This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS C2-95-1316 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Frederick Floyd Graham, Appellant. Filed August 13, 1996 Affirmed in part and reversed in part Schultz, Judge* Hennepin County District Court File No. 94-09-7646 Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for Respondent) John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant State Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for Appellant) Considered and decided by Norton, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Schultz, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N SCHULTZ, Judge Frederick Graham challenges his judgment of conviction, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of an out-of-court identification, testimony by a police officer and a probation officer, and evidence of a previous crime. Graham also challenges the trial court's order of restitution to a witness. We affirm in part and reverse in part. FACTS At 8:30 p.m. on November 5, 1994, a man entered an ICO convenience store in Minneapolis. He asked where the restroom was located, and, after a few minutes, he exited the restroom and began to look around the store. When the clerk turned around, the man was in front of him and wielding a covered object that the clerk believed to be a gun. The man asked the clerk for the money from the till and the money from the safe in the floor behind the counter. The man told the clerk that if he pushed any buttons he would be killed. As the man exited the store, he again told the clerk not to push any buttons or call the police. Once the man was outside the store, he took off his sunglasses and looked back at the clerk. When the police arrived at the scene, the clerk described the perpetrator as "approximately 30 years old, 5 foot-8, that he was a black male, that he had black hair, approximately one-half inch in length, that it was curly, and that he also had a mustache." The first time he gave a description, the clerk also said he thought the man was wearing a mask; however, he later changed the description from a mask to sunglasses. While at the store, the officers removed a videotape from the store's surveillance system, which had been operating during the robbery. The investigating officer watched the tape, and although it is undisputed that the images on the tape were barely discernible, the officer believed that the image on the tape resembled an individual he had arrested for robbing that same location six years before. That individual was appellant Frederick Graham. The officer, after learning that Graham was no longer in prison, contacted Graham's probation officer and told him that he was investigating a robbery and believed that the individual on the surveillance tape was Graham. The probation officer watched the tape and agreed that the person on the tape walked and talked like Graham. The officer obtained a search warrant and executed it at the home of Graham's friend, where Graham was temporarily living. During the search, the officers found a jacket resembling the one depicted in the surveillance video and a pair of sunglasses with the tags still on them. After Graham's arrest, the clerk was asked to view a lineup. The officer testified that he spoke with the clerk after the lineup, and the clerk told him that he had not picked anyone from the lineup but that he had eliminated all but two individuals. The officer testified that the clerk then told him which man he thought it was. The officer showed the clerk the jacket that had been seized and the surveillance video. The clerk testified that after the lineup, he went to an office, where he saw the jacket that had been seized in the search. After seeing the jacket, the clerk believed that the perpetrator must have been one of the men in the lineup. The clerk then viewed the videotape and saw an angle of Graham he had not been able to see at the time of the incident. After viewing the videotape, the clerk stated he was certain it was Graham. During the pretrial hearing, the trial court stated that it would not be helpful to have the officer testify that he recognized Graham from the video. The court did, however, decide to allow the probation officer to testify that the way the person on the video walked and talked was familiar to him and seemed like Graham. The court also ruled that neither the state nor the defense would be able to submit evidence regarding the clerk's inability to make an in-court identification. The court went on to decide that the testimony regarding the lineup procedures would be admitted, along with the Spreigl evidence of one of the previous robberies. The court ruled that its probative value outweighed its prejudice. In light of its Spreigl decisions, the court changed its earlier ruling on the testimony regarding Graham's resemblance to the person on the tape. The officer and probation officer would be allowed to testify that the person on the tape was familiar to them, but they could not state that it was "one in the same person as the defendant." Graham was convicted and sentenced to 111 months. He was also ordered to pay restitution to the convenience store and the clerk. This appeal followed. D E C I S I O N 1. Lineup. Graham contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court admitted evidence of an out-of-court identification that was preceded by an impermissibly suggestive lineup procedure. "Rulings on evidentiary matters rest within the sound discretion of the trial court." Caldwell v. State, 347 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. App. 1984) (citation omitted). In reviewing identification procedures, this court must determine whether the procedures "used were so impermissibly suggestive as to create a `very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.'" State v. Spann, 287 N.W.2d 406, 407 (Minn. 1979) (citations omitted). Graham argues that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive because the witness was only able to identify Graham after viewing the store's surveillance video and the jacket worn by the perpetrator. Graham further contends that the likelihood of misidentification is supported by the inability of the witness to identify Graham in court-- he was sitting at the defense table and was the only African American male in the room. In determining whether an eyewitness identification is impermissibly suggestive, "a two-part test is applied." State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn. 1995). "The first inquiry focuses on whether the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive." Id. This determination is based on whether the defendant was "unfairly singled out for identification." Id. Under the second prong, the evidence may still come in, however, if "the totality of the circumstances establishes that the evidence was reliable." Id. "If the totality