This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
C1-95-2716

Deborah Arndt,
Appellant,

and

Group Health, Inc.,
Intervenor,

vs.

Khanh Quoc Nguyen, et al.,
Respondents.


Filed August 13, 1996
Affirmed 
Kalitowski, Judge


Hennepin County District Court
File No. 9214599


Clarance E. Hagglund, Hagglund & Weimer, 4000 Water Park 
Place, 5101 Olson Memorial Highway, Minneapolis, MN  55422 
(for Appellant)

Stephen Tillitt, Elliot L. Olsen, Gislason, Dosland, Hunter & 
Malecki, P.L.L.P., P.O. Box 5297, Minnetonka, MN  55343-2297 
(for Respondent Nguyen)

Lawrence R. King, King & Hatch, Six West 5th Street, Suite 800, 
St. Paul, MN  55102 (for Respondent Nguyen)


	Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge, 
Parker, Judge, and Randall, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

KALITOWSKI, Judge
	Appellant Deborah Arndt challenges the jury's 
determination that Khanh Quoc Nguyen did not operate his car 
negligently on December 30, 1991, when Nguyen's vehicle crossed 
the center line and struck appellant's vehicle.  We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

	A court's decision not to overturn a jury's special verdict 
finding of no negligence will be reversed on appeal only if there is 
no evidence reasonably tending to sustain the verdict or if it is 
manifestly and palpably against the weight of the evidence.  
Stumne v. Village Sports & Gas, 309 Minn. 551, 552, 243 N.W.2d 
329, 330 (1976).  In examining a verdict on appeal the evidence 
must be considered in the light most favorable to the prevailing 
party and the verdict must be sustained if it is possible to do so on 
any reasonable theory of evidence.  Id.  
	The violation of a traffic law constitutes prima facie 
evidence of negligence.  Minn. Stat.  169.96 (1990).  A person 
who violates a traffic law, therefore, has the burden of showing 
some justification or excuse for the violation.  Freude v. Berzins, 
379 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Minn. App. 1985).  If the violator presents 
evidence tending to show excuse or justification, the question of 
whether the violation constitutes negligence is for the jury.  
Marshall v. Galvez, 480 N.W.2d 358, 361 (Minn. App. 1992).  
Losing control of a vehicle because of external factors such as wet 
or slippery road conditions is a reasonable alternative explanation 
for violating a traffic law.  Id.  Evidence of such road conditions 
provides sufficient justification to present a factual question 
regarding negligence to the jury.  Id.; see also, Brager v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of Fargo, 375 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. App. 1985) 
(reversing a district court's decision to grant JNOV in a negligence 
action where the driver who caused the automobile accident 
presented evidence of bad weather and worsening driving 
conditions).
	Nguyen does not dispute that he violated Minn. Stat.  
169.18 (1990) by crossing into Arndt's lane of traffic.  When taken 
in a light most favorable to the verdict, however, the evidence 
shows that Nguyen had been able to control his vehicle for several 
miles prior to the accident, had passed another motorist without 
losing control of his vehicle on the road where the accident 
occurred, and only lost control of his vehicle when hitting an icy 
patch of road while driving in worsening freezing rain conditions.  
Under Marshall, Nguyen's testimony created a fact question on the 
issue of negligence that was properly determined by the jury.  
	The jury could have viewed the evidence presented and 
found Nguyen acted negligently in causing the accident.  This 
court's function, however, is not to reexamine the evidence.  The 
serious injuries suffered by Arndt, an innocent victim, are 
unfortunate.  However, because there is competent evidence in the 
record reasonably tending to sustain the verdict, and because the 
verdict is not manifestly and palpably against the weight of the 
evidence, we are compelled to affirm the district court's refusal to 
set aside the jury's verdict.
	Affirmed.