This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS C3-96-525 In the Matter of the Welfare of: B.J.H., Child. Filed August 13, 1996 Affirmed Short, Judge Mower County District Court File No. J49550513 John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Susan K. Maki, Assistant Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for Appellant B.J.H.) Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Respondent Mower County) Patrick Oman, Mower County Attorney, Robert W. Auron, Assistant County Attorney, Mower County Courthouse, 201 First Street N.E., Austin, MN 55912 (for Respondent Mower County) Considered and decided by Parker, Presiding Judge, Short, Judge, and Foley, Judge.* U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N SHORT, Judge A trial court found B.J.H. guilty of behavior constituting third-degree assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1, adjudged her a delinquent child, and placed her on indefinite probation. On appeal, B.J.H. argues the evidence is insufficient to sustain the trial court's decision because: (1) the victim lacked credibility; and (2) the record fails to support the determination that B.J.H. either was an aggressor not entitled to claim self- defense or transcended the boundaries of justifiable force. We affirm. D E C I S I O N When a minor challenges his or her delinquency adjudication on the basis of insufficient evidence, we (1) do not retry the facts, but (2) view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision, and (3) assume the trial court believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. See In re Welfare of J.G.B., 473 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Minn. App. 1991) (quoting State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 111 (Minn. 1978), and applying this rule to a delinquency adjudication); see also State v. Atkins, 543 N.W.2d 642, 646 (Minn. 1996) (generally applying this standard in criminal actions). Viewing the record from this perspective, we must affirm if the finder of fact could reasonably conclude the juvenile was guilty of the offense charged. J.G.B., 473 N.W.2d at 344-45 (quoting Merrill, 274 N.W.2d at 111); see Atkins, 543 N.W.2d at 646 (generally applying this standard to criminal actions). B.J.H. argues the evidence is insufficient to support the decision that her behavior constituted third-degree assault because the victim lacked credibility. However, as the standard of review implies, it is not for us to second-guess the trial court's express determinations that B.J.H.'s testimony was "less than credible" and that the victim rendered a "believable" account of the incident. See State v. Lloyd, 345 N.W.2d 240, 245 (Minn. 1984) (stating the resolution of conflicting testimony is the "exclusive function of the [trier of fact] because it has the opportunity to observe * * * the witnesses"). B.J.H. also argues the evidence was not sufficient to overcome her self-defense theory. See Minn. Stat. § 609.06(3) (1994) (authorizing the use of reasonable force in resisting an offense against the person); see also State v. Housley, 322 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Minn. 1982) (noting the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used unjustifiable force). However, it is undisputed that B.J.H.: (1) provoked the evening's events by confronting the victim outside her home; (2) escalated the situation by physically preventing the victim's attempted return to the safety of her house; and (3) never endeavored to withdraw from the confrontation. See State v. McGath, 352 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Minn. App. 1984) (concluding the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reject the defendant's claim of self-defense, in part because it could have believed the defendant was the original aggressor but reversing the conviction on other grounds), rev'd, 370 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Minn. 1985) (affirming the evidence's sufficiency and reinstating the conviction); 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 7.07 (1990) (authorizing a person who has induced a physical confrontation to claim self-defense only after an obvious, good-faith attempt to withdraw from the altercation). Moreover, even if B.J.H. could have invoked the privilege of self-defense, the evidence most favorable to the trial court's decision establishes that B.J.H. exceeded the boundaries of reasonable force. See Minn. Stat. § 609.06(3) (permitting the use of reasonable force in self-defense); 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 7.06 (1990) (same). First, the victim testified that B.J.H. continued to beat or kick her after someone else had pulled her to the ground. Second, a police officer's testimony indicated that, on the night of the incident, B.J.H. admitted she "blacked out" or "lost it," then punched the victim, dragged her off the steps, and kicked her at least once while she was on the ground. And third, B.J.H. acknowledged at trial that she "might have" kicked the victim in the face. Under these circumstances, the trial court could reasonably have determined that the county carried its burden of disproving B.J.H.'s theory of self-defense. See J.G.B., 473 N.W.2d at 344-45 (quoting Merrill, 274 N.W.2d at 111, and examining the record of a delinquency adjudication for evidence that would permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the juvenile was guilty of the charged offense). Affirmed. * Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn Const. art. VI, § 10.