This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994) State of Minnesota in Court of Appeals C4-95-2273 D & L Electric, Inc., d/b/a Koppi Electric, Respondent, vs. Henry W. Haverstock, et al., Appellants. Filed June 25, 1996 Affirmed Kalitowski, Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. 9460001 William B. Butler, Messerli & Kramer P.A., 1800 Fifth Street Towers, 150 South Fifth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402-4218 (for Respondent) Daniel D. Reisman, 2300 Nicollet Avenue, Minneapolis, MN 55404 (for Appellants) Considered and decided by Norton, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Schultz, Judge. Unpublished Opinion KALITOWSKI, Judge (Hon. Daniel H. Mabley, District Court Trial Judge) Appellants Henry W. Haverstock, et al., challenge a judgment granted against them in this mechanic's lien action, awarding respondent D & L Electric, Inc. $31,009.33 in labor and materials, plus $20,098.51 in attorney fees. We affirm. Decision I. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. [T]his court will only reverse a trial court's findings of fact if, upon review of the entire evidence, we are ``left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'' In re Guardianship of Dawson, 502 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn. App. 1993) (quoting Gjovik v. Strope, 401 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn. 1987) ), review denied (Minn. Aug. 16, 1993). A mechanic's lien may be for ``the reasonable value of the work done, and of the skill, material, and machinery furnished.'' Minn. Stat. 𨹚.03, subd. 1(b) (1994). Moreover, the price set in the contract ``is prima facie evidence of the reasonable value of the improvement.'' Enviro-Fab, Inc. v. Blandin Paper Co., 349 N.W.2d 842, 848 (Minn. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Sept. 12, 1984); see also Ecolab, Inc. v. Gartland, 537 N.W.2d 291, 295 (Minn. App. 1995) (determining the contracting parties' intent based on ``the contract as a whole, its plain language, and the surrounding circumstances''). A party may, however, rebut the contract price by ``showing that it is `so exorbitant and unreasonable as to indicate fraud, mistake or the like *** .''' Enviro-Fab, 349 N.W.2d at 848 (quoting Leeds v. Little, 42 Minn. 414, 416, 44 N.W. 309 (1890) ). Here, the handwritten contract between the parties provides that appellants will pay for labor at ``$46.00/hr JR. Rate.'' The parties agree this term means ``$46.00 per hour journeyman rate.'' The trial court found that $46.00 per hour for both journeymen and nonjourneymen was a reasonable value for labor performed. Appellants claim the contract language requires the work be done only by journeymen and that evidence respondent used an apprentice electrician requires us to reverse the trial court as to the value of the labor. We disagree. The plain language of the contract refers only to journeymen rate, rather than journeymen status. Furthermore, respondent's expert witness testified that $45.00 to $55.00 was the customary rate in Minneapolis for both journeymen and apprentices. Appellants offered no evidence of fraud or mistake. Therefore, based on the plain meaning of the contract as well as industry custom, we conclude the trial court's finding regarding the value of labor was not clearly erroneous. To support a claim for materials provided, the lienholder must ``clearly segregate the items and their value at the trial.'' Jadwin v. Kasal, 318 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn. 1982). Here, the contract provides that materials will be billed at the ``established rate.'' The contract did not specify a lump sum value; therefore, under Jadwin, respondent was required to submit an itemized list of materials and their value. Respondent submitted invoices for all materials purchased for the project with item prices redacted, along with a claim that the value of the materials was $9,690.33. Appellants did not object to respondent's submission and did not introduce any evidence concerning ``established rates.'' The trial court found that $9,690.33 was a reasonable value for the materials provided. Without evidence to the contrary, we cannot conclude the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. II. A trial court may, in its discretion, determine the amount of attorney fees to be awarded; however, it is accepted that the factors to be considered are: time and effort required, novelty or difficulty of the issues, skill and standing of the attorney, value of the interest involved, results secured at trial, loss of opportunity for other employment, taxed party's ability to pay, customary charges for similar services, and certainty of payment. Jadwin, 318 N.W.2d at 848. Furthermore, an award of attorney fees must bear a ``reasonable relation to the amount of the judgment secured.'' Northwest Wholesale Lumber Inc. v. Citadel Co., 457 N.W.2d 244, 251 (Minn. App. 1990). On review, an appellate court will not reverse a trial court's award or denial of attorney fees absent an abuse of discretion. Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng'g Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 1987). Here, in response to appellants' motion objecting to respondent's request for $20,069.51 in attorney fees, respondent submitted affidavits of attorney fees and costs, including complete time and billing records. After review of the affidavits, the trial court disallowed $917.50 in requested fees, and added $946.50 for attorney fees incurred in responding to appellants' motion, resulting in an award of $20,098.51 in attorney fees. Given the Jadwin factors and the procedural history of this case, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring appellants to pay the attorney fees incurred by respondent. See C. Kowalski, Inc. v. Davis, 472 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Minn. App. 1991) (affirming attorney fees set at 93 percent of the judgment when the mechanic prevailed in all respects on its mechanic's lien claim), review denied (Minn. Sept. 13, 1991). Affirmed.