This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat.  480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
C2-95-2353

State of Minnesota, 
Respondent, 

vs.

Andrew Charles Nelson, 
Appellant. 

Filed August 13, 1996
Affirmed 
Amundson, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. K9-95-629

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Ann McCaughan, Assistant 
State Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue SE # 600, 
Minneapolis, MN 55417 (for Appellant)

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, Paul R. Kempainen, 
Assistant Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota 
Street, St. Paul, MN 55101, Waldemar B. Senyk, Otter Tail County 
Attorney, Otter Tail County Courthouse, Fergus Falls, MN 56537 
(for Respondent)

	Considered and decided by Huspeni, Presiding Judge, 
Randall, Judge, and Amundson, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

AMUNDSON, Judge
	Andrew Charles Nelson appeals from his judgment of 
conviction, arguing that: (1) the trial court should not have 
admitted statements he made during "negotiations" with police 
before he was charged, and (2) the circumstantial evidence is 
insufficient to sustain the conviction.  We affirm.

	FACTS

	On February 24, 1995, Paul Hardenberg's silver 1985 
Plymouth Voyager van was stolen after he parked it in the parking 
lot of Service Food for several minutes (with the keys in the 
ignition) while he went in to buy a few items.  A police officer 
working the night shift noticed a silver van parked in the driveway 
of the Jewel Motel.  After he heard a radio call about the van being 
stolen, he drove back to the motel and radioed to confirm the 
license plate of the van.  Another officer drove Hardenberg to the 
motel, and he identified the van as his.  Hardenberg noticed that 
keys and other personal items in the van were gone, that a pair of 
jeans with his billfold in the pocket had been gone through, and 
$350 in cash was missing.  
	After Hardenberg got off work, he went back to the motel 
to look for his keys.  He found them, and his billfold, in an open 
trash bag in the motel's dumpster.  A discarded job application that 
appellant Andrew Charles Nelson had filled out was also in the 
bag.  Hardenberg called the police and showed the bag to the 
officer who responded.  The officer talked to the motel manager, 
who told him that Nelson was registered to room one.  The officer 
knocked on Nelson's door, and he answered it, told the officer that 
he was not in any shape to talk to him, and asked the officer to 
come back later.  After the officer talked for about 20 minutes to a 
woman who came out of the room, Nelson came to the door, and 
the officer read him his Miranda rights, told him he was 
investigating the theft of a motor vehicle, and asked him about the 
trash bag.  
	On March 3, 1995, a police officer went to Nelson's hotel 
room.  The officer told Nelson that he did not intend to arrest him, 
but that he would be issued a complaint summons and required to 
appear in court at a later date.  The officer told him that 
	the evidence was overwhelming in the case and that a 
conviction would be forthcoming and that I talked about 
Mr. Hardenberg being out all this money and that it was a 
thought of mind [sic] that he needed the money and that if 
there was any type of restitution to be asked if he could pay 
restitution if the court ordered restitution upon a conviction.
The officer testified that "Mr. Nelson stated that he would be 
willing to pay Mr. Hardenberg back the money that was taken from 
the van" and that "he would, in fact, pay Mr. Hardenberg the cash 
that was gone."  The officer asked him if he was willing to make a 
statement about taking the van, but Nelson said he would wait until 
he conferred with his attorney.
	Nelson was charged with one count of theft of a motor 
vehicle.  On the morning of trial,  Nelson's counsel sought to 
exclude the statements Nelson made to the officer on March 3 on 
the grounds that they were inadmissible under Minnesota Rule of 
Evidence 408 because they were offers to compromise a claim.  
The trial court denied the motion.  The jury, after deliberating for 
one hour, returned a guilty verdict.  The trial court denied Nelson's 
motion for a downward departure and, based on his criminal 
history score of six, sentenced him to 44 months executed.  This 
appeal followed.  


	D E C I S I O N

	I.  Admission of Statements Regarding Restitution

	Nelson argues that the court should not have admitted 
statements he made to the police officer on March 3, 1995, 
regarding restitution.
	Nelson claims that the admission of the statements was 
improper under State v. Sufka, 295 N.W.2d 665 (Minn. 1980), 
Minn. R. Evid. 410, and Minn. R. Evid. 403.   Nelson did not raise 
these issues at trial.  Thus, we will not consider these issues further 
on appeal because they do not involve plain error. State v. Haala, 
415 N.W.2d 69, 75 (Minn.App. 1987) (a defendant failing to 
object is deemed to have waived his right to raise the issue on 
appeal unless there was  "plain error"), review denied (Minn. Dec. 
22, 1987).

	II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

	Nelson argues that the conviction was based on 
circumstantial evidence, and because there are other rational 
hypotheses for the "coincidence" of the discovery of the keys and 
billfold in a trash bag with Nelson's discarded job application, his 
conviction should be overturned.  See State v. Anderson, 379 
N.W.2d 70, 75 (Minn. 1985) ("A conviction may be based on 
circumstantial evidence and will be upheld if the 'reasonable 
inferences from such evidence are consistent only with the 
defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis 
except that of his guilt.'").  However, Nelson's conviction was not 
based just on circumstantial evidence, there were also his 
statements regarding restitution.  Given the following evidence: (1) 
Nelson was at the Service Food store at the time the van was 
stolen; (2) the van was located at the motel where Nelson was 
staying; (3) items taken from the van were in the trash bag with 
Nelson's job application; and (4) Nelson's statements regarding 
restitution, the jury could have reasonably found Nelson guilty of 
theft of a motor vehicle.  See State v. Alton, 432 N.W.2d 754, 756 
(Minn. 1988) (a reviewing court will not disturb jury verdict "if the 
jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and 
for  the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, could reasonably conclude that a defendant was proven 
guilty of the offense charged").
	Affirmed.  

On appeal, Nelson does not claim (as he did at trial) that the statements should have been excluded under Minn. R. Evid. 408.