This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). State of Minnesota in Court of Appeals C2-95-1607 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Robert Louis Canfield, Appellant. Filed May 14, 1996 Affirmed Willis, Judge Kanabec County District Court File No. K79519 Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, James B. Early, Assistant Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Respondent) Norman J. Loren, Kanabec County Attorney, 19 N. Vine, Mora, MN 55051 (for Respondent) Steven P. Russett, Assistant State Public Defender, 875 Summit Avenue, LEC 304, St. Paul, MN 55105 (for Appellant) Considered and decided by Amundson, Presiding Judge, Crippen, Judge, and Willis, Judge. Unpublished Opinion WILLIS, Judge (Hon. Linn Slattengren, District Court Trial Judge) On appeal from convictions for burglary and felony theft, appellant claims that (1) the trial court misconstrued criminal discovery rules, (2) there was no independent evidence corroborating his accomplice's testimony, and (3) the trial court incorrectly computed the amount of restitution owed to the burglary victims. We affirm. Facts In January 1995, appellant Robert Canfield was arrested in Kanabec County and charged with two counts of burglary and one count of felony theft. In a juvenile court proceeding approximately one week before Canfield's trial commenced, 17-year-old R.G. admitted committing the crimes and implicated Canfield as an accomplice. In exchange for his admission and testimony in Canfield's trial, the state agreed not to prosecute R.G. as an adult. At trial, the state called R.G. to testify and informed the court that it would question R.G. about statements he made in the juvenile court proceeding. Canfield objected, arguing that the state had violated Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01 by failing to disclose the existence of R.G.'s statement. Canfield's attorney admitted knowing that R.G. was appearing in juvenile court and conceded having heard, indirectly the day before, that R.G. had admitted his guilt. She denied knowing, however, all of the details and contended that the state had a duty to disclose the substance and the result of the juvenile proceeding as it related to her client. The district court overruled Canfield's objection and found that the discovery rule applied only to ``those matters which are within the control of [the prosecuting] attorney.'' Because ``court proceedings are not within the control of the prosecuting attorney,'' the court allowed the state to examine R.G. regarding statements he made in the juvenile proceeding. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts. The court imposed concurrent sentences and ordered Canfield to pay restitution totalling $3516.31 to the two victims. Decision I. Violation of discovery rule. Whether a trial court properly construed a criminal procedural rule is a question of law, reviewed de novo by an appellate court. State v. Pettee, 511 N.W.2d 43, 45 (Minn. App. 1994), aff'd, 538 N.W.2d 126 (Minn. 1995). The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure require the prosecution, without order of the court, to allow access at any reasonable time to all matters within the prosecuting attorney's possession or control which relate to the case and make the following disclosures: * * * * (2) Statements. The prosecuting attorney shall disclose and permit defense counsel to inspect and reproduce any relevant written or recorded statements which relate to the case within the possession or control of the prosecution, the existence of which is known by the prosecuting attorney, and shall provide defense counsel with the substance of any oral statements which relate to the case. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(2). Canfield claims that the state had a duty to disclose the substance of any oral statement made that related to his case. He argues that the alleged discovery violation here caused severe prejudice and therefore entitles him to a new trial. We disagree. Before calling R.G. to testify at Canfield's trial, the prosecutor informed the court and defense counsel about the ``recent development'' in the juvenile proceeding. Defense counsel objected, claiming that the alleged discovery violation severely prejudiced Canfield because counsel had no opportunity to prepare, and she asked the court to suppress any testimony regarding statements made in the juvenile court proceeding. We agree with the district court that criminal discovery rules do not apply to statements made on the record in open court. Moreover, the record reflects that defense counsel (1) knew about R.G.'s appearance in juvenile court, (2) knew that R.G. had admitted guilt, (3) listed R.G. as a defense witness, and (4) called R.G.'s attorney as a witness. Canfield cannot reasonably argue that the state's failure to disclose the substance of R.G.'s statements in the juvenile proceeding or the result of that proceeding constituted surprise that resulted in prejudice.