This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals
                              C9-95-2379

     In Re the Marriage of:

Barbara Jean Kolb, petitioner,
     Appellant,
     vs.

Patrick James Kolb,
     Respondent.
     Filed May 14, 1996
Affirmed
Harten, Judge


Wright County District Court

File No. F2-93-1696

Stephen L. Madsen, 2925 Dean Parkway, #300, Minneapolis, MN 55416 (for
Appellant)

James V. Gerharter, 3109 Hennepin Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55408 (for
Respondent)

Considered and decided by Davies, Presiding Judge, Harten, Judge, and
Willis, Judge.
                                     
                        Unpublished Opinion

HARTEN, Judge (Hon. Gary J. Meyer, District Court Trial Judge)

Appellant challenges the district court denial of her motion to reopen and
amend the parties' stipulated dissolution judgment. We affirm.
                                     
                               Facts

In 1994, the parties dissolved their seventeen-year marriage. After
extensive negotiations, completed on the scheduled date of their
dissolution trial, the parties agreed to a stipulation, which was read into
the district court record and resulted in a dissolution judgment.

The stipulation awarded appellant mother physical custody of the parties'
two minor daughters and respondent father custody of the parties' minor
son. The district court findings indicated that respondent's net monthly
income was ``no less than $3,680,'' from which respondent agreed to pay
$1,104 per month child support. Appellant was awarded $700 per month
maintenance, to be reduced to $550 per month in 1997 and $400 in 2000.
Finally, as reflected in Paragraph 12 of the ensuing judgment, respondent's
maintenance obligation would be reduced by one-half of any social security
disability benefits subsequently received by appellant.

In 1995, nearly one year after entry of the stipulated judgment, appellant
moved to reopen and amend the judgment to increase respondent's maintenance
and child support obligations and vacate Paragraph 12. Appellant claimed
that respondent had fraudulently withheld information concerning his actual
income and that her attorney had been incompetent and pressured her into
accepting the stipulation. Respondent filed a cross-motion for, among other
things, judgment reimbursing, pursuant to Paragraph 12, his overpayment of
maintenance. The district court denied appellant's motion and entered
judgment for respondent in the amount of $1,456.(1)
        [Footnote] (1)The district court also denied
        respondent's cross-motions for child support from
        appellant and to reduce his own child support
        obligation.
                                     
                              Decision

``Courts favor stipulations, particularly in dissolution cases.''
Steffan v. Steffan, 423 N.W.2d 729, 731 (Minn. App. 1988). Such
stipulations cannot be set aside without the consent of the other party
``except by leave of court for cause shown.'' Id. A court may set
aside a stipulation for fraud, duress, or mistake. Id. ``On appeal,
a trial court's determination whether or not to vacate a stipulation will
not be disturbed in absence of an abuse of discretion.'' Maranda v.
Maranda, 449 N.W.2d 158, 164 (Minn. 1989).

Appellant claims that respondent fraudulently failed to disclose during
negotiations his actual income, resulting in inadequate child support and
maintenance awards. To establish


fraud on the court sufficient to reopen a stipulated judgment, the moving
party must show
        
        an intentional course of material misrepresentation
        or non-disclosure, having the result of misleading
        the court and opposing counsel and making the
        property settlement grossly unfair.

Id. at 165.

We agree with the district court that respondent did not commit fraud.
Respondent's 1992 net monthly income was $3,680, and his temporary child
support obligation was derived from that figure. The parties agreed to use
that figure to determine respondent's permanent support obligations. In
correspondence to respondent's attorney, appellant's attorney proposed that
child support be based on an income of $3,680 per month, which represented
``the minimum net income of [respondent] based upon his annual tax
statements for approximately the last five years.'' The letter continued:
        
        I believe your pre-trial statement actually reflects
        a net income in excess of $4,000 per month. However,
        for settlement purposes we would accept a net income
        at the amount agreed to in the temporary order.

Moreover, respondent disclosed an actual income in excess of $3,680 in his
pre-hearing informational statement. The findings incorporated into the
judgment confirm that the stipulated child support was not intended to be
based on respondent's actual current income: ``Respondent's net monthly
income is no less than $3,680.00 per month.'' (Emphasis added.)
Appellant has not shown that respondent intentionally withheld information
concerning his actual income.

Appellant nonetheless asserts that even if her attorney had notice of
respondent's actual income, her attorney did not communicate such
information to her, and that her assent to the stipulation was therefore
ineffective. The joint tax return signed by appellant in March 1994,
however, indicates that appellant had knowledge that $3,680 did not
represent respondent's actual income. Furthermore, because respondent's
temporary support obligation was also based on respondent's 1992 income of
$3,680 per month, appellant herself had notice that respondent's permanent
obligation was not calculated from his income at the time of the
stipulation.

