This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals
                              C9-95-2401

     State Farm & Casualty Insurance Company,
     Respondent,
     vs.

Terry L. Pooley, et al.,
     Appellants.
     Blue Earth County District Court


File No. C3-94-1516

Filed May 14, 1996
Affirmed
Toussaint, Chief Judge

R.D. Blanchard, William M. Hart, Aaron B. Latto, Meagher & Geer, P.L.L.P.,
4200 Multifoods Tower, 33 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for
respondent)

Phillip R. Reitan, Reitan Law Office, 142 South Riverfront Drive, Mankato,
MN 56002-0142 (for appellant Terry L. Pooley)

C. Andrew Johnson, Johnson Law Office, 237 Belgrade Avenue, North Mankato,
MN 56003 (for appellant Gary Perrine)

Considered and decided by Short, Presiding Judge, Toussaint, Chief Judge,
and Foley, Judge.(*)
        [Footnote] (*)Retired judge of the Minnesota Court
        of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn.
        Const. art. VI, § 10.
                                     
                        Unpublished Opinion

TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge (Hon. James D. Mason, District Court Trial
Judge)

Terry L. Pooley and Gary Perrine challenge the district court's decision
granting State Farm & Casualty Insurance Company's (State Farm) summary
judgment motion. Perrine alleged that while sitting on a forklift he
suffered a personal injury when a heavy crane magnet, operated by Pooley,
struck the forklift on Mankato Iron and Metal's (MIM) premises. A civil
suit against Pooley followed. Pooley tendered the defense of the suit to
State Farm. State Farm (1) denied coverage; and (2) commenced a declaratory
judgment action to determine coverage. In granting the summary judgment
motion, the district court relied on the business pursuits exclusion in
State Farm's homeowners insurance policy. We affirm.
                                     
                              Decision

On appeal from summary judgment, we ask two questions: (1) whether there
are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the district court
erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d
2, 4 (Minn. 1990) (citation omitted). A motion for summary judgment shall
be granted when
        
        the pleadings, depositions, answers to
        interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
        with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
        genuine issue of material fact and that either party
        is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. On appeal, a reviewing court must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was
granted. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993).

The burden is on the insurer to prove that the loss arose from a cause that
is excepted or for which it is not liable or from a clause that limits its
liability. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 307 Minn. 301,
307, 239 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Minn. 1976).
        
        There seems almost unanimous accord in the decisions
        that the location at which an act is performed is
        not decisive on the question of whether the act
        constitutes part of an excluded business pursuit.
        Rather, it is the nature of the particular act

        involved and its relationship, or lack of
        relationship, to the business that controls.
        Personal acts, such as pranks, do not become part of
        a business pursuit, so as to be outside of the
        coverage, merely because performed during business
        hours and on business property. In order for an act
        to be considered part of a business pursuit it must
        be an act that contributes to, or furthers the
        interest of, the business and one that is peculiar
        to it. It must be an act that the insured would not
        normally perform but for the business, and must be
        solely referable to the conduct of the business.

Id. at 476.

Appellants claim that the district court abused its discretion when it
determined that the business pursuits exception applies to Perrine's claim.
Appellant's arguments are not persuasive.

The record reveals that Pooley was operating a crane and moving large
pieces of scrap metal around the scrap metal yard. Such an activity is done
to further a purpose ``peculiar'' to MIM's business interests. Pooley's
operation of the crane is distinguishable from Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 239
N.W.2d at 472, where a police officer, while on

duty, discharged his firearm injuring a fellow officer. The supreme court
held that the business pursuits exclusion did not apply because the act of
determining the trigger pull on a revolver was not a business related
activity. Pooley's conduct in this case is also distinguishable from
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Sipple, 255 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. 1977), where the court
held that a business pursuits exception did not apply because the act of
assaulting another was not peculiar to the business interests of the state
patrol. In both Milwaukee Mutual and Farmers Ins., the business
pursuits exclusion was found to be inapplicable even though the injuries
occurred while the insured was on the job. The difference between those
cases and this matter is that Pooley was moving the metal around the scrap
yard in furtherance of MIM's business interests when the accident causing
injury occurred.

In the alternative, Perrine argues that Pooley used the crane as a means to
vent anger and frustration. We are not persuaded by this argument. There is
something extra curricular about an officer striking a citizen, as in
Farmers Ins., and an officer discharging his firearm while satisfying his
idle curiosity about its trigger mechanism, as in Milwaukee Mutual. Here,
however, Pooley was doing what his job required him to do. In this case,
the business pursuit exception applies.

In his pleadings, Perrine alleges that Pooley's actions were grossly
negligent at the time of the accident. Because of this alleged gross
negligence conduct, Perrine claims that the business pursuits exclusion is
inapplicable. For the above stated reasons we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in granting State Farm's motion for
summary judgment.
Affirmed.