This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals

     In the Matter of the Welfare of: A.D.W.

Filed May 14, 1996
Short, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. J9-95-64458

Hubert H. Humphrey, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street,
St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Respondent State of Minnesota)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Donna J. Wolfson, Assistant
County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for
Respondent State of Minnesota)

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Charlann E. Winking, Assistant State
Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue, S.E., Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN
55414 (for Appellant A.D.W.)

Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge, Schumacher, Judge, and
Short, Judge.
                        Unpublished Opinion

SHORT, Judge (Hon. Patricia Belois, District Court Trial Judge)

The trial court certified A.D.W., a juvenile, for prosecution as an adult
on one count of first-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat.
𨺹.185(1) and one count of second-degree murder in violation of Minn.
Stat. 𨺹.19(1). On appeal from that certification order, A.D.W.
argues the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that the public
safety will not be served if he is retained in the juvenile system and
designated an extended jurisdiction juvenile. We affirm.

A presumption of certification applies when a sixteen- or seventeen-year-
old uses a firearm to commit specified offenses. See Minn. Stat.
𨵜.125, subd. 2a (Supp. 1995) (presuming certification when offense
is a felony using a gun or an offense with a presumptive executed sentence
under the sentencing guidelines). It is undisputed A.D.W. was fifteen and
one-half years old at the time of the July 1995 offenses. Therefore, no
presumption of certification applies.

In a nonpresumptive case, the juvenile court may order certification if the
state demonstrates ``by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the
proceeding in the juvenile court does not serve public safety.'' Id.,

subd. 2(6) (ii) (Supp. 1995). We will not reverse a certification
determination unless the juvenile court's findings are so clearly erroneous
as to constitute an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of J.L.B.,
435 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Mar.
17, 1989); see also In re Welfare of J.F.K., 316 N.W.2d 563, 564
(Minn. 1982)  (applying an abuse of discretion standard to certification

In determining whether certification will serve public safety, the juvenile
court must consider: (1) the seriousness of the alleged offense, including
the use of a firearm and the impact on any victim; (2) the culpability of
the child in committing the alleged offense; (3) the child's prior record
of delinquency; (4) the child's programming history; (5) the adequacy of
punishment or programming available in the juvenile justice system; and (6)
the dispositional options available for the child. Minn. Stat.
𨵜.125, subd. 2b (Supp. 1995). The juvenile court must give greater
weight to the seriousness of the offense and the child's prior record of
delinquency than to the other factors. Id.
The record establishes A.D.W.: (1) allegedly fired multiple shots in
the direction of his victim during daylight hours in a residential
neighborhood with many children playing nearby; (2) acted independently in
arming himself, seeking out the victim, and killing him; (3) was not
diagnosed with a mood or thought disorder; (4) has a record of delinquency,
which includes three property offenses; (5) has received a variety of
dispositions as a result of those offenses, but did not successfully
complete any of them; and (6) has repeatedly minimized his involvement in
delinquent behavior. In addition, expert testimony established: (1) A.D.W.
is a conduct-disordered individual in need of long-term treatment at a
locked facility; and (2) no treatment facility has both the security and
duration of program necessary to address A.D.W.'s problems in a manner
consistent with public safety. Based on our review of this record, we
conclude the juvenile court acted within its broad discretion in finding
clear and convincing evidence that public safety would not be served by
retaining A.D.W. in the juvenile system.