This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). State of Minnesota in Court of Appeals C9-95-2382 In the Matter of the Welfare of: A.D.W. Filed May 14, 1996 Affirmed Short, Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. J9-95-64458 Hubert H. Humphrey, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Respondent State of Minnesota) Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Donna J. Wolfson, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for Respondent State of Minnesota) John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Charlann E. Winking, Assistant State Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue, S.E., Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for Appellant A.D.W.) Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge, Schumacher, Judge, and Short, Judge. Unpublished Opinion SHORT, Judge (Hon. Patricia Belois, District Court Trial Judge) The trial court certified A.D.W., a juvenile, for prosecution as an adult on one count of first-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. 𨺹.185(1) and one count of second-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. 𨺹.19(1). On appeal from that certification order, A.D.W. argues the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that the public safety will not be served if he is retained in the juvenile system and designated an extended jurisdiction juvenile. We affirm. Decision A presumption of certification applies when a sixteen- or seventeen-year- old uses a firearm to commit specified offenses. See Minn. Stat. 𨵜.125, subd. 2a (Supp. 1995) (presuming certification when offense is a felony using a gun or an offense with a presumptive executed sentence under the sentencing guidelines). It is undisputed A.D.W. was fifteen and one-half years old at the time of the July 1995 offenses. Therefore, no presumption of certification applies. In a nonpresumptive case, the juvenile court may order certification if the state demonstrates ``by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in the juvenile court does not serve public safety.'' Id., subd. 2(6) (ii) (Supp. 1995). We will not reverse a certification determination unless the juvenile court's findings are so clearly erroneous as to constitute an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of J.L.B., 435 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 1989); see also In re Welfare of J.F.K., 316 N.W.2d 563, 564 (Minn. 1982) (applying an abuse of discretion standard to certification proceedings). In determining whether certification will serve public safety, the juvenile court must consider: (1) the seriousness of the alleged offense, including the use of a firearm and the impact on any victim; (2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged offense; (3) the child's prior record of delinquency; (4) the child's programming history; (5) the adequacy of punishment or programming available in the juvenile justice system; and (6) the dispositional options available for the child. Minn. Stat. 𨵜.125, subd. 2b (Supp. 1995). The juvenile court must give greater weight to the seriousness of the offense and the child's prior record of delinquency than to the other factors. Id. The record establishes A.D.W.: (1) allegedly fired multiple shots in the direction of his victim during daylight hours in a residential neighborhood with many children playing nearby; (2) acted independently in arming himself, seeking out the victim, and killing him; (3) was not diagnosed with a mood or thought disorder; (4) has a record of delinquency, which includes three property offenses; (5) has received a variety of dispositions as a result of those offenses, but did not successfully complete any of them; and (6) has repeatedly minimized his involvement in delinquent behavior. In addition, expert testimony established: (1) A.D.W. is a conduct-disordered individual in need of long-term treatment at a locked facility; and (2) no treatment facility has both the security and duration of program necessary to address A.D.W.'s problems in a manner consistent with public safety. Based on our review of this record, we conclude the juvenile court acted within its broad discretion in finding clear and convincing evidence that public safety would not be served by retaining A.D.W. in the juvenile system.