This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals
                              C8-96-584

     In Re the Marriage of:
Sherilyn Laverne Battee, n/k/a
Sherilyn Laverne Thomas, petitioner,
     Respondent,


vs.

Bobby Joe Battee,
     Appellant,
     and


In the Matter of the Welfare of:
B.J.B., S.S.B., and T.S.B., Children.

Filed June 17, 1996

Dismissed

Short, Judge

Mark A. Paige, Strandemo & Sheridan, P.A., 2125 Upper 55th Street East,
Inver Grove Heights, MN 55077 (for Appellant)

Sherilyn Laverne Battee, 2017 Terlingua Lane, Unit 156, Arlington, TX 76010
(Pro Se Respondent)

James Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Vance B. Grannis, II, Assistant
County Attorney, 1560 West Highway 55, Hastings, MN 55033 (for Respondent
Dakota County)

Considered and decided by Short, Presiding Judge, Schumacher, Judge, and
Foley, Judge.(*)
        [Footnote] (*)Retired judge of the Minnesota Court
        of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn.
        Const. art. VI, § 10.
                                     
                        Unpublished Opinion

SHORT, Judge (Hon. Susan M. Williams, District Court Trial Judge)

This appeal arises from an administrative hearing to determine child
support and medical support arrearages. An administrative law judge issued
an order establishing the amount of Bobby Joe Battee's child support
arrears, the parties stipulated to entry of judgment, and Battee filed this
appeal. After this court denied its first motion to dismiss, Dakota County
again moved to dismiss Battee's appeal on the grounds that it is untimely.

In opposition to the motion, Battee argues the county is collaterally
estopped from raising the timeliness issue, and the notice of filing was
ineffective, inadequate, and misleading.
                                     
                              Decision

Battee argues collateral estoppel prohibits the county from bringing this
second motion to dismiss. We disagree. The county now raises a new issue
regarding the limitation of the appeal period through service of notice of
filing. Under these circumstances, there is no preclusive effect. See
Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Minn. 1994) (finding no preclusive
effect because a subsequent motion presented a different issue).

Battee also argues the notice of filing was ineffective, inadequate, and
misleading. We disagree. First, the notice of filing was served by the
child support officer who represented the county in the underlying
proceeding. By moving for a determination of Battee's arrearages, the
county was the adverse party and properly served papers on Battee. See
Minn. Stat. 𨹞.5511, subd. 5 (Supp. 1995) (nonattorney employees
of the public authority responsible for child support may file motions to
obtain, modify, or enforce support orders and may participate in
proceedings before an administrative law judge); O'Brien v. Wendt,
295 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Minn. 1980) (definition of adverse party focuses on
positions taken at trial). Second, a proper notice of filing need not
include a copy of the judgment. See Duluth Ready-Mix Concrete, Inc. v.
City of Duluth, 520 N.W.2d 775, 777-78 (Minn. App. 1994) (requiring
service of a separate notice of filing, which ``may'' be accompanied by a
copy of the order or judgment). And third, the notice of filing was not
misleading even though it cited the general rule that an appeal from a

judgment may be taken 90 days after entry, unless another time is
prescribed by law. To be effective, a notice of filing need only (1) call
the recipient's attention to what was filed and when, (2) constitute a
separate document, (3) display an appropriate caption, and (4) describe the
decision filed. Levine v. Hauser, 431 N.W.2d 269, 270 (Minn. App.
1988) (quoting Rieman v. Joubert, 376 N.W.2d 681, 683-84 n.1 (Minn.
1985) ). Under these circumstances, Battee received adequate notice of
filing, which was effective to limit the appeal period.

The county argues Battee's failure to bring this appeal prior to the
expiration of the appeal period is fatal. See Hofseth v. Hofseth,
456 N.W.2d 99, 100-01 (Minn. App. 1990) (appeal time from a judgment in
a special proceeding arising from a dissolution action expires 30 days
after the adverse party serves notice of filing); see also Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 125.03 (three days added to prescribed period if service of
triggering document is by mail). The record demonstrates:(1) judgment was
entered on December 21, 1995; (2) on December 28, the county served the
notice of filing by mail; (3) the appeal period included three additional
days due to the method of service; (4) the appeal period expired on January
30, 1996; and (5) Battee filed this appeal on March 19, 1996. Because the
appeal was not filed within 33 days after the county served notice of
filing by mail, we lack authority to hear this matter. See Township of
Honner v. Redwood County, 518 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. App. 1994)
(finding no jurisdiction to hear an untimely appeal), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 16, 1994).

This matter is stricken from the June 26, 1996 oral argument calendar, and
the appeal is dismissed.
Dismissed