informant's identity. The trial court denied the motion. On the first day of trial, defense counsel learned the identity of the informant. On the last day of trial, an anonymous male called the public defender's office and said that the informant had lied on the stand and had been hospitalized for a drug overdose in New Ulm. On that same day, the jury found appellant guilty of all charges. Appellant moved for a new trial or an acquittal based on the anonymous phone call and the failure to disclose the informant's name. The trial court denied the motion. The court noted that appellant did not ask for additional time to make any investigation regarding the informant, defense counsel had not verified that the information given by the anonymous caller was true, and there was no indication that revealing the informant's name earlier would have led defense counsel to discover the information alleged by the anonymous caller. The trial court viewed the seven offenses as one behavioral incident and sentenced appellant to 86 months. This appeal followed. D E C I S I O N I. Identity of Informant Appellant argues that he was denied his right to a fair trial because the trial court refused to disclose the name and background of the informant. A prosecutor generally has a duty to disclose to defense counsel the names, addresses, and prior convictions of persons the prosecutor intends to call as witnesses. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(1)(a). There is, however, an exception to this general rule: The information relative to the witnesses and persons described in Rules 9.01, subd. 1(1), (2) shall not be subject to disclosure if the prosecuting attorney files a written certificate with the trial court that to do so may endanger the integrity of a continuing investigation or subject such witnesses or persons or others to physical harm or coercion * * *. Id., subd. 3(2). At the in camera meeting, a police officer testified that in 1994 the informant began working for the New Ulm Police Department in its investigation of the sale of drugs in the city of New Ulm; had been working as an informant for various governmental agencies since 1985; and was then working for a governmental agency in the investigation of the sale of drugs in the Grand Forks area. The officer also testified that Because of that, if his identity would be made known, it is known from--or my experience has been is that individuals, when they find out they've been had, they've been burnt, they've been--somebody had narked them off and was working with us, they do whatever they can to try to locate these individuals, for the purposes of intimidating them, scaring them into not testifying and hopefully, you know, getting them to drop the cases or maybe even sometimes physical harm, depending upon the degree as to what that individual might be involved in as far as the charges go. Appellant argues that the mere assertion that an informant is involved in an investigation, with no proof that disclosure would interfere with the investigation, is insufficient under the rule. Appellant notes that, in State v. Hathaway, 379 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1985), the trial court's ruling that witnesses would be subject to physical harm or coercion was supported by police reports reflecting threats of violence and intimidation attempts made against those witnesses. Id. at 506. In Hathaway, however, the determination that certification was proper did not depend entirely on those reports. The Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court's certification, stated: We hold that in future cases the trial court, upon certification by the prosecutor, make a record of the evidence presented by the prosecutor and the court's determination of its sufficiency before Rule 9.01, subdivision 3(2), is applied. Id. The trial court in this case followed that procedure, stating: Well, absent any guidance from the courts or rules, this Court finds that on the sworn testimony that the witness is currently involved with a governmental agency on a continuing drug investigation, that they're--the requisite sufficiency has been met for the Rule 9.01, subd. 3(2), certificate. In addition, appellant's interpretation is not supported by the language of the rule, which only requires that the certificate indicate that disclosure "may endanger" the investigation. The rule does not require any particular findings by the trial court and it does not require a finding that the disclosure will endanger the investigation. Finally, we believe that requiring evidence of specific threats before certification is allowed could produce disastrous results in cases such as this. The whole idea behind having an informant is that the person selling drugs, etc., does not know that the person he is dealing with is a potential witness. If the seller does not know that the person he is dealing with is a potential witness, he will not make threats about the informant testifying. If no such threats are made, then the rule would not apply. There are, of course, some risks involved in letting police officers simply assert that a witness could be threatened. The rule could be used as a tool to obtain an unfair advantage over defense counsel. However, a trial court should be able to judge when that assertion is unfounded. Thus, we decline to impose requirements for certification that are not contained in the rule or case law and conclude that the trial court properly certified in this case. Appellant claims he was prejudiced because he could not investigate and discover whether the informant had received clemency for past assistance to law enforcement, whether he had a history of drug problems, or "other information that would have permitted the defense to thoroughly cross-examine him to demonstrate the dubiousness of his testimony." Appellant also argues that if he would have had access to the informant's name before trial, he "may have discovered evidence" that would cast doubt on the informant's testimony and bolster appellant's entrapment claim. As the trial court noted, however, there is no indication that appellant would have discovered such evidence had the informant's name been revealed earlier. In addition, clemency granted for past testimony would not have been relevant to the most recent deal with the informant, and there was no evidence of any clemency granted in exchange for the informant's testimony in this case. Any prejudice, therefore, is purely speculative. II. Entrapment Appellant argues that this court should reverse his conviction because the informant entrapped him. A defendant pleading the defense of entrapment has the option of presenting the issue to the jury as a factual issue or to the court as a matter of law, although based on the same factual elements. State v. Grilli, 304 Minn. 80, 87, 230 N.W.2d 445, 451 (1975). Appellant chose to have the issue tried to the jury, and the jury rejected the defense. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must assume the jury believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved evidence to the contrary. State v. Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Minn. 1980). "[T]he jury determines the credibility and weight given to the testimony of individual witnesses." State v. Bias, 419 N.W.2d 480, 484 (Minn. 1988). Appellant makes various arguments regarding why the jury should have found him more credible than the informant, but it did not. The only argument regarding sufficiency of the evidence that is not dependent on this court finding him more credible than the informant, which this court cannot do, is his argument that the defense was precluded from further impeaching the informant's credibility because of the trial court's ruling on certification. As we already noted, it is speculative that releasing the informant's name earlier would have led appellant to discover impeachment evidence. Thus, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. Affirmed.