This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Jason Edward Johnson,
Lemario Javaise Jones,
Abdikhafar Abdukadir Mumin,
Filed June 19, 2007
Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 06061875, 06070247, 06066882, 06067082
Lori Swanson, Attorney General,
Michael O. Freeman,
Leonardo Castro, Hennepin County Public Defender, Peter W. Gorman, Assistant Public Defender, 317 Second Avenue South, Suite 200, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401 (for respondents);
Jeffrey J. Keyes, Briggs and
Morgan, P.A., 2200 IDS Center,
Teresa Jo Nelson, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, 450 North Syndicate Street, Suite 230, St. Paul, Minnesota 55104 (for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota)
Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Hudson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
In these consolidated appeals, appellant state challenges the district courts’ decisions to dismiss charges against respondents Dwayne Hutchinson, Jason Edward Johnson, Lemario Javaise Jones, and Abdikhafar Abdukadir Mumin for third-degree controlled-substance crime, sale or aiding and abetting the sale of cocaine. Appellant argues that the district courts erred by concluding that the third-degree controlled-substance statute, Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 1(1) (2004), violates respondents’ equal-protection rights as applied. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
D E C I S I O N
appeal presents the identical legal issue decided by this court in State v. Richmond, 730 N.W.2d 62 (Minn.
App. 2007), and followed by this court in State
v. Holliday, No. A06-2249, 2007 WL 1191824
On appeal, this court reviewed the statutory scheme
for controlled-substance offenses and construed the third-degree offense to be
more specific than the fourth-degree offense.
parties do not dispute that the context of this appeal is identical to that of the
On this appeal from the district courts’
dismissals of the third-degree charges against respondents, the parties substantially
rely on the briefs. Because the
arguments are identical to the arguments submitted in the Holliday appeal, and because
Respondents and amicus curiae present additional
argument in support of the district courts’ dismissal decisions. But the Richmond opinion demonstrates that this court considered all issues
raised by, and even issues not raised by, respondents and amicus curiae: the court considered a facial challenge to the
third-degree controlled-substance statute, the government’s basis for the
entire controlled-substance-crime statutory scheme, the need for evidence of
dissimilarly treated defendants only in the context of the as-applied challenge,
and precedent supporting application of Minnesota precedent, particularly that
supporting broader application of Minnesota’s constitutional protections. Therefore,
we conclude that respondents and amicus curiae have not presented new or
different arguments or precedent requiring this court to deviate from the
Reversed and remanded.