This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals

     State of Minnesota,

Robert Louis Canfield,
     Filed May 14, 1996
Willis, Judge

Kanabec County District Court

File No. K79519

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, James B. Early, Assistant
Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101
(for Respondent)

Norman J. Loren, Kanabec County Attorney, 19 N. Vine, Mora, MN 55051 (for

Steven P. Russett, Assistant State Public Defender, 875 Summit Avenue, LEC
304, St. Paul, MN 55105 (for Appellant)

Considered and decided by Amundson, Presiding Judge, Crippen, Judge, and
Willis, Judge.
                        Unpublished Opinion

WILLIS, Judge (Hon. Linn Slattengren, District Court Trial Judge)

On appeal from convictions for burglary and felony theft, appellant claims
that (1) the trial court misconstrued criminal discovery rules, (2) there
was no independent evidence corroborating his accomplice's testimony, and
(3) the trial court incorrectly computed the amount of restitution owed to
the burglary victims. We affirm.

In January 1995, appellant Robert Canfield was arrested in Kanabec County
and charged with two counts of burglary and one count of felony theft. In a
juvenile court proceeding approximately one week before Canfield's trial
commenced, 17-year-old R.G. admitted committing the crimes and implicated
Canfield as an accomplice. In exchange for his admission and testimony in
Canfield's trial, the state agreed not to prosecute R.G. as an adult.

At trial, the state called R.G. to testify and informed the court that it
would question R.G. about statements he made in the juvenile court
proceeding. Canfield objected, arguing that the state had violated Minn. R.
Crim. P. 9.01 by failing to disclose the existence of R.G.'s statement.
Canfield's attorney admitted knowing that R.G. was appearing in juvenile
court and conceded having heard, indirectly the day before, that R.G. had
admitted his guilt. She denied knowing, however, all of the details and
contended that the state had a duty to disclose the substance and the
result of the juvenile proceeding as it related to her client.

The district court overruled Canfield's objection and found that the
discovery rule applied only to ``those matters which are within the control
of [the prosecuting] attorney.'' Because ``court proceedings are not within
the control of the prosecuting attorney,'' the court allowed the state to
examine R.G. regarding statements he made in the juvenile proceeding.

The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts. The court imposed
concurrent sentences and ordered Canfield to pay restitution totalling
$3516.31 to the two victims.

I. Violation of discovery rule. Whether a trial court properly
construed a criminal procedural rule is a question of law, reviewed de novo
by an appellate court. State v. Pettee, 511 N.W.2d 43, 45 (Minn.
App. 1994), aff'd, 538 N.W.2d 126 (Minn. 1995). The Minnesota Rules
of Criminal Procedure require the prosecution, without order of the court,
        allow access at any reasonable time to all matters
        within the prosecuting attorney's possession or

        control which relate to the case and make the
        following disclosures:
        * * * *
        (2) Statements. The prosecuting attorney
        shall disclose and permit defense counsel to inspect
        and reproduce any relevant written or recorded
        statements which relate to the case within the
        possession or control of the prosecution, the
        existence of which is known by the prosecuting
        attorney, and shall provide defense counsel with the
        substance of any oral statements which relate to the

Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(2).

Canfield claims that the state had a duty to disclose the substance of any
oral statement made that related to his case. He argues that the alleged
discovery violation here caused severe prejudice and therefore entitles him
to a new trial. We disagree.

Before calling R.G. to testify at Canfield's trial, the prosecutor informed
the court and defense counsel about the ``recent development'' in the
juvenile proceeding. Defense counsel objected, claiming that the alleged
discovery violation severely prejudiced Canfield because counsel had no
opportunity to prepare, and she asked the court to suppress any testimony
regarding statements made in the juvenile court proceeding.

We agree with the district court that criminal discovery rules do not apply
to statements made on the record in open court. Moreover, the record
reflects that defense counsel (1) knew about R.G.'s appearance in juvenile
court, (2) knew that R.G. had admitted guilt, (3) listed R.G. as a defense
witness, and (4) called R.G.'s attorney as a witness. Canfield cannot
reasonably argue that the state's failure to disclose the substance of
R.G.'s statements in the juvenile proceeding or the result of that
proceeding constituted surprise that resulted in prejudice.(1)
        [Footnote] (1)An issue not before us is the state's
        duty to disclose any out-of-court oral statement
        relating substantively to Canfield's case that R.G.
        might have made in connection with the juvenile
        proceeding. Defense counsel limited her objection to
        R.G.'s statements during the juvenile court
        proceeding, and we cannot determine from the record
        whether R.G. made any out-of-court statement.

