This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals

     State of Minnesota,

Derek Thomas Gunn,
     Filed May 14, 1996
Crippen, Judge

Winona County District Court

File No. K19582

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, Thomas Erik Bailey, Assistant
Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101

Julius E. Gernes, Winona County Attorney, Courthouse, Winona, MN 55987

John M. Stuart, Minnesota Public Defender, Marie L. Wolf, Assistant Public
Defender, 2829 University Avenue S.E., Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414

Considered and decided by Amundson, Presiding Judge, Crippen, Judge, and
Willis, Judge.
                        Unpublished Opinion

CRIPPEN, Judge (Hon. Lawrence T. Collins, District Court Trial

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction for assault during a burglary and alleges that the trial court
erred in sentencing him to an additional month of incarceration to offset
good time accrued in jail. We affirm.

Based on his involvement in a robbery and burglary at the home of his aunt
and uncle, appellant Derek Gunn was found guilty by the trial court jury on
one count of simple robbery (Minn. Stat. 𨺹.24); one count of first-
degree burglary of an occupied dwelling (Minn. Stat. 𨺹.582, subd.
1(a) ); one count of first-degree burglary involving an assault (Minn.
Stat. 𨺹.582, subd. 1(c) ); and one count of second-degree burglary
of a dwelling (Minn. Stat. 𨺹.582, subd. 2(a) ). As a result of
incidents that occurred while appellant was held in the Winona County Law
Enforcement Center awaiting trial for the above offenses, appellant was
also charged on three counts of terroristic threats (Minn. Stat.
𨺹.713, subd. 1); fourth-degree assault (Minn. Stat. 𨺹.2231,
subd. 1); and possession of a dangerous weapon in jail (Minn. Stat.
𨻙.165, subd. 2).

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to one count of
terroristic threats and fourth-degree assault in exchange for dismissal of
the two remaining terroristic threats charges and the charge for possession
of a dangerous weapon in jail. In addition, appellant and respondent agreed
to a joint sentencing recommendation for appellant's convictions on first-
degree burglary, simple robbery, terroristic threats, and fourth-degree
assault. This recommendation included imposition of a consecutive twelve-
month and one day sentence for appellant's terroristic threats conviction
and appellant's waiver at the time of sentencing to any good time accrued
in jail.

The trial court imposed sentences in accordance with the parties' joint
sentencing recommendation, resulting in a sentence of 112 months for
burglary in the first degree (one month added to presumptive 111-month
sentence to effectuate appellant's waiver of good time while in jail), a
concurrent sentence of 57 months for simple robbery, a concurrent sentence
of 22 months for assault in the fourth degree, and a consecutive sentence
of one year and one day for terroristic threats, an aggregate sentence of
124 months and one day.

1. Sufficiency of the evidence

We must affirm the verdict of appellant's guilt if it represents a
reasonable conclusion, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

the state and assuming the factfinder believed the state's witnesses and
disbelieved contrary evidence, but having due regard for the state's burden
of proving appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 111 (Minn. 1978).

Minnesota law provides that ``[w]hoever enters a building without consent
*** and commits a crime while in the building'' commits burglary in the
first degree if ``the burglar assaults a person within the building.''
Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (1994). ``Assault'' is defined as
``[a]n act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily
harm or death'' or ``[t]he intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict
bodily harm upon another.'' Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10 (1994).
``Bodily harm'' includes ``physical pain or injury, illness, or any
impairment of physical condition.'' Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7.

Appellant claims that his alleged statements to his aunt and uncle that he
would ``mace'' anyone who tried to stop him from burglarizing their home
were insufficient to prove he committed an assault in the course of a
burglary. This argument is without merit. The evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction, showed appellant intended to cause
fear of bodily harm. It was not unreasonable for the jury to have concluded
that appellant's threat to use mace on his aunt and uncle was made with the
intent to place them in fear of immediate bodily harm and a showing of
intent to cause fear of bodily harm is sufficient to sustain an assault
conviction. See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(1) (assault
includes ``[a]n act done with intent to cause fear'').

2. Sentencing

Trial courts have broad discretion in sentencing and reviewing courts will
not modify a sentence that is within the presumptive range established by
the sentencing guidelines unless there are compelling reasons to do so.
State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). The sentencing
guidelines presumptive sentence for someone with appellant's criminal
history is 111 months, with a presumptive range of 107 to 115 months.
Appellant's 112-month sentence, therefore, is well within the presumptive

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in adding an additional month
to his sentence for first-degree burglary with assault in order to negate
the approximately twenty days of good time appellant accrued during his
nearly three months in the county jail. The trial court does not have the
prerogative to eliminate rights for good time sentence reductions. State
v. Parr, 414 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied
(Minn. Jan. 15, 1988). But we must recognize that the trial court had
considerable discretion to impose a sentence within the sentencing
guidelines presumptive range. Moreover, we have recognized that a trial
court error may be overlooked if there is a lawful basis for the sentence
imposed. See Williams v. State, 361 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn.
1985) (stating that if reasons for departure from the guidelines are
improper or inadequate, but there is sufficient evidence in the record to
justify the departure, the departure will be allowed). We conclude that the
trial court had lawful powers to impose a 112-month sentence, and we will
not reverse appellant's sentence on the basis of an erroneous explanation
by the trial court.