This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of the Welfare of: H.V.
Winona County District Court
File No. J70550309
John M. Stuart, Minnesota Public Defender, Jodie L. Carlson, Assistant Public Defender, Suite 425, 2221 University Avenue Southeast, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and
Charles E. MacLean,
Considered and decided by Stoneburner, Presiding Judge; Dietzen, Judge; and Worke, Judge.
Appellant, a juvenile adjudicated delinquent by reason of having committed third-degree criminal sexual conduct, argues that the mandatory registration requirement as applied to juveniles violates the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the separation-of-powers doctrine. Because we find no merit in appellant’s legal arguments, we affirm.
Appellant H.V., whose date of birth is December 6, 1988, engaged in consensual-sexual intercourse with K.L.S., whose date of birth is March 18, 1991. At the time of the contact, H.V. was 15 years old, and K.L.S. was 13 years old. Respondent state filed a delinquency petition alleging that H.V. committed third-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (2004), which criminalizes sexual penetration of a person who is at least 13 years old but less than 16 years old by a person who is more than 24 months older. Adjudication for the offense charged triggers mandatory registration as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1(a)(1)(iii) (2004).
H.V. requested a jury trial, arguing that the registration requirement constitutes criminal punishment, which, under the Sixth Amendment, cannot constitutionally be imposed on him without a jury trial. The district court denied H.V.’s request for a jury trial, noting that “courts have consistently held adult registration requirements not to be punitive because they serve the regulatory purpose of assisting police in their investigations.”
The matter was submitted to the
district court under State v. Lothenbach,
296 N.W.2d 854 (
A person adjudicated delinquent for
violating Minn. Stat. § 603.344 (2004), is required to register as a
predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1(a)(1)(iii)
(2004). When a juvenile who is required
to register becomes subject to a juvenile court disposition, the court shall inform
the juvenile of the duty to register and, “if the [juvenile] fails to comply
with the registration requirements, information about the offender may be made
available to the public through electronic, computerized, or other accessible
means.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 2 (2004). The court is precluded
from modifying the juvenile’s duty to register.
H.V. argues that the statute, as
applied to juveniles, unconstitutionally violates due-process rights, the right
to a jury trial, and the separation-of-powers doctrine. The constitutionality of a statute is
reviewed de novo. State v. Barnes, 713 N.W.2d 325, 330 (
I. Due Process and Sixth Amendment rights
H.V.’s due-process and Sixth Amendment arguments overlap, and we will address them together. H.V. argues that the registration statute is punitive as applied to juveniles and frames the issue as “whether the process that is due a juvenile—a court trial instead of a jury trial—is sufficiently reliable to use as a basis for imposing a sentencing condition.” We previously addressed this argument in In re Welfare of C.D.N., 559 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. May 20, 1997).
was a consolidated appeal involving two juveniles who asserted, as does H.V.,
that Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (1996), violated their right to due process
“because it imposes an adult sanction without providing them the right to a
jury trial, a significant procedural safeguard available in the adult court
system.” 559 N.W.2d at 433. In C.D.N.,
we held that the registration statute, as applied to juveniles who are
adjudicated delinquent for listed offenses without jury trials, does not
violate due-process rights.
Appellant acknowledges the authority of C.D.N. but argues that the holding should be revisited because changes in the registration statute enacted after that decision was issued have rendered the statute punitive, triggering the constitutional right to a jury determination before the requirement can be imposed. Despite the statutory changes, however, the supreme court and this court have continued to hold that the statute is not punitive and does not trigger fundamental rights.
In 1999, the supreme court addressed
a constitutional challenge to the registration requirement imposed on an adult
defendant who had been charged with, but not convicted of, criminal sexual
conduct in the third degree. Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711,
supreme court, noting that it had previously recognized the presumption of
innocence as a fundamental right that only applies to statutes which are
punitive or criminal in nature, determined that the registration statute “is a
civil, regulatory statute” that does not implicate fundamental rights.
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment – retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 717 (quotation omitted).
In 2002, the supreme court,
referencing Boutin and the Kennedy factors, reaffirmed its holding
that predatory-offender registration for adult criminal defendants “is a
regulatory rather than punitive consequence.”
Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d
900, 905 & n.9, 907 (
Very recently, a plurality of the
Minnesota Supreme Court narrowed the characterization of the registration
statute as it applies to enrolled tribal members who live on a
reservation. State v. Jones, 729 N.W.2d 1, 2-3, 12 (
We conclude that Jones does not diminish the authority of Boutin, Kaiser, and C.D.N. The registration statute, in the context of whether it triggers constitutional rights associated with criminal prosecutions, is civil/regulatory in nature and does not trigger the constitutional rights asserted by H.V. in this case.
H.V. also argues that “[b]ecause the
registration requirement imposes additional punishment on a juvenile based on
the court’s finding that the juvenile committed a registrable offense,” it
constitutes a sentence enhancement for which a jury needs to determine the
facts under Apprendi v.
II. Separation of Powers
H.V. argues, for the first time on
appeal, that the registration requirement violates the separation-of-powers
doctrine because “it interferes with the court’s discretion to impose
appropriate sentencing conditions.”
Generally, this court will not consider issues that were not initially
raised in the district court. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (
Article III, Section 1, of the
Minnesota Constitution provides: “The powers of government shall be divided
into three distinct departments: legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or
constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly
belonging to either of the others except in the instances expressly provided in
this constitution.” “Due respect for
coequal branches of government requires [courts] to exercise great restraint in
considering the constitutionality of statutes particularly when the
consideration involves what is a legislative function and what is a judicial
function.” State v. Losh, 721 N.W.2d 886, 891 (
As discussed in some detail above,
the registration requirement is not punitive, and is not a sentence or a
sentence enhancement. Although the
registration statute requires the sentencing court to give a defendant notice
of the duty to register and prohibits the court from modifying a defendant’s
duty to register, the statute further provides that if the court does not give
notice to the defendant, the assigned corrections agent shall notify the
defendant of the duty to register.
Although the legislature has twice declined our invitation to reexamine the wisdom of imposing predatory offender registration on all juveniles adjudicated of predicate offenses, we nonetheless reissue the invitation, particularly in the context of cases such as this one in which there is record evidence that the juvenile delinquent is not a sexual predator.
 The BCA has a website that lists the noncompliant predatory offenders. https://por.state.mn.us (last visited May 22, 2007). The website allows the public to search for offenders by name, age, or location.