This opinion will be unpublished and

                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals
                              C4-95-2273

     D & L Electric, Inc.,
d/b/a Koppi Electric,
     Respondent,


vs.

Henry W. Haverstock, et al.,
     Appellants.


Filed June 25, 1996
Affirmed
Kalitowski, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 9460001

William B. Butler, Messerli & Kramer P.A., 1800 Fifth Street Towers, 150
South Fifth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402-4218 (for Respondent)

Daniel D. Reisman, 2300 Nicollet Avenue, Minneapolis, MN 55404 (for
Appellants)

Considered and decided by Norton, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and
Schultz, Judge.
                                     
                        Unpublished Opinion

KALITOWSKI, Judge (Hon. Daniel H. Mabley, District Court Trial
Judge)

Appellants Henry W. Haverstock, et al., challenge a judgment granted
against them in this mechanic's lien action, awarding respondent D & L
Electric, Inc. $31,009.33 in labor and materials, plus $20,098.51 in
attorney fees. We affirm.
                                     
                              Decision
I.
        
        Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
        documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
        clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
        the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
        credibility of the witnesses.

Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
        
        [T]his court will only reverse a trial court's
        findings of fact if, upon review of the entire
        evidence, we are ``left with the definite and firm
        conviction that a mistake has been made.''

In re Guardianship of Dawson, 502 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn. App. 1993)
(quoting Gjovik v. Strope, 401 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn. 1987) ),
review denied (Minn. Aug. 16, 1993).



A mechanic's lien may be for ``the reasonable value of the work done, and
of the skill, material, and machinery furnished.'' Minn. Stat. 𨹚.03,
subd. 1(b) (1994). Moreover, the price set in the contract ``is prima facie
evidence of the reasonable value of the improvement.'' Enviro-Fab, Inc.
v. Blandin Paper Co., 349 N.W.2d 842, 848 (Minn. App. 1984), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 12, 1984); see also Ecolab, Inc. v. Gartland,
537 N.W.2d 291, 295 (Minn. App. 1995) (determining the contracting
parties' intent based on ``the contract as a whole, its plain language, and
the surrounding circumstances''). A party may, however, rebut the contract
price by ``showing that it is `so exorbitant and unreasonable as to
indicate fraud, mistake or the like *** .''' Enviro-Fab, 349 N.W.2d
at 848 (quoting Leeds v. Little, 42 Minn. 414, 416, 44 N.W. 309
(1890) ).

Here, the handwritten contract between the parties provides that appellants
will pay for labor at ``$46.00/hr JR. Rate.'' The parties agree this term
means ``$46.00 per hour journeyman rate.'' The trial court found that
$46.00 per hour for both journeymen and nonjourneymen was a reasonable
value for labor performed. Appellants claim the contract language requires
the work be done only by journeymen and that evidence respondent used an
apprentice electrician requires us to reverse the trial court as to the
value of the labor. We disagree.

The plain language of the contract refers only to journeymen rate, rather
than journeymen status. Furthermore, respondent's expert witness testified
that $45.00 to $55.00 was the customary rate in Minneapolis for both
journeymen and apprentices. Appellants offered no evidence of fraud or
mistake. Therefore, based on the plain meaning of the contract as well as
industry custom, we conclude the trial court's finding regarding the value
of labor was not clearly erroneous.

To support a claim for materials provided, the lienholder must ``clearly
segregate the items and their value at the trial.'' Jadwin v. Kasal,
318 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn. 1982). Here, the contract provides that
materials will be billed at the ``established rate.'' The contract did not
specify a lump sum value; therefore, under Jadwin, respondent was required
to submit an itemized list of materials and their value. Respondent
submitted invoices for all materials purchased for the project with item
prices redacted, along with a claim that the value of the materials was
$9,690.33. Appellants did not object to respondent's submission and did not
introduce any evidence concerning ``established rates.'' The trial court
found that $9,690.33 was a reasonable value for the materials provided.
Without evidence to the contrary, we cannot conclude the trial court's
finding was clearly erroneous.
                                II.

A trial court may, in its discretion, determine the amount of attorney fees
to be awarded; however,
        
        it is accepted that the factors to be considered
        are: time and effort required, novelty or difficulty
        of the issues, skill and standing of the attorney,
        value of the interest involved, results secured at
        trial, loss of opportunity for other employment,
        taxed party's ability to pay, customary charges for
        similar services, and certainty of payment.

Jadwin, 318 N.W.2d at 848. Furthermore, an award of attorney fees
must bear a ``reasonable relation to the amount of the judgment secured.''
Northwest Wholesale Lumber Inc. v. Citadel Co., 457 N.W.2d 244, 251
(Minn. App. 1990). On review, an appellate court will not reverse a trial
court's award or denial of attorney fees absent an abuse of discretion.
Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng'g Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn.
1987).



Here, in response to appellants' motion objecting to respondent's request
for $20,069.51 in attorney fees, respondent submitted affidavits of
attorney fees and costs, including complete time and billing records. After
review of the affidavits, the trial court disallowed $917.50 in requested
fees, and added $946.50 for attorney fees incurred in responding to
appellants' motion, resulting in an award of $20,098.51 in attorney fees.
Given the Jadwin factors and the procedural history of this case, we
conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring
appellants to pay the attorney fees incurred by respondent. See C.
Kowalski, Inc. v. Davis, 472 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Minn. App. 1991)
(affirming attorney fees set at 93 percent of the judgment when the
mechanic prevailed in all respects on its mechanic's lien claim), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 13, 1991).

Affirmed.