This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. sec. 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
C3-96-167

Amy C. Townsdin, and Others Similarly Situated that Oppose the 
Granting of a Conditional Use Permit to Minnegasco,
Appellants,

vs.

Douglas County,
Respondent,

vs.

Minnegasco, a Division of NorAm Energy Corp.,
Intervenor/Respondent.

Filed August 13, 1996 
Reversed and remanded 
Randall, Judge

Douglas County District Court
File No. C9-95-389

Thomas J. Reif, Thornton, Hegg, Reif, Johnston, & Dolan, P.A., 1017 
Broadway, P.O. Box 819, Alexandria, MN  56308 (for Appellants)

Ann L. Carrott, Douglas County Attorney, Douglas County 
Courthouse, Alexandria, MN  56308 (for Respondent Douglas 
County)

Brenda A. Bjorkland, Minnesgasco, a Division of NorAm Energy 
Corp., 800 LaSalle Ave., 11th Floor, P.O. Box 59038, Minneapolis, 
MN  55459 (for Respondent Minnegasco)

Kevin F. Gray, Rajkowski Hansmeier Ltd., 11 Seventh Ave. North, St. 
Cloud, MN  56302 (for Respondent Minnegasco)

Timothy R. Thornton, Briggs and Morgan, P.A., 2400 IDS Center, 
Minneapolis, MN  55402 (for Respondent Minnegasco)

	Considered and decided by Parker, Presiding Judge, Randall, 
Judge, and Schumacher, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

RANDALL, Judge
	Appellants challenge the district court's order dismissing their 
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Because the county 
zoning ordinance expressly provides for a direct appeal to a district 
court, and in light of this court's recent decision in Toby's of 
Alexandria v. County of Douglas, 545 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. App. 1996), 
review denied (Minn. May 21, 1996), we reverse and remand.

FACTS

	Minnegasco applied for a conditional use permit to build a 
"peak shaving plant" in a commercial zone.  A shaving plant is used to 
inject propane air into the natural gas system to supplement natural gas 
supplies during high demand periods.  The Douglas County Planning 
Advisory Commission held a public hearing where evidence was 
received regarding the pending application.  The Planning Advisory 
Commission recommended the Douglas County Board of 
Commissioners deny the application.  The Board of Commissioners 
held a public meeting to consider the recommendation of the Planning 
Commission.  The Board granted Minnegasco's application.
	Pursuant to the Douglas County zoning ordinance, appellants 
appealed the Board's decision to Douglas County District Court.  The 
county zoning ordinance provides that any party aggrieved by a 
decision of the Board of Commissioners may appeal the decision to a 
Minnesota district court.  Douglas County Zoning Ordinance Sec. 
VI(G)(2)(b) (1993).  Respondents moved to dismiss the matter for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing an appeal of the Board's 
decision could only be taken by writ of certiorari to this Court.
	The district court granted respondents' motions and entered 
judgment dismissing appellants' complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The district court ruled the only available means by 
which a decision of the Board of Commissioners could be reviewed 
was by writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the Douglas County 
zoning ordinance could not convey subject matter jurisdiction to the 
district courts, and equitable estoppel did not apply to the case at bar.
	This appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N

	Recently, in Toby's of Alexandria v. County of Douglas, 545 
N.W.2d 54 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. May 21, 1996), 
this court passed on the same Douglas County zoning ordinance 
provision at issue in this case.  The Douglas County Board of 
Commissioners denied Toby's a conditional use permit to operate a 
restaurant.  Id. at 55.  Toby's, pursuant to the Douglas County zoning 
ordinance, appealed the decision to the district court.  Id. The district 
court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Id.  
This Court reversed, holding that the county zoning ordinance 
specifically conferred jurisdiction on the district court to hear appeals 
from the county board's decision to grant or deny conditional use 
permits.   Id. at 56.  Similarly, we hold that the district court possessed 
subject matter jurisdiction in the present case.
	Absent an adequate method of review or legal remedy, judicial 
review of the quasi-judicial decisions of administrative bodies, such as 
the decision to grant or deny a conditional use permits, must be 
invoked by writ of certiorari.  Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 
237, 239 (Minn. 1992); Nietzel v. County of Redwood, 521 N.W.2d 
73, 76 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 1994); 
Pierce v. Otter Tail County, 524 N.W.2d 308, 310 n.2 (Minn. App. 
1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 3, 1994).  But Toby's, and the 
present case, can be distinguished, as only in these two cases was the 
direct appeal to district court spelled out in the zoning ordinance.  In 
Toby's, we held that "Section VI of the Douglas County zoning 
ordinance, together with the enabling statute [Minnesota Statutes 
Chapter 394], * * * provide[s] an available method of judicial 
review."  Toby's, 545 N.W.2d at 56.
	As we noted in Toby's, Chapter 394 provides counties the 
power to conduct planning and zoning activities, including the specific 
procedures for enacting zoning ordinances and for obtaining 
conditional use permits.  Id.; See Minn. Stat.  394.21-.37 (1994 & 
Supp. 1995); Minn. Stat.  394.24 (Supp. 1995) (official controls); 
Minn. Stat.  394.301 (1994) (conditional use permits).  Chapter 394 
does not specify how to appeal a decision regarding the grant or denial 
of conditional use permits.  The statute does provide that the board of 
adjustment has the authority to hear and decide appeals from the 
decision of any administrative official who enforces any ordinance 
adopted pursuant to Chapter 394.  Minn. Stat.  394.27, subd. 5 
(1994).  The issuance or denial of a conditional use permit is an 
appealable "decision" within the jurisdiction of the board of 
adjustment because the section concerning conditional use permits, 
section 394.301, is within Chapter 394, and because it is an 
administrative officer who issues the permit following an order by the 
county board or planning commission.  Toby's, 545 N.W.2d at 56.  As 
we noted in Toby's, the Douglas County zoning ordinance specifically 
directed individuals to appeal to district courts, bypassing the board of 
adjustment level of appeal.  Id.  In Toby's, we also concluded that 
nothing in the enabling statute precludes counties from directing 
methods of appeal.  Id.  See Minn. Stat.  394.25, subd. 1 (1994) 
("Official controls shall be adopted by ordinance and may include but 
are not limited to the features set forth in this section.").  Accordingly, 
we held that the zoning ordinance conveyed subject matter jurisdiction 
to the trial court.  Toby's, 545 N.W.2d at 56. 
	This case is indistinguishable from Toby's.  Accordingly, we 
hold that the trial court possesses subject matter jurisdiction.  Because 
we conclude that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction, we 
need not address appellants' arguments regarding estoppel, waiver, and 
due process.
	Reversed and remanded.