This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994) State of Minnesota in Court of Appeals C7-96-60 Stark Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, Respondent, Marcel Hoffmann, et al., Appellants, vs. Fred Rodriguez, Defendant, M & M Lounge Restaurant, Ltd., d/b/a The Barrel Inn, Defendant, The Getaway of New Ulm, Defendant. Holtan, Judge Brown County District Court File No. C394603 Mark G. McKeon, Willenbring, Dahl, Wocken & Zimmerman, Red River at Main, P.O. Box 417, Cold Spring, MN 56320 (Respondent) Dustan J. Cross, Gislason, Dosland, Hunter & Malecki, P.L.L.P., One South State Street, P.O. Box 458, New Ulm, MN 56073 (for Appellants) Timothy W. Waldeck, 2300 Metropolitan Centre, 333 South Seventh Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for Defendant M & M Lounge Restaurant, Ltd., d/b/a The Barrell Inn) Richard Scattergood, 2000 Metropolitan Centre, 333 South Seventh Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for Defendant The Getaway of New Ulm) Considered and decided by Huspeni, Presiding Judge, Klaphake, Judge, and Holtan, Judge.(1) [Footnote] (1)Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. Unpublished Opinion HOLTAN, Judge (Hon. Terri J. Stoneburner, District Court Trial Judge) Appellants challenge a trial court order allocating to respondent insurance company 100 percent of a settlement obtained by appellants and respondent from tortfeasors under the subrogation provisions of appellants' insurance policy with respondent. We reverse. Facts Appellants Marcel, Brad, and Dean Hoffmann are father and sons who farm together. In July 1993, Brad Hoffmann was driving his father's tractor and pulling an herbicide sprayer belonging to the two brothers when he was hit by a drunk driver. The tractor and sprayer were destroyed. Respondent, insurer of both pieces of equipment, paid the Hoffmanns just over $20,000, representing the equipment's actual value.(2) [Footnote] (2)Appellants' tractor and sprayer were insured separately under two policies. The subrogation clauses of both policies are identical; thus, for simplicity's sake we will refer to a single policy throughout this opinion. Appellants and respondent filed a joint complaint against the intoxicated driver and two bars that served him alcohol before the accident. Appellants claimed that they sustained damages uncompensated by insurance, including (1) $18,183.50 in extra herbicide costs incurred when appellants were forced to delay herbicide spraying while securing a new tractor, and (2) $11,635.95 in financing charges incurred when appellants purchased a replacement tractor. Appellants and respondent entered into a settlement agreement with the dram–shop defendants for $20,000. Appellants and respondent were unable to agree on an allocation of the settlement proceeds and filed cross-motions seeking a judicial division of the amount. Appellants argued that they were entitled to the entire $20,000 because they had not been fully compensated for their loss by the insurance payments. Respondent contended it was entitled to the entire $20,000 under the subrogation provision of its policy with appellants. The trial court awarded respondent the entire $20,000 under the terms of its subrogation provision. This appeal followed. Decision The law in Minnesota is clear that where an insured has not been fully compensated for a loss, his or her insurance company will not be reimbursed for any payments made, even if the insured's policy contains a subrogation clause, unless that clause clearly states that subrogation will lie before full recovery. See Westendorf by Westendorf v. Stasson, 330 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Minn. 1983) (adopting the majority ``full recovery rule'' that ``absent express terms to the contrary, subrogation will not be allowed where the insured's total recovery is less than the insured's actual loss,'' and specifically rejecting the minority rule that ``a subrogation clause ipso facto authorizes first priority recovery by the insurer''). Appellants contend they have not been fully compensated by their insurance proceeds, and respondent does not dispute this claim on appeal. Respondent contends that its policy with appellants contains ``express contract terms'' stating that respondent's subrogation rights stand even in the event that appellants have not been fully compensated for a loss. We disagree. The subrogation clause in appellants' policy provides: If we pay a loss to or on behalf of an insured and the insured recovers damages from another person for the same loss, the insured shall hold the amount recovered in trust for us and shall first reimburse us up to the full amount we have paid under this policy. (Emphasis omitted.) This clause does not explicitly override the full recovery rule by stating that recovery will lie even if the insured has not been fully compensated. Cf. MedCenters Health Care v. Ochs, 854 F. Supp. 589, 592 (D. Minn. 1993) (``This Court believes that Minnesota's full recovery rule requires that the subrogation clause must be explicit regarding priority of payments and the plan's recovery regardless of full recovery or the `full recovery rule' will bar subrogation.''), aff'd, 26 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 1994); Hershey v. Physicians Health Plan of Minnesota, Inc., 498 N.W.2d 519, 520-21 (Minn. App. 1993) (holding subrogation clause effective despite insured's incomplete recovery in light of clause's language: ``[Insurer] PHP may collect from