This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994). State of Minnesota in Court of Appeals C3-95-1342 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Derek Thomas Gunn, Appellant. Filed May 14, 1996 Affirmed Crippen, Judge Winona County District Court File No. K19582 Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, Thomas Erik Bailey, Assistant Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 Julius E. Gernes, Winona County Attorney, Courthouse, Winona, MN 55987 John M. Stuart, Minnesota Public Defender, Marie L. Wolf, Assistant Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue S.E., Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 Considered and decided by Amundson, Presiding Judge, Crippen, Judge, and Willis, Judge. Unpublished Opinion CRIPPEN, Judge (Hon. Lawrence T. Collins, District Court Trial Judge) Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for assault during a burglary and alleges that the trial court erred in sentencing him to an additional month of incarceration to offset good time accrued in jail. We affirm. Facts Based on his involvement in a robbery and burglary at the home of his aunt and uncle, appellant Derek Gunn was found guilty by the trial court jury on one count of simple robbery (Minn. Stat. 𨺹.24); one count of first- degree burglary of an occupied dwelling (Minn. Stat. 𨺹.582, subd. 1(a) ); one count of first-degree burglary involving an assault (Minn. Stat. 𨺹.582, subd. 1(c) ); and one count of second-degree burglary of a dwelling (Minn. Stat. 𨺹.582, subd. 2(a) ). As a result of incidents that occurred while appellant was held in the Winona County Law Enforcement Center awaiting trial for the above offenses, appellant was also charged on three counts of terroristic threats (Minn. Stat. 𨺹.713, subd. 1); fourth-degree assault (Minn. Stat. 𨺹.2231, subd. 1); and possession of a dangerous weapon in jail (Minn. Stat. 𨻙.165, subd. 2). Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to one count of terroristic threats and fourth-degree assault in exchange for dismissal of the two remaining terroristic threats charges and the charge for possession of a dangerous weapon in jail. In addition, appellant and respondent agreed to a joint sentencing recommendation for appellant's convictions on first- degree burglary, simple robbery, terroristic threats, and fourth-degree assault. This recommendation included imposition of a consecutive twelve- month and one day sentence for appellant's terroristic threats conviction and appellant's waiver at the time of sentencing to any good time accrued in jail. The trial court imposed sentences in accordance with the parties' joint sentencing recommendation, resulting in a sentence of 112 months for burglary in the first degree (one month added to presumptive 111-month sentence to effectuate appellant's waiver of good time while in jail), a concurrent sentence of 57 months for simple robbery, a concurrent sentence of 22 months for assault in the fourth degree, and a consecutive sentence of one year and one day for terroristic threats, an aggregate sentence of 124 months and one day. Decision 1. Sufficiency of the evidence We must affirm the verdict of appellant's guilt if it represents a reasonable conclusion, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state and assuming the factfinder believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence, but having due regard for the state's burden of proving appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 111 (Minn. 1978). Minnesota law provides that ``[w]hoever enters a building without consent *** and commits a crime while in the building'' commits burglary in the first degree if ``the burglar assaults a person within the building.'' Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (1994). ``Assault'' is defined as ``[a]n act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death'' or ``[t]he intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another.'' Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10 (1994). ``Bodily harm'' includes ``physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.'' Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7. Appellant claims that his alleged statements to his aunt and uncle that he would ``mace'' anyone who tried to stop him from burglarizing their home were insufficient to prove he committed an assault in the course of a burglary. This argument is without merit. The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, showed appellant intended to cause fear of bodily harm. It was not unreasonable for the jury to have concluded that appellant's threat to use mace on his aunt and uncle was made with the intent to place them in fear of immediate bodily harm and a showing of intent to cause fear of bodily harm is sufficient to sustain an assault conviction. See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(1) (assault includes ``[a]n act done with intent to cause fear''). 2. Sentencing Trial courts have broad discretion in sentencing and reviewing courts will not modify a sentence that is within the presumptive range established by the sentencing guidelines unless there are compelling reasons to do so. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). The sentencing guidelines presumptive sentence for someone with appellant's criminal history is 111 months, with a presumptive range of 107 to 115 months. Appellant's 112-month sentence, therefore, is well within the presumptive range. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in adding an additional month to his sentence for first-degree burglary with assault in order to negate the approximately twenty days of good time appellant accrued during his nearly three months in the county jail. The trial court does not have the prerogative to eliminate rights for good time sentence reductions. State v. Parr, 414 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 1988). But we must recognize that the trial court had considerable discretion to impose a sentence within the sentencing guidelines presumptive range. Moreover, we have recognized that a trial court error may be overlooked if there is a lawful basis for the sentence imposed. See Williams v. State, 361 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1985) (stating that if reasons for departure from the guidelines are improper or inadequate, but there is sufficient evidence in the record to justify the departure, the departure will be allowed). We conclude that the trial court had lawful powers to impose a 112-month sentence, and we will not reverse appellant's sentence on the basis of an erroneous explanation by the trial court.