This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Anoka County District Court
File No. K1-46690
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 1800
Robert M.A. Johnson,
Considered and decided by Minge, Presiding Judge; Wright, Judge; and Collins, Judge.*
Appellant challenges his judgment of conviction for solicitation, inducement, and promotion of prostitution, contending that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.
Appellant Jermaine Dickerson was charged with solicitation, inducement, and promotion of prostitution in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1(2), (3) (2002). These charges stem from incidents involving a 16-year-old girl that occurred in the spring of 2004. Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to the charges in exchange for a sentencing departure. The district court accepted the guilty plea.
Prior to sentencing, appellant moved the district court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea, contending that he “did not fully understand the consequences stemming out of the plea agreement,” that he “did not have adequate time in which to consider and evaluate the consequences of the plea offer,” and that his “public defender did not know the consequences of the plea offer.” At a subsequent hearing on the motion, the district court requested that appellant clarify the grounds for his motion and file a waiver of his attorney-client privilege if his motion was based on inadequacy of counsel.
then filed a memorandum of law with the district court in support of his
motion, arguing that his guilty plea was neither accurate nor voluntary. Appellant represented that “he told his
attorney he didn’t believe he could get a fair trial in
After several hearings, the district court denied appellant’s motion and sentenced him. This appeal follows.
issue in this case is whether the district court abused its discretion by
refusing to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea. We review the district court’s decision
whether to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. Barragan
v. State, 583 N.W.2d 571, 572 (
to sentencing, a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea “if it is fair and just
to do so.”
valid guilty plea has three requisites; “it must be accurate, voluntary[,] and
intelligent (i.e., knowingly and understandingly made).” State
v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (
contends that the district court should have granted his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea prior to sentencing because he “felt pressured and pushed,” and was
“tricked . . . into accepting the plea.”
Specifically, appellant claims his guilty plea was involuntary because
he “was told that he could not receive a fair trial in
appellant provides little context in which we can review these statements. On appeal he contends that he “was told”
he could not get a fair trial. (Emphasis
added.) But in a motion to the district
court, appellant explained that “he told his attorney he didn’t believe he
could get a fair trial in
We note that appellant signed a plea petition, indicating that he understood his trial rights. He also agreed that he had not been coerced into entering the guilty plea. Specifically, appellant agreed that:
a. No one – including my attorney, any police officer, prosecutor, judge, or any other person – has made any promises to me . . . in order to obtain a plea of guilty from me.
b. No one – including my attorney, any police officer, prosecutor, judge, or any other person – has threatened me . . . in order to obtain a plea of guilty from me.
Appellant indicated that he had had enough time to discuss the case with his attorney, was satisfied that his attorney was fully informed regarding the facts of the case, and was satisfied with the representation he received.
At the plea hearing, responding to his attorney’s questioning under oath, appellant indicated that he desired to plead guilty. He indicated that he had reviewed the plea petition with his attorney. And when questioned by the district court, appellant indicated that he understood his rights, that he had been able to discuss the case with his attorney, and that his attorney had answered his questions to his satisfaction. Based on appellant’s voluntary statements that he was knowingly and voluntarily entering the guilty plea, and without any more detail about what are otherwise vague and generalized apprehensions of prejudice, appellant has not shown that withdrawal of his guilty plea was necessary.
The district court also considered whether allowing appellant to withdraw his guilty plea would prejudice the state. When evaluating whether plea withdrawal is “fair and just,” the district court may consider the interests of the victim. Kim, 434 N.W.2d at 267. This case involves a girl who was a minor at the time of the crime, who the district court referred to as a “vulnerable victim.” The crime took place in 2004, and the witnesses’ memories, affecting the strength of the state’s case, have likely diminished in the time that has passed since the offense. The prosecution indicated that the vulnerable victim might not now be able to participate in a trial. Allowing appellant to withdraw his guilty plea creates potential problems for the prosecution.
Based on this record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea under the “fair and just” standard.
criminal rules also provide that a district court “shall allow a defendant to
withdraw [his] plea” at any time before or after sentencing, when “withdrawal
is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”
* Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is not raised on appeal. Although we do not have transcripts of the pertinent hearings to review on appeal, it appears that appellant never waived his attorney-client privilege. The record indicates that the district court eventually concluded that appellant’s failure to waive his attorney-client privilege constituted a waiver of the claim.