the proceeds of any settlement or judgment recovered from you or your legal representative regardless of whether you have been fully compensated.''). The instant clause is materially indistinguishable from a subrogation clause that this court found not to be a sufficiently clear rejection of the full recovery rule to allow reimbursement of the insurer before full recovery by the insured. See Allum v. MedCenter Health Care, 371 N.W.2d 557, 558, 560-61 (Minn. App. 1985) (rejecting insurer's argument that its subrogation clause, providing that subrogation rights ``shall be considered as the first priority claim against any such third party to be paid before any other claims for general damages by such individual,'' expressly gave the insurer the right to settlement proceeds before full recovery). Like the clause in Allum, respondent's subrogation clause does not ``plainly provide'' that respondent may enforce its subrogation rights even if the insureds have not been fully compensated. See Hershey, 498 N.W.2d at 520 (observing that language there did plainly provide such rights). Thus, the trial court erred in enforcing the subrogation provision before appellants have been fully compensated for their loss. More importantly, the subrogation clause does not apply to the settlement proceedings, because the proceedings are not payments ``for the same loss'' as that for which respondent paid appellants, that is, the actual value of the destroyed equipment. The subrogation clause, again, provides: If we pay a loss to or on behalf of an insured and the insured recovers damages from another person for the same loss, the insured shall hold the amount recovered in trust for us, and shall first reimburse us up to the full amount we have paid under this policy. (Emphasis added.) (Other emphasis omitted.) Respondent asserts that the term ``loss'' in the subrogation clause means ``all of the items of damage suffered by an insured because of * * * [a] tort,'' relying on case law prohibiting the splitting of a single cause of action into different suits based on different items of damages. See Myhra v. Park, 193 Minn. 290, 292-96, 258 N.W. 515, 516-18 (1935) (where plaintiff's cause of action was founded on ``one negligent act,'' plaintiff could not bring several suits against the tortfeasor based on various damages). Myhra is inapplicable in this insurance setting; it does not proscribe distinguishing between ``insured loss'' and ``uninsured loss'' within an insurance policy. The natural meaning of ``loss'' in respondent's subrogation clause is ``insured loss.'' Because the herbicide and financing losses for which the parties obtained settlement proceeds were not insured losses, the proceeds do not represent damages recovered ``for the same loss,'' and the subrogation clause is inapplicable. Respondent essentially contends that it ought to be permitted to insure only a specific loss, such as the actual value of appellants' property, and then be reimbursed for any payments made for that loss under their subrogation clauses as soon as any money is recovered from the tortfeasors for the remaining, uninsured portions of appellants' loss. This scheme leaves respondent, which paid $20,000 on the original claims, fully compensated while appellants suffer an $18,000 to $20,000 loss. But the case law stresses that insurance companies rather than insureds should bear the losses from third-party negligence when a tortfeasor's contribution is inadequate to compensate both. See Westendorf, 330 N.W.2d at 704, 703 (holding that where ``the enrollee has paid for comprehensive health care,'' she should recover fully before the insurance company is reimbursed: ``equitable principles apply to all instances of subrogation except when modified by specific provisions in the contract''); Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Wis. 1977) (``[W]here either the insurer or the insured must to some extent go unpaid, the loss must be borne by the insurer for that is a risk the insured has paid it to assume.''), cited in Westendorf, 330 N.W.2d at 703 n.1). Subrogation is an equitable doctrine designed to prevent double recovery by insureds and otherwise ``compel the payment of a debt by him who ought in equity to pay it.'' Westendorf, 330 N.W.2d at 703 (quoting Northern Trust Co. v. Consolidated Elevator Co., 142 Minn. 132, 138, 171 N.W. 265, 268 (1919) ). Because the loss recovered here is not the same loss as that paid by respondent, there is no double recovery and, absent explicit language to the contrary, subrogation would prevent the insureds from making a full recovery. Respondent has not contested on appeal appellants' claim that they require $18,183.50 in herbicide costs to fully recover their losses from the July 1993 accident; finding no indication that the herbicide expense is not a legitimate loss, we order $18,183.50 of the settlement proceeds to appellants. Moreover, we note that the trial court found the $11,365 to represent not a legitimate loss but appellants' decision to buy an extremely expensive replacement tractor. Appellants, however, need only show $1,816.50 in legitimate financing charges to be entitled to the entire $20,000 settlement. Respondent makes no answer to appellants' contention that at least $1,816.50 of the financing is legitimate, and we are persuaded that even electing a much less expensive replacement tractor, appellants' financing would exceed $1,816.50. Thus, we now award the entire $20,000 settlement proceeds to appellants. Reversed.