This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of the
Welfare of: K.D.S., Child.
Filed September 25, 2007
Anoka County District Court
File No. JX-05-52867
Lori Swanson, Attorney General,
Robert M.A. Johnson,
John M. Stuart, State Public
Defender, Susan J. Andrews, Assistant Public Defender,
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Lansing, Judge; and Parker, Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Appellant K.D.S. was on probation when he pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The state subsequently filed a delinquency petition charging appellant with contempt of court for violating a condition of probation. Appellant pleaded guilty to contempt of court, and the district court adjudicated him delinquent of contempt and criminal sexual conduct and ordered him to register as a sex offender. On appeal from the delinquency adjudication and disposition order, appellant argues that (1) the appropriate sanction for violating probation is probation revocation rather than prosecution for contempt of court; (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to stay the adjudication on the criminal-sexual-conduct charge because a stay posed no threat to public safety and was in his best interest; and (3) the predatory-offender registration requirement violates due process as applied to juveniles adjudicated delinquent of felony-level criminal sexual conduct without the benefit of a jury trial. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion and appellant’s remaining arguments are without merit, we affirm.
In July 2005, appellant was charged with aiding and abetting felony theft. Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense, and in January 2006, the district court adjudicated him delinquent and ordered him to complete 30 hours of community-service work by April 5, 2006.
A few weeks after the delinquency
adjudication, appellant, then 16 years old, had what he claimed was consensual
sex with a 14-year-old girl at his parents’ house. The girl, however, said she did not want to
do it, but felt pressured to do so. The
next day, the girl reported to her school nurse that she thought she might be
pregnant. The school nurse made a
sexual-assault report to the Coon Rapids Police Department, and the case was
referred to the Anoka County Sheriff’s Office for investigation. In March 2006,
By June 2006, appellant had only completed six hours of community service. As a result, Anoka County charged him with misdemeanor contempt of court under Minn. Stat. § 588.20, subd. 2(4) (2004). Appellant pleaded guilty to contempt in July 2006, by which time he had completed all 30 hours of community service. At the contempt hearing, appellant stated that he was unable to complete the community service earlier because his theft conviction made it difficult to find employment. The district court declined appellant’s request to stay adjudication on the criminal-sexual-conduct charge and sentenced him to 12 months of probation. The district court also required appellant to register as a sex offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(iii) (Supp. 2005). This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that his adjudication for contempt of court must be reversed because (1) contempt is not a specified punishment for a probation violation; and (2) he did not have notice that he could be prosecuted for contempt for violating a condition of probation. But appellant pleaded guilty to the contempt charge, and a valid guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects. State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986). Furthermore, appellant did not argue to the district court that his case should have been handled as a probation violation, nor did he move to withdraw his plea. Instead, he raises these issues for the first time on appeal. Because these arguments were not raised by appellant before the district court, we do not consider them on appeal. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996).
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to stay his delinquency adjudication for third-degree criminal sexual conduct. “A district court has broad discretion in determining whether to continue an adjudication in a delinquency proceeding.” In re Welfare of J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. App. 2002) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002). This court will affirm dispositions that are not “arbitrary.” In re Welfare of N.T.K., 619 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Minn. App. 2000) (quotation omitted). “When it is in the best interests of the child and the protection of the public to do so, the court may continue the case without adjudicating the child.” Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4(A). A court need not make particularized findings when deciding whether to impose or withhold adjudication of delinquency. Welfare of J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d at 246.
Here, the district court acknowledged that appellant was not diagnosed as a predatory offender and did not forcibly sexually assault someone or seek out a victim “five, six, seven, eight years younger than him.” But the district court stated that a stay of adjudication should be granted “in those cases where we feel certain that a child will be able to complete that stay, will be able to complete all of the orders of the court to the letter perfectly and that the child will not re-offend.” The district court then refused to stay the adjudication because appellant is “a child who has demonstrated he has violated the law in the past. This is a child who has demonstrated that he cannot complete court orders in a timely manner.”
While we might have reached a different conclusion, this court defers to the district court when there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court’s findings and those findings support the district court’s conclusion. Stiff v. Associated Sewing Supply Co., 436 N.W.2d 777, 779–80 (Minn. 1989). We conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court’s findings, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to stay appellant’s delinquency adjudication for third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Finally, appellant argues that requiring juveniles adjudicated delinquent of felony-level criminal sexual conduct to register as sex offenders under Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (Supp. 2005) violates due process. This court has previously addressed and rejected this argument. Welfare of J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d at 249 (holding constitutional the registration requirement for juveniles younger than age 14); In re Welfare of C.D.N., 559 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Minn. App. 1997) (holding that registration statute as applied to juveniles does not violate due process and is not inconsistent with rehabilitative purpose of juvenile court system), review denied (Minn. May 20, 1997).
Appellant argues that the consequences of his adjudication resemble punishment because failure to register is a felony that carries a mandatory prison sentence of a year and a day. But the supreme court has held that predatory registration requirements do not violate due process because “they are civil and regulatory in nature and are imposed in the interest of public safety.” Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 905 (Minn. 2002).
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 It is unusual, however, that respondent chose to pursue this matter as a contempt proceeding rather than a violation of probation under the Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure, especially since appellant had completed the required community service by the date of the contempt hearing. That said, we are aware of nothing that prevents respondent from doing so. See State ex rel. L.E.A. v. Hammergren, 294 N.W.2d 705, 706 (Minn. 1980) (holding that “[j]uvenile courts have the authority to find a juvenile in contempt of court and to impose appropriate sanctions”).
>See State ex rel. L.E.A. v. Hammergren, 294 N.W.2d 705, 706 (Minn. 1980) (holding that “[j]uvenile courts have the authority to find a juvenile in contempt of court and to impose appropriate sanctions”).