of the circumstances shows the witness' identification has adequate independent origin, it is considered to be reliable despite the suggestive procedure." Id. Although during the pretrial hearing the clerk testified that he had made an attempt not to look too intently at the perpetrator, he was able to see the man's lips and chin. He also testified that he had narrowed it down to two of the men in the lineup, and after viewing the surveillance tape, he positively identified Graham. He stated that his identification was based on the man's lips. As the trial court noted, however, the image on the surveillance tape was barely discernible and thus it is not likely that viewing the tape created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Similarly, the clerk testified that he was not sure if he viewed the jacket before or after viewing the video, and, although he stated that seeing the jacket reinforced his identification of Graham, there is no indication that the clerk was told who the jacket belonged to. See State v. Porter, 411 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Minn. App. 1987) (holding that viewing items seized pursuant to a search warrant could have no effect on the identification because witness was not told who the items belonged to). We conclude that the circumstances of the lineup did not create a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification and thus were not impermissibly suggestive. In any event, such evidence was appropriately presented to the jury to weigh the credibility of the identification procedures. See State v. Jackson, 365 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Minn. App. 1985) ("`Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature.'") (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2254 (1977)). 2. Testimony of police officer and probation officer. Graham contends that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the sales clerk, the police officer, and the probation officer that the person they saw on the surveillance videotape resembled Graham. The sales clerk was allowed to testify about the videotape as part of his explanation of the lineup procedure. Thus, Graham's argument about the clerk's opinion being improper is not persuasive. With regard to the police officer and the probation officer, the trial court ruled that the probative value of this testimony outweighed the potential for prejudice because the court did not believe that a jury would find it very credible considering the poor quality of the tape. Both witnesses had personal knowledge of Graham and his mannerisms, and, considering the poor quality of the tape, such testimony would be helpful to the jury. Further, the probation officer's occupation was not revealed to the jury, in an attempt to avoid prejudice. Because the trial court made every effort to minimize the potential for prejudice, we find that the admission of the testimony of the police officer and the probation officer was not an abuse of discretion. 3. Evidence of previous robbery. Graham contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a previous robbery because the crimes were not similar enough to establish identity. In addition, Graham argues that if the evidence was relevant, it was prejudicial and should have been excluded. "Whether the probative value of the convictions outweighs their prejudicial effect is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court." State v. Graham, 371 N.W.2d 204, 208 (Minn. 1985). "The trial court's decision will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion." Id. at 209. Evidence of another crime * * * may * * * be admissible for * * * proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Minn. R. Evid. 404 (b). When determining whether to admit the evidence, the trial court should engage in a balancing of factors such as the relevance or probative value of the evidence, the need for the evidence, and the danger that the evidence will be used by the jury for an improper purpose, or that the evidence will create unfair prejudice pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 403. State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 197 (Minn. 1995) (citation & footnotes omitted). In weighing the probative value against the potential for unfair prejudice, the trial court must consider whether the evidence is necessary to the state's case. Evidence of other crimes is admissible only if "`the direct or circumstantial evidence of defendant's identity is otherwise weak or inadequate, and * * * it is necessary to support the state's burden of proof.'" State v. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d 500, 504 (Minn. 1991) (quoting State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 178, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967)). In determining whether the offered evidence is relevant, the trial court should "focus on the closeness of the relationship between the other crimes and the charged crimes in terms of time, place and modus operandi." Bolte, 530 N.W.2d at 198. It is difficult to dispute the fact that the state's identity evidence was not particularly strong. The inquiry then must focus on whether the evidence was relevant and whether is was prejudicial. The record indicates that in both robberies the perpetrator carried a gun, wanted the money from the floor safe, told the clerk not to push any buttons, and both robberies occurred at the same store. In addition, the clerk testified that the general public was not aware of the floor safe, which is visible from only one angle of the opening of the counter. The crimes were sufficiently similar, and the evidence was necessary to support the state's burden of proof. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Spriegl evidence. 4. Restitution. Graham contends that the trial court erred in ordering that he pay $100 restitution to the sales clerk, who claimed that he had to take three days of vacation to testify. Graham contends that, as a witness, the clerk was entitled to compensation in the form of witness fees. By statute, witnesses are paid $20 for each day in court, as well as mileage for their travel to the courthouse. Minn. Stat. § 357.22 (1994). In criminal cases, witnesses also receive "expenses incurred for meals, loss of wages and child care, not to exceed $60 per day." Minn. Stat. § 357.24 (1994). Thus, under the statutes, the clerk was entitled to receive $80 per day, plus mileage and meal expenses. The victim of this crime was ICO, the store that was robbed. The clerk was a witness. Under the circumstances of this case, we find it would have been more appropriate for the clerk to be reimbursed his witness fees from the county treasury. Thus, we reverse the trial court's order of restitution to the clerk. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. * Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.