Further, the record reflects that Canfield cross-examined and impeached
R.G.'s testimony by establishing that on the day of the burglaries R.G. was
intoxicated and high on marijuana to the degree that he ``could barely
recall what happened.'' R.G. also stated that he admitted his guilt in
juvenile court and ``testified accordingly'' to avoid going to jail. We are
not persuaded that the defense was prejudiced because of lack of time to
II. Corroborating evidence. An accomplice's testimony, by itself, is
not sufficient to support a conviction. Minn. Stat. 𨻒.04 (1994). The
testimony must be
        corroborated by such other evidence as tends to
        convict the defendant of the commission of the
        offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if
        it merely shows the commission of the offense or the
        circumstances thereof.

Id. The corroborating evidence need not establish a prima facie case
against the defendant, but it must reflect -- to a substantial degree --
the defendant's guilt. State v. Adams, 295 N.W.2d 527, 533 (Minn.

1980). Moreover, the accomplice's testimony does not need to ``be
corroborated on every point or element of the crime.'' State v.
Lemire, 315 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Minn. 1982).

A person commits first-degree burglary by ``enter[ing] a building without
consent and with intent to commit a crime,'' when ``another person not an
accomplice is present * * * .'' Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a)
(1994). Theft occurs when a person intentionally takes another's movable
property without consent and ``with intent to deprive the owner permanently
of possession of the property.'' Minn. Stat. 𨺹.52, subd. 2(1)
(1994). There is abundant evidence in the record, independent of R.G.'s
testimony, to connect Canfield to the burglaries and the theft. For
example, (1) one of the victims supplied police with a license plate number
that matched (within one letter) the license plate of Canfield's car; (2)
Canfield admitted to authorities that he drove R.G. to one of the houses
that was burglarized, purportedly to collect a debt; (3) tire tracks found
in the driveways of both houses that were burglarized matched the tires on
Canfield's car; (4) engine coolant identified as having come from
Canfield's car was leaked onto both victims' driveways; and (5) coins found
in Canfield's car were identified as belonging to one of the victims. The
evidence sufficiently corroborates R.G.'s testimony and substantially
supports an inference that Canfield was guilty of
 committing the burglaries and the theft.

Canfield also argues that the record lacked evidence that R.G. actually
entered the house of one victim because R.G. fled as soon as he
broke the door and heard the homeowner scream. Therefore, Canfield claims
this conviction should be reduced to attempted first-degree burglary. This
court rejected a similar argument in State v. Nelson, 363 N.W.2d 81,
83 (Minn. App. 1985). Nelson and a companion decided to burglarize a
fertilizer plant. Id. at 82. Nelson pried open a window and
triggered a motion detector when ``he stepped through the window with one
leg and put one or two feet on the desk inside * * * .'' Id. at 83.
Nelson argued that these facts were insufficient to prove he had
``entered'' the building and that ``at most [the facts] showed an attempted
burglary * * * .'' Id. The court of appeals rejected this analysis
and defined ``entry'' as ``the intrusion of any part of the offender's body
into the premises.'' Id. (citations omitted).

Under the Nelson definition, the jury reasonably could have inferred
that R.G. entered the home. R.G.'s act of kicking the door in ``and causing
the jam and some of the trim to literally blow back into the residence''
could be construed as an ``entry'' under Nelson. The record contains
ample evidence corroborating R.G.'s testimony, and we believe that the
evidence reflects -- to a substantial degree -- Canfield's guilt.
III. Restitution. Failure to object to a restitution award at
sentencing constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal. State v.
Anderson, 507 N.W.2d 245, 247 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied
(Minn. Dec. 22, 1993). Before the sentencing hearing, the victims submitted
itemization of their costs resulting from the burglaries. One of the victim
statements noted that there might be additional costs associated with

At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel did not object to the amount of
restitution ordered. She made only three requests to the court: She asked
(1) that any restitution ordered by the court be final ``today,'' (2) that
the court reject one victim's request to make Canfield responsible for the
cost of a home security system, and (3) that responsibility to pay
restitution be joint and several between Canfield and R.G. The court
granted each of these requests.

Because Canfield failed to contest the amount of restitution at sentencing,
the issue of restitution is not properly before this court.