(1) [Footnote] (1)An issue not before us is the state's duty to disclose any out-of-court oral statement relating substantively to Canfield's case that R.G. might have made in connection with the juvenile proceeding. Defense counsel limited her objection to R.G.'s statements during the juvenile court proceeding, and we cannot determine from the record whether R.G. made any out-of-court statement. Further, the record reflects that Canfield cross-examined and impeached R.G.'s testimony by establishing that on the day of the burglaries R.G. was intoxicated and high on marijuana to the degree that he ``could barely recall what happened.'' R.G. also stated that he admitted his guilt in juvenile court and ``testified accordingly'' to avoid going to jail. We are not persuaded that the defense was prejudiced because of lack of time to prepare. II. Corroborating evidence. An accomplice's testimony, by itself, is not sufficient to support a conviction. Minn. Stat. 𨻒.04 (1994). The testimony must be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to convict the defendant of the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof. Id. The corroborating evidence need not establish a prima facie case against the defendant, but it must reflect -- to a substantial degree -- the defendant's guilt. State v. Adams, 295 N.W.2d 527, 533 (Minn. 1980). Moreover, the accomplice's testimony does not need to ``be corroborated on every point or element of the crime.'' State v. Lemire, 315 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Minn. 1982). A person commits first-degree burglary by ``enter[ing] a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime,'' when ``another person not an accomplice is present * * * .'' Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a) (1994). Theft occurs when a person intentionally takes another's movable property without consent and ``with intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession of the property.'' Minn. Stat. 𨺹.52, subd. 2(1) (1994). There is abundant evidence in the record, independent of R.G.'s testimony, to connect Canfield to the burglaries and the theft. For example, (1) one of the victims supplied police with a license plate number that matched (within one letter) the license plate of Canfield's car; (2) Canfield admitted to authorities that he drove R.G. to one of the houses that was burglarized, purportedly to collect a debt; (3) tire tracks found in the driveways of both houses that were burglarized matched the tires on Canfield's car; (4) engine coolant identified as having come from Canfield's car was leaked onto both victims' driveways; and (5) coins found in Canfield's car were identified as belonging to one of the victims. The evidence sufficiently corroborates R.G.'s testimony and substantially supports an inference that Canfield was guilty of committing the burglaries and the theft. Canfield also argues that the record lacked evidence that R.G. actually entered the house of one victim because R.G. fled as soon as he broke the door and heard the homeowner scream. Therefore, Canfield claims this conviction should be reduced to attempted first-degree burglary. This court rejected a similar argument in State v. Nelson, 363 N.W.2d 81, 83 (Minn. App. 1985). Nelson and a companion decided to burglarize a fertilizer plant. Id. at 82. Nelson pried open a window and triggered a motion detector when ``he stepped through the window with one leg and put one or two feet on the desk inside * * * .'' Id. at 83. Nelson argued that these facts were insufficient to prove he had ``entered'' the building and that ``at most [the facts] showed an attempted burglary * * * .'' Id. The court of appeals rejected this analysis and defined ``entry'' as ``the intrusion of any part of the offender's body into the premises.'' Id. (citations omitted). Under the Nelson definition, the jury reasonably could have inferred that R.G. entered the home. R.G.'s act of kicking the door in ``and causing the jam and some of the trim to literally blow back into the residence'' could be construed as an ``entry'' under Nelson. The record contains ample evidence corroborating R.G.'s testimony, and we believe that the evidence reflects -- to a substantial degree -- Canfield's guilt. III. Restitution. Failure to object to a restitution award at sentencing constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal. State v. Anderson, 507 N.W.2d 245, 247 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 1993). Before the sentencing hearing, the victims submitted itemization of their costs resulting from the burglaries. One of the victim statements noted that there might be additional costs associated with clean-up. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel did not object to the amount of restitution ordered. She made only three requests to the court: She asked (1) that any restitution ordered by the court be final ``today,'' (2) that the court reject one victim's request to make Canfield responsible for the cost of a home security system, and (3) that responsibility to pay restitution be joint and several between Canfield and R.G. The court granted each of these requests. Because Canfield failed to contest the amount of restitution at sentencing, the issue of restitution is not properly before this court. Affirmed.