This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS C0-95-2352 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Quentin Dean Stewart, Appellant. Filed August 13, 1996 Affirmed Toussaint, Chief Judge Otter Tail County District Court File No. K9-95-694 Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, Catherine M. Keane, Assistant Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondent) Waldemar Senyk, Otter Tail County Attorney, Courthouse, 121 Junius Avenue, Fergus Falls, MN 56537 (for respondent) John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Evan W. Jones, Assistant State Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue S.E., Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant) Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge, Toussaint, Chief Judge, and Peterson, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge Quentin Dean Stewart was charged and convicted of first- degree arson in connection with two fires that damaged the trailer home in which he lived with his girlfriend. Stewart was sentenced to the presumptive term of 48 months imprisonment and now appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, and that the trial court erred by not granting a downward dispositional and durational departure despite the existence of substantial and compelling mitigating factors. We affirm. D E C I S I O N Where there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our review on appeal is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). A reviewing court must assume the jury believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. State v. Steinbuch, 514 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 1994). I. Stewart does not challenge the finding of arson, only that there was insufficient evidence to prove his guilt, arguing that the evidence presented was almost entirely circumstantial. A jury normally is in the best position to evaluate circumstantial evidence, and its verdict is entitled to due deference. Webb, 440 N.W.2d at 430. Where a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, the verdict will be sustained on appeal when the reasonable inferences from such evidence are consistent only with defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt. State v. Alton, 432 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Minn. 1988). The state often must rely on circumstantial evidence to prove arson. State v. Jacobson, 326 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Minn. 1982). A review of the record reveals that the jury heard testimony establishing Stewart's guilt by suggesting motive, opportunity, and means. Stewart was also convicted of fifth-degree assault, which he does not challenge on appeal. It is not unreasonable for the jury to have concluded that the incident resulting in the assault conviction angered Stewart and was his motive for setting the fire. Motive helps form inferences from circumstantial evidence and adds credibility to the state's case. Webb, 440 N.W.2d at 431. Furthermore, Stewart's own testimony as well as that of other witnesses, place him at the scene moments before the fire started, establishing opportunity. The jury also heard expert testimony that items recovered at the scene and from Stewart's car could have been used as possible means of setting the fires, either by creating a homemade torch or by using a lighter. All of the testimony presented to establish motive, opportunity, and means was sufficient to permit the jury to reach its verdict. See State v. Conklin, 406 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. App. 1987) (arson conviction was sufficiently supported by circumstantial evidence where totality of evidence demonstrated motive, means, and opportunity to commit crime). In addition to the circumstantial evidence, during questioning by the police, Stewart admitted starting one of the fires. Stewart argues that the police officer lied to him about his circumstances, leading him to believe that if he admitted starting a fire he would be able to go home. An inculpatory statement is only admissible if it was voluntarily given. State v. Orscanin, 283 N.W.2d 897, 899 (Minn. 1979), cert. denied (Minn. Nov. 26, 1979). The admissibility of a confession is strictly a matter for the trial court at the omnibus hearing. Id. at 901. Stewart waived any omnibus issues at the omnibus hearing, so the determination of the weight and credibility of his admission were the only matters for the jury's consideration. See State v. Schaeffer, 457 N.W.2d 194, 196 (Minn. 1990). Both Stewart and the police officer testified that Stewart received a Miranda warning and that Stewart stated he understood it. If the police fully advise an accused of his Miranda rights, and the accused indicates that he understands his rights and nevertheless gives an incriminating statement, the state is deemed to have met its burden of proving that the accused knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 286 (Minn. 1995). The police officer also testified that he made no promises to Stewart in exchange for information, but that he only tried to appear sympathetic so that Stewart would tell the truth. A recording of the questioning was also played for the jury at defense counsel's request. We must presume that the jury believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. Appellant's admission, coupled with circumstantial evidence, amply supports the jury's finding of guilt. State v. Battin, 474 N.W.2d 427, 431 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn.Oct. 23, 1991). Stewart also argues that the evidence was insufficient because the police failed to investigate his girlfriend, a possible suspect. The record reveals that she in fact was investigated, and the jury heard testimony to that effect. The jury had the power to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence presented at trial. Id at 430. We will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that a defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged. Alton, 432 N.W.2d at 756. II. Stewart was sentenced to the presumptive term of 48 months for first-degree arson. Stewart argues that the trial court erred by not considering mitigating factors that would have justified a downward dispositional and durational departure. Stewart argues that the trial court should have considered: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence as to whether he started the second fire; (2) that this was his only felony offense; and (3) that he had strong family ties. Only in a "rare" case will a reviewing court reverse a trial court's imposition of the presumptive sentence. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). The defendant must establish substantial and compelling circumstances to justify departure, and even then departure is still discretionary. Id. None of Stewart's arguments is substantial and compelling. The trial court considered his claims and determined that the presumptive sentence was appropriate. Even if a mitigating factor was found to exist, it did not obligate the court to impose a shorter term. State v. Wall, 343 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 1984). See also State v. Back, 341 N.W.2d 273, 275 (Minn. 1983) (reviewing court will not ordinarily interfere with sentence in the presumptive range even when there are grounds to justify departure). Nothing in the record indicates that this is the "rare" case which would justify reversal of the trial court's sentence. Affirmed.