This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS C2-95-2353 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Andrew Charles Nelson, Appellant. Filed August 13, 1996 Affirmed Amundson, Judge Otter Tail County District Court File No. K9-95-629 John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Ann McCaughan, Assistant State Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue SE # 600, Minneapolis, MN 55417 (for Appellant) Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, Paul R. Kempainen, Assistant Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101, Waldemar B. Senyk, Otter Tail County Attorney, Otter Tail County Courthouse, Fergus Falls, MN 56537 (for Respondent) Considered and decided by Huspeni, Presiding Judge, Randall, Judge, and Amundson, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N AMUNDSON, Judge Andrew Charles Nelson appeals from his judgment of conviction, arguing that: (1) the trial court should not have admitted statements he made during "negotiations" with police before he was charged, and (2) the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. We affirm. FACTS On February 24, 1995, Paul Hardenberg's silver 1985 Plymouth Voyager van was stolen after he parked it in the parking lot of Service Food for several minutes (with the keys in the ignition) while he went in to buy a few items. A police officer working the night shift noticed a silver van parked in the driveway of the Jewel Motel. After he heard a radio call about the van being stolen, he drove back to the motel and radioed to confirm the license plate of the van. Another officer drove Hardenberg to the motel, and he identified the van as his. Hardenberg noticed that keys and other personal items in the van were gone, that a pair of jeans with his billfold in the pocket had been gone through, and $350 in cash was missing. After Hardenberg got off work, he went back to the motel to look for his keys. He found them, and his billfold, in an open trash bag in the motel's dumpster. A discarded job application that appellant Andrew Charles Nelson had filled out was also in the bag. Hardenberg called the police and showed the bag to the officer who responded. The officer talked to the motel manager, who told him that Nelson was registered to room one. The officer knocked on Nelson's door, and he answered it, told the officer that he was not in any shape to talk to him, and asked the officer to come back later. After the officer talked for about 20 minutes to a woman who came out of the room, Nelson came to the door, and the officer read him his Miranda rights, told him he was investigating the theft of a motor vehicle, and asked him about the trash bag. On March 3, 1995, a police officer went to Nelson's hotel room. The officer told Nelson that he did not intend to arrest him, but that he would be issued a complaint summons and required to appear in court at a later date. The officer told him that the evidence was overwhelming in the case and that a conviction would be forthcoming and that I talked about Mr. Hardenberg being out all this money and that it was a thought of mind [sic] that he needed the money and that if there was any type of restitution to be asked if he could pay restitution if the court ordered restitution upon a conviction. The officer testified that "Mr. Nelson stated that he would be willing to pay Mr. Hardenberg back the money that was taken from the van" and that "he would, in fact, pay Mr. Hardenberg the cash that was gone." The officer asked him if he was willing to make a statement about taking the van, but Nelson said he would wait until he conferred with his attorney. Nelson was charged with one count of theft of a motor vehicle. On the morning of trial, Nelson's counsel sought to exclude the statements Nelson made to the officer on March 3 on the grounds that they were inadmissible under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 408 because they were offers to compromise a claim. The trial court denied the motion. The jury, after deliberating for one hour, returned a guilty verdict. The trial court denied Nelson's motion for a downward departure and, based on his criminal history score of six, sentenced him to 44 months executed. This appeal followed. D E C I S I O N I. Admission of Statements Regarding Restitution Nelson argues that the court should not have admitted statements he made to the police officer on March 3, 1995, regarding restitution. Nelson claims that the admission of the statements was improper under State v. Sufka, 295 N.W.2d 665 (Minn. 1980), Minn. R. Evid. 410, and Minn. R. Evid. 403. Nelson did not raise these issues at trial. Thus, we will not consider these issues further on appeal because they do not involve plain error. State v. Haala, 415 N.W.2d 69, 75 (Minn.App. 1987) (a defendant failing to object is deemed to have waived his right to raise the issue on appeal unless there was "plain error"), review denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 1987). II. Sufficiency of the Evidence Nelson argues that the conviction was based on circumstantial evidence, and because there are other rational hypotheses for the "coincidence" of the discovery of the keys and billfold in a trash bag with Nelson's discarded job application, his conviction should be overturned. See State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Minn. 1985) ("A conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence and will be upheld if the 'reasonable inferences from such evidence are consistent only with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.'"). However, Nelson's conviction was not based just on circumstantial evidence, there were also his statements regarding restitution. Given the following evidence: (1) Nelson was at the Service Food store at the time the van was stolen; (2) the van was located at the motel where Nelson was staying; (3) items taken from the van were in the trash bag with Nelson's job application; and (4) Nelson's statements regarding restitution, the jury could have reasonably found Nelson guilty of theft of a motor vehicle. See State v. Alton, 432 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Minn. 1988) (a reviewing court will not disturb jury verdict "if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that a defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged"). Affirmed.
On appeal, Nelson does not claim (as he did at trial) that the statements should have been excluded under Minn. R. Evid. 408.