This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals

     Craig J. Smith, et al.,

Peoples National Bank of Mora,

a national banking association,
     Filed May 14, 1996
Davies, Judge

Kanabec County District Court

File No. C895627

John G. Westrick, Westrick & McDowall-Nix, P.L.L.P., 400 Minnesota Bldg.,
46 E. Fourth St., St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Appellants)

Lawrence P. Zielke, Shapiro & Nordmeyer, Suite 390, 7300 Metro Blvd.,
Edina, MN 55439 (for Appellants)

Robert C. Lindig, 209 E. Maple, Mora, MN 55051 (for Respondent)

Considered and decided by Davies, Presiding Judge, Willis, Judge, and
Stone, Judge.(*)
        [Footnote] (*)Retired judge of the district court,
        serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals
        by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI,
        § 10.
                        Unpublished Opinion

DAVIES, Judge (Hon. Timothy R. Bloomquist, District Court Trial

Appellants claim that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
their motion for a temporary restraining order that would have prevented a
foreclosure sale of their farmland. We affirm.


Appellants Craig, Christen, Mildred, and Kimberly Smith filed a motion for
a temporary restraining order (TRO) to bar a November 1, 1995, sale of
their farmland pursuant to a foreclosure of mortgages by advertisement. An
accompanying complaint alleged fraud in the inducement and slander of title
and requested a declaratory judgment, an accounting, an injunction, and
specific performance. Trial on the complaint is scheduled for September

The district court denied the TRO motion, thus allowing respondent Peoples
National Bank of Mora to proceed with its foreclosure sale. Appellants,
although they remain in possession of the land during the one-year
redemption period, challenge denial of the TRO. Respondent challenges

Respondent claims this appeal is moot because the foreclosure sale that
appellants sought to have restrained has already taken place. We disagree.

An issue is moot and will not be considered by this court
        [w]hen the affirmance or reversal of an order made
        in the course of the proceeding would make no
        difference in respect of the controversy on the
        merits * * * .

Barnes v. Macken, 252 Minn. 412, 416, 90 N.W.2d 222, 226 (1958).
That is not the case here, for a reversal of the district court's order
could provide relief to appellants -- namely, a delayed redemption period.
See Obermoller v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 409 N.W.2d 229, 231
(Minn. App. 1987) (foreclosure sale did not render appeal moot because
voiding sale would result in delayed redemption period), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 1987).

Respondent next claims that the order from which this appeal is taken is
not reviewable because the one-day notice for the hearing provided
something less than a full hearing, making it, in effect, the equivalent of
an unappealable ex parte order.(1)
        [Footnote] (1) See Town of Burnsville v. City of
        Bloomington, 262 Minn. 455, 459, 115 N.W.2d 923, 926
        (1962) (ex parte TRO nonappealable).

We do not find this case comparable to an ex parte situation. Although the
short notice may have left respondent somewhat unprepared, there was a
contested hearing and the parties were able to submit both oral arguments
and written evidence. This record is sufficient for review and the order is

On appeal from an order denying a temporary restraining order, the sole
issue is whether the district court clearly abused its discretion.
M.G.M. Liquor Warehouse Int'l v. Forsland, 371 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Minn.
App. 1985). Appellant claims that the court abused its discretion by
failing to make sufficient findings.

Before granting or denying a TRO, a district court must generally consider
five elements, known collectively as the Dahlberg factors.(2)
        [Footnote] (2)Though initially developed for
        temporary injunctions, ``[t]his analysis applies
        equally to temporary restraining orders.'' M.G.M.
        Liquor, 371 N.W.2d at 77.

The factors are: (1) the relationship of the parties before the dispute
arose; (2) the harm the plaintiff is likely to suffer if the order is
denied, compared to that inflicted on the defendant if it is granted; (3)
the likely outcome on the merits; (4) public policy considerations; and (5)
administrative burdens related to the order if granted. Dahlberg Bros.,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 Minn. 264, 274-75, 137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22
(1965). We have held that it is error for a district court to rule on a TRO
motion without a memorandum accompanying the order showing that it
considered these factors. M.G.M. Liquor, 371 N.W.2d at 77.

In the instant case, although the district court did not explicitly mention
the Dahlberg factors by name, it did address at least one critical
factor: the showing of irreparable harm. Its failure to address the other
factors is not necessarily fatal, for where the district court's finding is
on a dispositive Dahlberg factor, a remand for additional findings
on the other factors is generally unnecessary. See Sunny Fresh Foods v.
Microfresh Foods, 424 N.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Minn. App. 1988) (denial of
temporary injunction affirmed where district court addressed comparative
harm in granting or denying injunction and applicant failed to establish
lack of adequate legal remedy); Satellite Indus. v. Keeling, 396
N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. App. 1986) (denial of temporary injunction affirmed
where applicant failed to establish irreparable harm), review denied
(Minn. Jan. 21, 1987) . But see M.G.M. Liquor, 371 N.W.2d at 77
(error for district court to consider only public policy factor).

Here, the record supports the district court's determination that
appellants did not make a sufficient showing of irreparable harm.
Appellants claim to have suffered a loss of their land. Technically, that
is true, but in reality appellants are in possession of the land and will
remain so until the one-year period of redemption expires in November 1996.
In addition, the underlying claims will likely be resolved at the trial
scheduled for September 1996. If appellants prevail at that time, the
foreclosure sale will be vacated.(3)
        [Footnote] (3)If the case is not tried when
        scheduled, before the running of the period of
        redemption, appellants' redemption rights can be
        preserved pursuant to Minn. Stat. 𨺜.28

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the TRO because
appellants failed to show irreparable harm.