This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Filed October 16, 2007
Toussaint, Chief Judge
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Willow J. Najjar, Assistant Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and
Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Polk County Courthouse, 612 North Broadway, Crookston MN 56716 (for respondent State of Minnesota)
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge
Appellant Shannon Patrick Donald English challenges his indeterminate commitment as a sexually dangerous person (SDP). Because clear and convincing evidence in the record supports the conclusion that appellant meets the standards for commitment, we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
“We review de novo whether there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the district court’s conclusion that appellant meets the standards for commitment.” In re Thulin, 660 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App. 2003).
To commit a person as an SDP,
the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that the person: (1)
has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct; (2) has manifested a sexual,
personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and (3) is therefore
likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct. Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c
(2006). See also Matter of Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171,180 (
1. Course of Harmful Sexual Conduct
Appellant contends that he did not engage in the “course of harmful sexual conduct” requisite for commitment. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 7a (2006). He concedes that in 1995, when he was 19, he had a “forced sexual act” with K.M.F., a girl of 13, and that he was involved in an indecent-exposure incident with K.C. in 2004, but argues that these two events, taken together, are not a “course of harmful sexual conduct.” But after appellant pleaded guilty to criminal sexual conduct in the third degree in 1996, he was placed on probation and was prohibited from contact with females under 18. He does not dispute that, while on probation, he twice had sexual intercourse with A.R., then 15; had oral sex with A.M., then 16; and had intercourse with S.M.R., then 16. He argues that this sexual activity was consensual and therefore cannot be used to establish a course of harmful sexual conduct, but he offers no support for this argument.
The district court made extensive findings on appellant’s sexual conduct with five individuals. With regard to K.M.F., the court noted that it found the official crime record credible and appellant’s denial not credible; with regard to A.R., the court found that her testimony was credible; with regard to A.M., the court found that her testimony was credible; with regard to S.M.R., the court found that her testimony was credible and that appellant’s testimony denying the incident was not credible; and with regard to K.C., the court found that her testimony was credible and that appellant’s was not credible. Moreover, both court-appointed examiners who reviewed appellant’s record and interviewed him, and a third examiner retained to review his records, all testified that appellant engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct. The district court’s finding of a course of harmful sexual conduct is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
2. Sexual or Mental Disorder or Dysfunction
Appellant contends that the district court erred in finding he has a sexual or mental disorder that prevents him from exercising adequate control over his sexual behavior. He does not dispute that he has antisocial-personality disorder, narcissistic-personality disorder, and polysubstance abuse but asserts that these conditions do not prevent him from exercising adequate control over his sexual impulses.
But the three examiners who testified opposed this assertion. One answered, “Absolutely” when asked if “[appellant’s] past sexual misconduct [was] a result of the disorders that [the examiner had] described.” This examiner also explained that “because of [appellant’s] personality disorders, he then does get into addictions and he gets into his sexual cycles” and testified that appellant has never “controlled his [sexual behavior] . . . for any significant period of time.” Another examiner testified that appellant’s “sexual acting out . . . results from his sexualized personality combined with drug abuse and antisocial sociopathic personality characteristics.” The third examiner answered, “Yes” when asked if appellant’s past sexual misconduct was a result of the disorders the examiner had described.
While appellant claims that the evidence showed that his sexual or mental disorders led only to “irresponsible behavior,” the record refutes this claim. The finding that appellant has a sexual or mental disorder or dysfunction that prevents him from exercising adequate control over his sexual behavior is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
3. High Likelihood of Future Acts of Harmful Sexual Conduct
Appellant alleges that the district court erred in concluding that he is highly likely to engage in future acts of harmful conduct based on its findings regarding the Linehan factors: (1) demographic characteristics; (2) history of violent behavior; (3) base-rate statistics for violent behavior among individuals with his background; (4) sources of stress in his environment; (5) similarity of future context to context of previous violent behavior, and (6) record in sex-therapy programs. See Matter of Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994).
As to demographic characteristics, one examiner noted that appellant’s age gives him “many years ahead to perpetuate his pattern of sexual offending,” that appellant has a “poor work history [that] suggest[s] difficulty adjusting to his community,” that appellant “reports that his longest period of employment was as a landscaper for three months,” and that appellant has ‘limited marketable skills” and an “offense history [that] would make it difficult to find employment.” Appellant contends that the district court ignored certain positive factors, such as his steady girlfriend, his earning a GED, his working at several jobs, and his maintaining relationships with his mother and grandparents. But evidence supports the district court’s findings, and this court does not reweigh the evidence. See In re Salkin, 430 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Nov. 23, 1988).
As to violence, one examiner reported that “[appellant] is a true psychopath with prominent manifestation of that psychopathy in the form of interpersonal violence directed towards females and of a sexual nature since early adulthood.” Another examiner reported that “[appellant] indicates he enjoys humiliating females and feels a great sense of power over them if he can have sex with them,” that appellant “admits to grooming at least five underage girls,” and that appellant “is hostile and angry towards [his victims] and [has] absolutely no remorse whatsoever for any of his sexual assaults.” Appellant cites testimony that he is less violent than some others who have been committed as SDPs, but again, the district court’s finding is supported by evidence, and this court does not reweigh that evidence.
As to base-rate statistics, appellant objects that, while the district court found the tests show appellant is likely to be re-arrested, it failed to find that he is likely to be re-arrested for a sexual offense. But of the four tests the district court considered, one was “a reliable measure of a sex offender’s likelihood to reoffend,” and another “is generally accepted as a reliable measure of recidivism for sex offenders.” The district court’s analysis of base-rate statistics was not erroneous.
As to both the sources of stress in his environment and the similarity of his future context to the context in which he offended, appellant objects to the district court’s finding that he copes with stress by abusing drugs and engaging in harmful sexual conduct because “[w]ith the exception of the crimes discussed above, the harmful sexual conduct considered by the court is again appearing to be that of the consensual sex with other drug users.” As one examiner noted, appellant continues to ignore any harm that his sexual activity may have caused his victims.
Finally, as to appellant’s record of sex therapy, the district court’s finding that it makes him likely to reoffend is supported by evidence. One examiner reported that appellant “can be considered a sex offender who had treatment and then was released and failed, which then increases his likelihood of reoffending,” and another reported that he “is entrenched in his denial/minimization for his sexual offending and his sexual deviance. . . [and] has been terminated from treatment due to such minimization.”
Clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s findings that appellant has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct, that he has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction that prevents adequate control of his sexual impulses, and that he is therefore likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c. We affirm appellant’s commitment.
 Appellant implies that no harm can be suffered from consensual conduct. But it is not necessary that a victim suffer harm; the requirement for a course of harmful sexual conduct is that the conduct create a substantial likelihood of physical or emotional harm. See Minn. Stat. §253B.02, subd 7a (2006) (defining harmful sexual conduct as “sexual conduct that creates a substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to another”); In re Civil Commitment of Martin, 661 N.W.2d 632, 639 (Minn. App. 2003) (no requirement that victim suffer serious emotional or physical harm).
 Appellant declined to make himself available for an interview by this examiner.
 Appellant claimed to have had drug-related sexual contact with between 50 and 100 women. He argues that the district erred when it relied on this claim to find a course of harmful sexual conduct. But, while the district court mentioned the claim in its findings, it clearly relied on the victims’ and the examiners’ testimony.