This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). State of Minnesota in Court of Appeals Craig J. Smith, et al., Appellants, vs. Peoples National Bank of Mora, a national banking association, Respondent. Filed May 14, 1996 Affirmed Davies, Judge Kanabec County District Court File No. C895627 John G. Westrick, Westrick & McDowall-Nix, P.L.L.P., 400 Minnesota Bldg., 46 E. Fourth St., St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Appellants) Lawrence P. Zielke, Shapiro & Nordmeyer, Suite 390, 7300 Metro Blvd., Edina, MN 55439 (for Appellants) Robert C. Lindig, 209 E. Maple, Mora, MN 55051 (for Respondent) Considered and decided by Davies, Presiding Judge, Willis, Judge, and Stone, Judge.(*) [Footnote] (*)Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. Unpublished Opinion DAVIES, Judge (Hon. Timothy R. Bloomquist, District Court Trial Judge) Appellants claim that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion for a temporary restraining order that would have prevented a foreclosure sale of their farmland. We affirm. Facts Appellants Craig, Christen, Mildred, and Kimberly Smith filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to bar a November 1, 1995, sale of their farmland pursuant to a foreclosure of mortgages by advertisement. An accompanying complaint alleged fraud in the inducement and slander of title and requested a declaratory judgment, an accounting, an injunction, and specific performance. Trial on the complaint is scheduled for September 1996. The district court denied the TRO motion, thus allowing respondent Peoples National Bank of Mora to proceed with its foreclosure sale. Appellants, although they remain in possession of the land during the one-year redemption period, challenge denial of the TRO. Respondent challenges appealability. Decision I. Respondent claims this appeal is moot because the foreclosure sale that appellants sought to have restrained has already taken place. We disagree. An issue is moot and will not be considered by this court [w]hen the affirmance or reversal of an order made in the course of the proceeding would make no difference in respect of the controversy on the merits * * * . Barnes v. Macken, 252 Minn. 412, 416, 90 N.W.2d 222, 226 (1958). That is not the case here, for a reversal of the district court's order could provide relief to appellants -- namely, a delayed redemption period. See Obermoller v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 409 N.W.2d 229, 231 (Minn. App. 1987) (foreclosure sale did not render appeal moot because voiding sale would result in delayed redemption period), review denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 1987). II. Respondent next claims that the order from which this appeal is taken is not reviewable because the one-day notice for the hearing provided something less than a full hearing, making it, in effect, the equivalent of an unappealable ex parte order.(1) [Footnote] (1) See Town of Burnsville v. City of Bloomington, 262 Minn. 455, 459, 115 N.W.2d 923, 926 (1962) (ex parte TRO nonappealable). We do not find this case comparable to an ex parte situation. Although the short notice may have left respondent somewhat unprepared, there was a contested hearing and the parties were able to submit both oral arguments and written evidence. This record is sufficient for review and the order is reviewable. III. On appeal from an order denying a temporary restraining order, the sole issue is whether the district court clearly abused its discretion. M.G.M. Liquor Warehouse Int'l v. Forsland, 371 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Minn. App. 1985). Appellant claims that the court abused its discretion by failing to make sufficient findings. Before granting or denying a TRO, a district court must generally consider five elements, known collectively as the Dahlberg factors.(2) [Footnote] (2)Though initially developed for temporary injunctions, ``[t]his analysis applies equally to temporary restraining orders.'' M.G.M. Liquor, 371 N.W.2d at 77. The factors are: (1) the relationship of the parties before the dispute arose; (2) the harm the plaintiff is likely to suffer if the order is denied, compared to that inflicted on the defendant if it is granted; (3) the likely outcome on the merits; (4) public policy considerations; and (5) administrative burdens related to the order if granted. Dahlberg Bros., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 Minn. 264, 274-75, 137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22 (1965). We have held that it is error for a district court to rule on a TRO motion without a memorandum accompanying the order showing that it considered these factors. M.G.M. Liquor, 371 N.W.2d at 77. In the instant case, although the district court did not explicitly mention the Dahlberg factors by name, it did address at least one critical factor: the showing of irreparable harm. Its failure to address the other factors is not necessarily fatal, for where the district court's finding is on a dispositive Dahlberg factor, a remand for additional findings on the other factors is generally unnecessary. See Sunny Fresh Foods v. Microfresh Foods, 424 N.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Minn. App. 1988) (denial of temporary injunction affirmed where district court addressed comparative harm in granting or denying injunction and applicant failed to establish lack of adequate legal remedy); Satellite Indus. v. Keeling, 396 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. App. 1986) (denial of temporary injunction affirmed where applicant failed to establish irreparable harm), review denied (Minn. Jan. 21, 1987) . But see M.G.M. Liquor, 371 N.W.2d at 77 (error for district court to consider only public policy factor). Here, the record supports the district court's determination that appellants did not make a sufficient showing of irreparable harm. Appellants claim to have suffered a loss of their land. Technically, that is true, but in reality appellants are in possession of the land and will remain so until the one-year period of redemption expires in November 1996. In addition, the underlying claims will likely be resolved at the trial scheduled for September 1996. If appellants prevail at that time, the foreclosure sale will be vacated.(3) [Footnote] (3)If the case is not tried when scheduled, before the running of the period of redemption, appellants' redemption rights can be preserved pursuant to Minn. Stat. 𨺜.28 (1994). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the TRO because appellants failed to show irreparable harm. Affirmed.