State of Minnesota in Court of Appeals C9-95-1717 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Alvin Jones, Appellant. Holtan, Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. 94109783 Hubert H. Humphrey III, Minnesota Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for Respondent) John M. Stuart, Minnesota State Public Defender, Bradford S. Delapena, Assistant State Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue S.E., Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for Appellant) Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge, Huspeni, Judge, and Holtan, Judge.(1) [Footnote] (1)Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. Unpublished Opinion HOLTAN, Judge (Hon. Franklin J. Knoll, District Court Trial Judge) This appeal is from a judgment of conviction for first-degree assault and attempted second-degree murder. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.17, .19(1), .221 (1994). Appellant Alvin Jones, who was sentenced to 173 months for the attempted second-degree murder, argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Facts Jones was charged with attempted second-degree murder and first-degree assault for an attack on Steven Smith, who suffered life-threatening slash wounds to his neck. The injury occurred at the home of a woman with whom each man had been romantically involved and after considerable drinking by all three participants. Earlier in the evening, Smith had punched Jones several times, at one point sending him through a glass window. Smith fled the house, but returned several hours later. Jones awoke to hear Smith and the woman, Louisa White, in an altercation. White was calling for help. Jones ran over and hit Smith on the head with a vodka bottle. Although he denied any further assaultive act, the state presented evidence that Smith had two deep slash wounds, one on each side of his neck. Jones also told White, immediately after the incident, that he had ``cut'' Smith. Decision Jones contends the evidence does not support the conviction for attempted second-degree (intentional) murder because there is insufficient evidence that he deliberately inflicted the life-threatening wounds to Smith's neck. He admits, as he did at trial, that he struck Smith on the head with the vodka bottle, but argues that the state failed to prove a separate, intentional act (or acts) causing the neck wounds. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, assuming the jury believed the state's evidence and discredited contrary evidence. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). The court must determine whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences from those facts, the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged. State v. Thunberg, 492 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1992). As Jones points out, the evidence of intent in this case was circumstantial. In such case, the circumstances must be inconsistent with any rational hypothesis of innocence. State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Minn. 1994). This court, however, must give due deference to the verdict of the jury, which is in the best position to evaluate the circumstantial evidence. State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Minn. 1985). Jones argues there is insufficient evidence that he deliberately slashed Smith's neck with the neck of the vodka bottle. Jones testified that he thought he hit Smith once, but was not sure how many blows he struck. He also testified that Smith turned around quickly and swung at him. From this evidence the jury could infer that Jones committed an intentional second assaultive act on Smith. The jury could also have inferred, from evidence of the love triangle involving Jones, Smith, and White, that Jones intended to injure Smith, not merely to defend White. The state's theory of a separate act (or acts) directed at Smith's throat is also supported by the medical evidence. Smith reported to the hospital with two widely-spaced gashes on either side of his neck, with no connecting wound. This evidence tended strongly to negate the defense theory of wounds caused by a single motion of bringing the vodka bottle down over Smith's head. Thus, the defense theory of a single blow is contrary to all the available physical evidence. Finally, Jones' statements to White immediately after the assault indicated that he was aware he had cut Smith's throat and had intentionally done so. A defendant's conduct or statements made after an assault or homicide may suggest the requisite criminal intent. See, e.g., State v. Starkey, 516 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Minn. 1994). Jones' comments, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, support an inference that Jones intentionally hit Smith over the head and intentionally cut his throat. The evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Affirmed.