Appellant also suggests that the stipulation should be vacated on the basis
of mistake. The following factors guide district court acceptance of a
stipulation:
        
        (1) whether the party was represented by competent
        counsel;

(2) whether extensive and detailed negotiations occurred;

(3) whether the party agreed to the stipulation in open court; and

(4) whether when questioned by the judge the party acknowledged
understanding the terms and considering them fair and equitable.

Steffan, 423 N.W.2d at 731.

Deferring for the moment consideration of the first factor, we find that
the last three factors are satisfied. The transcript from the dissolution
hearing, at which the stipulation was read into the record, indicates that
the parties' attorneys had spent the entire day negotiating the terms of
the agreement. It reflects that the district court cautioned the parties as
follows:


        I'm going to ask that both the parties please
        listen carefully to the agreement as it's
        recited into the record because you won't have a
        chance to sign a written agreement. This is it.
        If you decide that you want to change your mind
        the day after tomorrow in connection with this
        agreement, you won't be allowed to do so. So
        this will substitute for a written agreement * *
        *, but you've had a chance throughout the whole
        day to discuss the matter with your respective
        attorneys and I'm sure they're both very
        competent attorneys who have a lot of experience
        in this area and I'm sure they both have
        explained all of the ramifications of this
        agreement to you.

After the agreement was recited, appellant testified that settlement
discussions had been held throughout the day; that she had heard the agreement
read into the record; that her attorney had explained the terms to her
satisfaction; and that she agreed to the terms, knowing that they were final.

Appellant argues that her attorney did not competently advise her about the
stipulated terms. She claims that the attorney misstated the law in telling
her that respondent would have a claim for a portion of any personal injury
award received by appellant as a result of a recent accident. The stipulation
provided that respondent receive 15 percent of any such award in satisfaction
of all claims thereto, including any claim for loss of consortium. In her
motion, however, appellant did not request that this provision be amended or
vacated; rather, she only sought relief from the child support and maintenance
provisions and from Paragraph 12.

Moreover, appellant has not shown that her attorney misstated the law. At the
motion hearing, appellant pointed out that no personal injury action had even
been commenced. Moreover, appellant states in her brief that personal injury
awards ``are generally described as non-marital property.'' (Emphasis
added.) Appellant has not established that respondent had no viable claim to a
portion of a future award; thus, appellant has not established that her
attorney was incompetent in recommending that she agree to the provision.

Appellant also contends that her attorney misstated the law by telling her
that she was legally required to give respondent one-half of all social
security disability benefits. At the motion hearing, appellant's new attorney
told the court that the law does not necessarily require a maintenance
reduction to account for disability benefits, but that the issue is normally
one for trial. It is likely, therefore, that appellant's original attorney
recommended agreement to Paragraph 12 because he recognized that a court could
decide the issue adversely to appellant. We conclude that appellant has not
provided sufficient evidence of her attorney's alleged incompetence, and we
hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
vacate the stipulation on that basis.

Finally, appellant contends that her attorney pressured her into accepting the
terms by telling her that the judge would be angry and hold it against her if
she refused to accept the stipulation. Appellant asserts that her anxiety
disorder, which causes her to fear authority figures, led to her to accept it
in open court.

We reject appellant's claim of duress stemming from a psychological condition.
As evidence of her condition, appellant submitted a letter from a psychologist
stating that appellant suffers from an anxiety disorder. The letter, which was
not in affidavit form, did not speak of an inordinate fear of authority
figures. In Lindsey v. Lindsey, 388 N.W.2d 713 (Minn. 1986), the
supreme court ruled that a stipulated dissolution judgment could be reopened
where the consenting party lacked sufficient capacity:
        

        [Respondent] clearly lacked the capacity to validly
        enter into a stipulated dissolution decree. Her
        mental and emotional condition at the time of the
        dissolution precluded her from being able to fairly
        and reasonably understand the matters under
        consideration.

Id. at 716 (citation omitted). As the district court concluded here,
appellant has not met the Lindsey threshold -- she did not show that
her condition prevented her from being able to understand the terms
of the agreement.

The cases cited by appellant are distinguishable. See John v.
John, 322 N.W.2d 347, 348 (Minn. 1982) (stipulated dissolution judgment
set aside where term was omitted and party was not adequately informed of
the consequences of the stipulation); Steel v. Steel, 305 Minn. 504,
504-05, 232 N.W.2d 104, 105 (1975) (district court did not err in opening
stipulated property division because of duress and material mistake of
fact). As discussed, no material mistake of fact was present here. Nor has
appellant established duress sufficient to justify vacating the
stipulation. See Kroeplin v. Haugen, 390 N.W.2d 872, 875
(Minn. App. 1986) (pressure on party to reach dissolution agreement did not
amount to duress in light of lengthy period of negotiations), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 1986).

In summary, appellant has not established fraud, duress, or mistake
sufficient to support her motion to reopen and amend the stipulated
dissolution judgment. We hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying appellant's motion.
Affirmed.